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Fifteen years on one recruitment notice

On 3 November 2011, the Karnataka Public Service Commission (KPSC) invited applications for 362 Group A and Group B gazetted probationer posts. The response was enormous: 138,307 people applied, 91,667 sat the preliminary examination, 6,211 reached the main examination, and 1,090 were called for interview. For thousands of applicants, this was the beginning of a possible career in public service. For some, it became a wait that would outlast the recruitment cycle by more than a decade. The final selection did not survive. Complaints about irregularities led the State government to withhold the final list and refer the matter to the Criminal Investigation Department (CID). The inquiry revealed serious manipulation, corruption and nepotism involving officials of the Commission. The recruitment was cancelled. The cancellation was challenged, examined by the Karnataka Administrative Tribunal and the High Court, and ultimately left undisturbed by the Supreme Court in 2018.

That should have been the end of the selection. It was not. In 2022, the Karnataka legislature enacted a law declaring the 2011 selection valid and directing the government to issue appointment orders. One hundred and ninety-one people were appointed under that law. On 29 October 2026, the Supreme Court struck the law down and held that the appointments made under it would come to an end. It directed fresh recruitment for the vacant posts, with a one-time age relaxation for specified affected candidates (Srinivasa T. v. State of Karnataka, 2026).

The judgment settled a constitutional question, but it also exposed a more uncomfortable failure. A recruitment process that began with a public promise of merit had become a fifteen-year dispute over cancellation, validation, appointment and, finally, cancellation again. The people caught in that sequence were not all in the same position. Some had continued litigating. Some had been appointed. Some were found tainted; others were not. None could recover the years already spent waiting for the State to reach a lawful conclusion.

How the selection lost credibility

The Supreme Court's 2018 order in Avinash C. v. State of Karnataka records the concerns that undermined the selection. The High Court had considered call details between candidates and members of the KPSC, the awarding of identical interview marks and evidence suggesting that the interview process lacked an objective assessment. The Supreme Court noted that 566 candidates had received the same marks in circumstances that appeared predetermined. It also referred to the replacement of the digital video recorder in the Commission's building, which the record treated as an attempt to destroy evidence (Avinash C. v. State of Karnataka, 2018).

These were not minor defects in paperwork. The concern was that the selection process itself had lost credibility. The Supreme Court declined to interfere with the High Court's conclusion that the recruitment could not be sustained. It also rejected the suggestion that it would necessarily be possible to separate candidates considered tainted from those not individually implicated: where the process itself is compromised, dividing the list may not restore its integrity. The Court did leave open a limited question about whether the written examination could be preserved and the process resumed from the interview stage, if the written examination was found free from blemish. That route was later pursued before the High Court and did not succeed. The 2026 judgment records that the later attempt to restart the recruitment from the written-examination results was also unsuccessful. By then, the judicial record had repeatedly treated the selection as vitiated by serious irregularities, not merely as an administrative exercise that had been cancelled for convenience.

The law that tried to bring the list back

The Karnataka Civil Services (Validation of Selection and Appointment of 2011 Batch Gazetted Probationers) Act, 2022 was presented as a measure to provide justice to candidates who, according to its statement of objects and reasons, had not been responsible for the misconduct under investigation. The argument had an understandable human appeal: if officials and intermediaries were responsible for wrongdoing, why should candidates who had not been charged suffer the consequences?

But Section 3 did more than offer relief to individuals. It began with a clause overriding any contrary judgment, decree or order of a court, tribunal or authority. It declared the KPSC selection valid, cancelled the State's earlier orders withdrawing the recruitment, directed the issue of appointment orders according to the selection list, and restricted proceedings to review appointments made under the Act. It also said that no court should enforce an order directing a review contrary to the statute (Karnataka Act No. 14 of 2022).

That wording matters. A law intended to correct a defect would ordinarily identify what the defect was and change the legal rule that produced it. This Act instead attempted to reverse the cancellation itself, even though the cancellation had already survived judicial scrutiny. It did not explain how the underlying findings about the selection process had been removed. The difference between those two approaches became decisive in the Supreme Court's judgment.

The constitutional line between validation and overruling

The Constitution gives legislatures substantial authority to make laws, including laws that operate retrospectively where the subject and constitutional limits permit. The power is not unlimited. When a court invalidates an action because the law supporting it contains a defect, a legislature may sometimes amend that law retrospectively and remove the defect. If the legal foundation genuinely changes, the consequences of the earlier judgment may also change. This is the principle commonly described as legislative validation.

