The Rise and Imminent Fall of Naxalist Insurgency in India

The rise of the Naxalite movement in India took birth on 18 May 1967 in Naxalbari village in Siliguri sub-division in Darjeeling district of West Bengal, in an attempt to protect the rights of poor peasants who were the landholders victimized by the local zamindars. This was an armed conflict waged by Left-Wing Extremists groups following a Maoist ideology. They claimed to be fighting a rural people's war against the Indian Government. This uprising was spearheaded by Communist Party of India (Marxist) members Charu Majumdar, Kanu Sanyal and Jangal Santhal, known as the "Siliguri group", who later formed a Marxist-Leninist faction that later splintered into smaller groups. In 1969, the formation of Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) took place. It inspired similar movements in Odisha, Madhya Pradesh, Andhra Pradesh and Kerala. Though the first wave of insurgent violence badly failed to yield the desired results, the movement remained alive altogether. In the early 1980s, the rise of insurgency was witnessed in South India, and on 22 April 1980, the Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) People's War, commonly called People's War Group, was founded by Kondapalli Seetharamaiah. By the early 1980s, the insurgents had established a stronghold and sanctuary along the Andhra Pradesh-Orissa border. The PWG cadre were told to reject parliamentary democracy and aim at setting up a “people's war". ‘’This group, in fact, was one from a family of brothers and sisters in arms who all traced their parentage to the uprising in the north Bengal village of Naxalbari under Charu Majumdar. The cadres occupied space in India's heart of darkness, much of it in remote, underdeveloped, and tribal-dominated regions, stretching north almost crescent-like from Andhra Pradesh through the forests of eastern Maharashtra, south-east Madhya Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Odisha, Jharkhand, and Bihar before slipping into Nepal. They even had a name for it: The “Compact Revolutionary Zone that will feed the final insurrection” to overthrow the state.”1

Further, on December 2, 2000, the armed wing of the Maoists, called the People's Liberation Guerrilla Army, was founded. It was equipped with small arms. In September 2004, the CPI-Maoist was founded as a result of the merger of the People's War Group and the Maoist Communist Centre of India. In June 2009, the Centre banned the CPI (Maoist) and its front organizations under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967. In the meantime, violent clashes with the paramilitary forces and the police continued, in which thousands of civilians as well as the personnel from the forces lost their lives. The trend is continuing in limited areas and with less intensity.

The Latest Blow to the Naxalite Movement

On 18th November 2025, the top Maoist leader Madvi Hidma, 50, was killed in an encounter with the Andhra Pradesh police at Maredumilli forest near the tri-junction of Andhra Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, and Odisha. Along with him, his wife Madakam Raje, 44, and four other Maoists were killed. His killing has dealt a crippling blow to the Left-Wing Extremism movement in India. Hidma carried a reward of Rs 1 crore on his head, while his wife carried a reward of Rs 50 lakh on her head. The significance of his death is well-expressed in the words of Inspector General of Police, Bastar Range, Sundarraj P, when he said: “It is a historic and decisive day for the security forces on the anti-Naxal front. Hidma's death marks one of the most decisive breakthroughs in the history of anti-Naxal operations, not only for Chhattisgarh, Andhra Pradesh, and Telangana, but for the entire nation.”2 He was the commander of the People's Liberation Guerrilla Army, Battalion 1, the most lethal striking unit of CPI (Maoist). According to police records, “his name appeared as responsible for multiple major Maoist attacks, including the 2010 attack near Tadmetla in which 76 security personnel were killed, the 2013 Darbha or Jhiram Valley ambush that wiped out almost the entire Chhattisgarh Congress leadership, the 2017 Burkapal attack and connected strikes in Sukma that led to a large number of security casualties, and the 2021 encounter near Tarrem on the Sukma-Bijapur border where security forces faced heavy resistance and casualties.”3 His death is also significant because he was an Adivasi and belonged to the younger generation of leaders groomed to lead the organization. He represented the section that refused to forgo armed struggle and join the political mainstream. “His death will hopefully influence those underground to explore peace options rather than fall to bullets in a losing battle of ideas and firepower.”4

Initiatives Taken by the Centre and States to Curb the Insurgency

In Chhattisgarh State, since 2019, several police camps have been opened, including 87 such camps in core areas of the Maoists. These camps provided much-needed security and administrative presence of the State. The distance between the two camps has been reduced from 45 km to 20 km, at places even to 10 km. That provided a certain level of consistency to security operations.5

The formation of the District Reserve Guard or the Bastaria battalion, consisting of tribal communities. The unceasing conflict gave way to the weaponization of tribal society. They are now killing the Maoist tribals. The choice for the tribals has shrunk now to two extremes only: either to be with the Maoists or with the State. ‘’The tribals were lured to participate in the insurgency to protect their jal-jangal-zameen (water, forests, and land) and ended up suffering, displacement, and a lack of development.”6

