“It is also a matter of regret that Article 44 of our Constitution has remained a dead letter.” ~Justice Y.V. Chandrachud

1. The UCC at a Constitutional and Contemporary Crossroads

The Uniform Civil Code occupies a peculiar position within the Indian constitutional scheme. It is neither a Fundamental Right nor an immediately enforceable constitutional command. Article 44, located in Part IV under the Directive Principles of State Policy, provides that “the State shall endeavour to secure for the citizens a uniform civil code throughout the territory of India.” Article 37 makes the Directive Principles non-justiciable, while simultaneously declaring them fundamental in the governance of the country.

The constitutional question is not simply whether Article 44 should be implemented. It is also whether the contents of a proposed UCC would conform to the Fundamental Rights. A civil code dealing with marriage, divorce, succession, adoption or guardianship necessarily enters domains protected by equality, dignity, liberty, privacy and religious freedom. Consequently, Article 44 cannot operate in constitutional isolation. It must be read harmoniously with Articles 14, 15, 21 and 25.

The Supreme Court's decision in Sarla Mudgal v. Union of India, (1995) 3 SCC 635, remains one of the most frequently cited authorities in the UCC discourse. The Court examined the problem of Hindu husbands converting to Islam to contract another marriage without dissolving the first marriage. The Court held that such a second marriage was invalid and observed that Article 44 reflected an important constitutional objective. The judgment demonstrated that divergent personal laws can sometimes create situations in which individuals attempt to exploit differences between legal regimes.

The earlier decision in Mohd. Ahmed Khan v. Shah Bano Begum, (1985) 2 SCC 556, similarly brought personal law and gender justice into the constitutional spotlight. The Court recognised the right of a divorced Muslim woman to seek maintenance under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Although the subsequent legislative response generated intense controversy, the constitutional significance of Shah Bano lies in its recognition that civil consequences of marriage and divorce cannot be completely insulated from concerns of social justice.

Later jurisprudence has moved further towards a rights-centred understanding of personal law. In Shayara Bano v. Union of India, (2017) 9 SCC 1, the Supreme Court invalidated the practice of instant triple talaq. The judgment is important not because it established a UCC, but because it demonstrated that reform of personal-law practices can occur through constitutional adjudication even in the absence of a comprehensive common civil code.

The contemporary UCC debate therefore stands at a constitutional crossroads. On one side lies the Directive Principle of Article 44 and the aspiration for common civil standards. On the other lie India's plural traditions and constitutionally protected freedoms. Between them stands the individual—the woman seeking equality within marriage, the child seeking equal inheritance, the person seeking autonomy in intimate decisions, and the transgender person asking whether the legal family itself recognises their existence. The real constitutional challenge is therefore not merely to make civil law uniform. It is to make it just, inclusive and constitutionally legitimate.

2. From Article 44 to the 2029 Push: India’s Changing UCC Landscape

The history of the UCC demonstrates that constitutional principles often evolve through gradual legislative and judicial development rather than through a single transformative enactment. Article 44 was incorporated into the Constitution in 1950, but successive governments refrained from enacting a nationwide UCC. Instead, India witnessed sectoral reforms of personal laws, including the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955; Hindu Succession Act, 1956; Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956; and Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956.

The Law Commission has also periodically examined family-law reform. Its consultations have focused on questions of gender equality, discrimination and the reform of family laws rather than treating uniformity as the sole objective. The contemporary phase acquired concrete form with Uttarakhand. The Uttarakhand Legislative Assembly passed the Uniform Civil Code Bill in February 2024, and the State notified the legislation in March 2024. The Rules were subsequently framed in 2025, making Uttarakhand the first Indian State to operationalise a comprehensive UCC framework covering areas such as marriage, divorce, succession and related civil matters. The debate entered a new political phase in September 2026 when Union Home Minister Amit Shah announced that the UCC would be implemented in all BJP- and NDA-ruled States before the 2029 Lok Sabha elections. The announcement gave renewed momentum to the state-level approach.