What a legislature cannot do is sit as an appellate court over a final judicial decision. It cannot simply declare that a judgment will no longer have effect while leaving the legal and factual basis of that judgment untouched. The distinction is not technical wordplay. It protects the separation of powers and ensures that judicial review is not reduced to advice that the government may disregard whenever it dislikes the result.

In its 29 October judgment, the Supreme Court relied on established decisions to explain that boundary. Janapada Sabha, Chhindwara v. Central Provinces Syndicate recognised that a legislature may, within limits, change the law retrospectively and cure the defect on which a judgment rests, but may not render the judgment ineffective by declaration alone. In re: Cauvery Water Disputes Tribunal warned that allowing a State legislature to override a judicial decision would threaten the rule of law. S.T. Sadiq v. State of Kerala likewise distinguished changing the legal basis of a decision from directly annulling the decision itself. Applying those principles, the Court found that the 2022 Act did not identify or cure any irregularity in the State's cancellation of the recruitment. The cancellation had been upheld by the High Court and the Supreme Court. The Act instead declared the selection valid, cancelled the orders that had withdrawn it and directed appointments. The State's own senior counsel, Kapil Sibal, told the Court that the legislation could not be supported. The Court held the Act unconstitutional and set aside the High Court orders that had sustained it (Srinivasa T. v. State of Karnataka, 2026).

This is why the phrase “validation is not absolution” is useful, provided it is understood carefully. Validation is not inherently unlawful. It becomes constitutionally objectionable when it is used as a substitute for curing the defect or as a device to nullify a judgment. A legislature can change the law. It cannot simply rewrite the result of a case between parties.

The March judgment and the October ruling

There is another part of the chronology worth understanding. On 23 March 2026, the Supreme Court decided State of Karnataka v. Santhosh Kumar C. The case concerned a candidate from the 2011 selection who had been appointed to one post and sought another post after the candidate selected for it did not complete the required pre-appointment formalities or join service. The Court held that the 1997 recruitment rules did not permit an additional or waiting list to be operated in that way. In explaining why the candidate had no automatic right to the vacant post, the Court referred to the 2022 Validation Act as evidence of the legislature's intention to give finality to the 2011 selection. It also said that the Act did not, by itself, conclude the entire controversy. The March case was about the operation of the recruitment rules and a claim to a particular vacancy; it was not a decision on the constitutional validity of the Act.

Seven months later, the Court directly considered that validity in Srinivasa T. The two judgments addressed different questions. The March decision did not approve the Act as constitutionally valid, and the October decision did not reverse a ruling on that issue. What changed was the question before the Court: first, whether a candidate could claim an unfilled post from the old list; later, whether the legislature could use the 2022 Act to restore a selection already cancelled by final judicial decisions. Keeping that distinction clear is essential to telling this story accurately.

The people left with the consequences

The 2026 judgment records that 46 of the 362 selected candidates were found tainted. Of the 191 people appointed under the 2022 Act, 14 were tainted. These figures describe different groups and should not be confused. Nor does the fact that a candidate was not found tainted mean that the appointment could automatically survive. The Court's reasoning was that the entire selection had been annulled and the appointments rested on a law that was unconstitutional.

Candidates who had not been found tainted argued that they should not lose their positions because they had not been named in the criminal case. The Court was not persuaded. It held that the prosecution's failure to result in a trial did not validate appointments that depended on the 2022 Act. Once the entire selection had been cancelled, the Court said there was no basis at this late stage to separate the tainted and untainted candidates by relying on the CID report. That conclusion does not amount to a finding that every appointee personally committed corruption. It means that the legal foundation for all those appointments had failed.

The six appellants faced a different loss. They had pursued the matter for years, and by 2026 they had crossed the ordinary age limit for consideration. The Court recognised that the passage of a decade and a half made it impractical to resume the old process from the stage before the irregularities were found. It therefore directed the State to notify fresh recruitment for the vacant Group A and Group B posts under the rules then in force. The six appellants, candidates in pending proceedings before the Karnataka Administrative Tribunal, and appointed candidates not found tainted were to receive a one-time age relaxation to compete alongside other eligible candidates. The relief was not an appointment by another name. Anyone selected in the fresh recruitment would receive seniority only from the date of the new appointment and no back wages or notional appointment for the earlier period. For people currently serving who are selected again, their earlier service would count towards pension and retirement benefits. The Court tried to address the practical consequences without treating the old selection as valid.