In Andhra Pradesh, Greyhounds was set up in 1989 by KS Vyas (within the Andhra Pradesh police). This was a deputation force of people who used to come and go. They were given about 14 weeks of training in jungle warfare. One of the reasons for Greyhound’s success was also the type of intelligence input provided by the Subsidiary Intelligence Bureau (SIB) and the State police in jungle tactics.7

Rehabilitation Policies

Rehabilitation policies for surrendered Naxals also played a major part in bringing peace to the insurgency-afflicted regions. Rehabilitation policies started long ago in Andhra Pradesh. In the early days, the surrendered Naxals would get Rs . 5 lakh to settle down. Those who wanted to study were helped back into college. An important leader became an engineer and a successful contractor. Others became doctors after going to medical colleges. Skill development and factory employment were also given priority. In Andhra Pradesh, a scheme, Remote and Interior Area Development (RIAD), came in handy to surrender Naxals who were integrated through these programmes. A lot of other initiatives have been envisaged by the successive governments to absorb ex-Naxals into the mainstream. Maharashtra too has a strong rehabilitation policy for such people.8

The Aftermath of Insurgency

On April 5, 2025, the Union Home Minister Amit Shah, while speaking on the occasion of “Bastar Pandum” in Dantewada, said, “Even today, I have come to request all Naxalite brothers, those who have arms in their hands and those who don't, that you lay down arms, join the mainstream. You are our own. No one is happy when a Naxalite is killed, but this region wants development……” However, this message fell on the deaf ears of Naxal leaders who are still fighting a losing battle against the nation. The results are quite obvious: "As per media reports, over the past 25 years, Chhattisgarh has seen 3,404 armed encounters, in which 1,541 Maoists, 1,315 security personnel, and 1,817 civilians (mainly tribals) were killed. The data underlines the stories of uprooted families and scorched villages.”9 According to another data available on the South Asia Terrorism Portal, the same number of Maoists were killed (143) between May 21 last year and November 18 this year (144) while the number of civilians killed fell from 49 last year to 27 this year during the same period.10 Besides that, in the last year (2024) alone, 1,850 Maoists have surrendered and renounced violence.11

The Shrinking Maoist Base: Causes

The strategy of exploitation of the tribal aspirations for the ulterior motives of the Maoists stands exposed. They started taking up tribal issues in the hope of garnering the support of the local tribal population for sustenance.
The first issue was related to the wages paid for the collection of tendu patta (leaf of the tendu tree), which is used to make beedis. The Maoists started to negotiate better rates for the collection of tendu patta, as the tribals depended very much on it for their livelihood. Along with that, they also started extorting money from the tendu contractors. It resulted in diminished tribal earnings.
The Maoists also began to extort money from mining corporations operating in the area.
In the process, they started spending most of their time running their organization, launching attacks, and preserving cadres. Resultantly, they deviated from their promise to fight for the tribal cause.12
Maoists started to generate a sumptuous amount of revenue from their industry of protection, kidnapping, and indirect taxation. “It is reported that more than 50% of the income generated was allocated for military capability building, obviously at the cost of other developmental agendas-establishing the priorities in the name of revolution.”13
The Maoists would often indulge in controlling the elections and functioning of the village body, the gram sabha (GS), to suit their requirements. Factually, they preferred to govern the areas under their control through arbitrary kangaroo courts.14

Thus, it is clear that the Maoists preferred to tread on an exploitative path regarding the poor tribals by first arousing their aspirations and then riding roughshod over them. This strategy gradually eroded their tribal base and weakened the whole edifice of the Maoists’ rhetoric.

Undoubtedly, Naxalism in India is facing the grave danger of extinction. The Union Home Minister Amit Shah has set the deadline of March 31, 2026, for this purpose, and given the current trend, this target is not impossible to achieve. However, at the same time, it poses a big challenge for the Central and State governments to fill the possible vacuum created by the vanishing Maoists in the region. On one hand, the remaining splinter groups of the Maoists need to be brought under the democratic polity of the country through negotiation or by the use of optimum power. But more important is that the governments have to cater to the tribal aspirations as far as possible in the least possible time. They need houses to live in, rations to eat, schools to send their children and means of livelihood to fend for themselves. The security angle is also an important denominator. A reconstruction of broken trust is the toughest job for the lawmakers, and it needs fresh and constructive thinking. The road ahead is full of obstructions, and a test of willpower lies ahead for the politicians and the administrators alike. Only then will the longstanding problem of Naxalite insurgency be rooted out in due course of time. Let us not forget that socio-economic inequity is the root cause of such insurgencies, and in order to avoid the prevailing situation, its removal is the only alternative left for the governments.

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