There is no easy way to describe what fifteen years means to a person who prepared for an examination, challenged an outcome, waited through litigation and then found that the only available remedy was to compete again. An age relaxation can reopen a door, but it cannot return the years in which that door remained shut. The same is true for an appointee who may have entered service under a law later struck down. The legal positions are different, but both reveal the cost of prolonged uncertainty.

What public recruitment must learn

The first lesson is that a public service commission must be able to preserve the evidence behind its decisions. Interview marks, evaluation records, communications, video footage and the reasons for selection should be retained under clear rules, with independent audit and secure access controls. In this case, the Supreme Court's earlier record referred to identical interview marks and the replacement of a digital video recorder. Recruitment systems should not depend on evidence that can disappear when scrutiny begins.

The immediate aftermath also shows why implementation must be watched carefully. On 4 November 2026, The Indian Express reported that Karnataka's Parliamentary Affairs and Legislation Department had advised the government to end appointments made under the invalidated Act and proceed with an open fresh recruitment. The report described departmental advice, not proof that every step had already been implemented. It also reported caution against a separate examination restricted to the 2011 candidates or continuing their appointments without the Supreme Court's permission (The Indian Express, 2026).

The second lesson is that recruitment litigation needs more effective case management. Courts cannot promise that every dispute will be resolved quickly, but public recruitment cases involving large numbers of candidates should be identified early, consolidated where appropriate and heard with a realistic timetable. Governments and commissions should also avoid changing their positions from one stage of litigation to another without explaining the legal basis for doing so.

Third, when a selection is cancelled, the authority should state clearly what happens to candidates who were not personally implicated, candidates whose results may be separable, and those who have already crossed the age limit because of the delay. Such a framework must remain consistent with the law and with the integrity of the recruitment process. It cannot guarantee appointment to an invalid selection, but it can prevent affected candidates from being left without a defined remedy for years.

Finally, any retrospective validation law should identify the precise legal defect it intends to cure and demonstrate how the new law removes that defect. A statement of sympathy for candidates is not enough. Nor is a clause declaring a selection valid despite contrary judicial orders. Legislative power is meaningful precisely because it can change legal rules; it is not a licence to decide that a final judgment should be ignored.

Justice cannot return the lost years

The Supreme Court's decision did not produce a perfect outcome. It could not. Some candidates will have to sit another examination; some appointments will end; and the State must now carry out a fresh process under existing rules. The judgment also leaves the government with the practical responsibility of implementing the directions and conducting recruitment without repeating the failures that brought the matter to court. The larger lesson is not that every candidate in a tainted selection is guilty, or that every retrospective law is unconstitutional. It is that public recruitment must be governed by rules that remain credible even when the outcome becomes inconvenient. A government may correct a legal defect through legislation, but it cannot use legislation to erase a judicial decision without changing the basis on which that decision was made.

The 2011 notification promised an opportunity to enter public service on merit. Fifteen years later, the Supreme Court had to order the State to begin again. The law could end the appointments and reopen the competition; it could not restore the time that candidates had lost. That is the cost of allowing public hiring to remain unresolved—and the reason a selection cannot be saved merely by declaring it valid.

References:

  1. Avinash C. v. State of Karnataka, Civil Appeal Nos. 3543–3555 of 2018 (Supreme Court of India, April 4, 2018). https://api.sci.gov.in
  2. In re: Cauvery Water Disputes Tribunal, 1993 Supp (1) SCC 96 (Supreme Court of India, 1993).
  3. Janapada Sabha, Chhindwara v. Central Provinces Syndicate Ltd., (1970) 1 SCC 509 (Supreme Court of India, 1970).
  4. Karnataka Civil Services (Validation of Selection and Appointment of 2011 Batch Gazetted Probationers) Act, 2022, Karnataka Act No. 14 of 2022. India Code. https://www.indiacode.nic.in
  5. Medical Council of India v. State of Kerala, (2019) 13 SCC 185 (Supreme Court of India, 2019).
  6. S.T. Sadiq v. State of Kerala, (2015) 4 SCC 400 (Supreme Court of India, 2015).
  7. State of Karnataka v. Santhosh Kumar C., 2026 INSC 276 (Supreme Court of India, March 23, 2026). https://api.sci.gov.in
  8. Srinivasa T. & Ors. v. State of Karnataka & Ors., 2026 INSC 1173 (Supreme Court of India, October 29, 2026). https://indiankanoon.org/doc/87266850/
  9. The Indian Express. (2026, November 4). Karnataka advised not to retain officials from tainted probationers’ batch. https://indianexpress.com

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