The state route is constitutionally significant because marriage, divorce, adoption, wills, intestacy, succession and joint family matters fall within Entry 5 of the Concurrent List. Both Parliament and State Legislatures therefore possess legislative competence in these areas, subject to the constitutional framework and the operation of Article 254 in cases of repugnancy.

The result is a changing UCC landscape in which “the UCC” may not initially mean a single national statute. Different States may experiment with their own models. This creates an important conceptual problem: if several States enact different UCCs, can they collectively be called “uniform”?

The answer may depend upon what is meant by uniformity. Uniformity could mean identical statutory language, common minimum standards, or merely the replacement of religion-specific personal laws with religion-neutral civil rules. The distinction is crucial. The Uttarakhand experience has already demonstrated that implementation requires detailed administrative rules, registration mechanisms and procedural structures. Its official portal records substantial numbers of marriage and testamentary registrations and continues to publish amendments and government orders.

3. One Constitution, Different Civil Codes? The Federal Question

The Indian Constitution combines federalism with a strong national constitutional identity. The emergence of State-specific UCCs raises a difficult federal question: can the constitutional aspiration of a uniform civil code coexist with different State-level enactments? The answer begins with legislative competence. Personal-law subjects are situated within the Concurrent List, allowing both Parliament and State Legislatures to legislate. This constitutional arrangement reflects India's federal structure while permitting both national and regional responses to family law.

The Uttarakhand model demonstrates the possibility of State-level experimentation. Other States may choose different approaches because social practices, customary institutions, tribal traditions and demographic realities vary substantially. The Madhya Pradesh approach, for example, reportedly incorporates exceptions relating to Scheduled Tribes, reflecting the constitutional protection accorded to tribal customs and social institutions.⁷

This exposes an apparent paradox. A code described as “uniform” may itself contain exceptions. Yet constitutional equality does not necessarily require identical treatment in every circumstance. Article 14 prohibits arbitrary discrimination but permits reasonable classification. More importantly, substantive equality sometimes requires differentiated treatment of historically or constitutionally protected groups.

The Fifth and Sixth Schedules, Article 371-series provisions, and constitutional protections relating to Scheduled Tribes demonstrate that Indian constitutionalism has never treated cultural uniformity as an absolute value. Article 25 itself protects religious freedom subject to constitutional limitations, while Article 26 recognises denominational autonomy. Customary practices may also receive statutory or constitutional protection.

The federal question therefore requires a distinction between uniformity of principle and uniformity of detail. A national framework might prescribe equal inheritance rights, equal marital capacity, gender-neutral maintenance principles and minimum procedural safeguards while permitting limited cultural variation where constitutionally justified.

Excessive State-by-State divergence could create another problem. If marriage is valid under one State's UCC but subject to different conditions in another, citizens may encounter a fragmented civil-law environment. Inter-State marriages, succession disputes and migration could produce conflicts of law. Such fragmentation could undermine the very objective of simplification associated with a UCC.

A possible constitutional solution lies in identifying a common national floor of rights rather than demanding complete legislative identicalness. The constitutional objective should be equal civil status, while procedural and cultural details may accommodate legitimate diversity.

The federal structure thus need not be viewed as an obstacle to civil-law reform. It can serve as a testing ground. State experimentation may reveal what works, where administrative burdens arise, how communities respond and whether the law actually improves outcomes for women and marginalised groups. But experimentation must be accompanied by constitutional discipline. Federalism should not become a justification for unequal citizenship, nor should uniformity become a justification for suppressing legitimate diversity.

4. The Politics of Uniformity: Reform, Representation and Consensus

No discussion of the UCC can ignore its political dimension. Personal law is closely associated with religious identity, community institutions and historical experiences. Consequently, legal reform in this area inevitably raises questions of representation, trust and democratic legitimacy.

Supporters of the UCC generally present it as a means of establishing equal civil rights irrespective of religion and eliminating discriminatory practices. Critics, however, have raised concerns about the manner, timing and content of reform and have argued that a common code should not become a vehicle for majoritarian cultural standardisation.

Recent political debate illustrates these competing perspectives. The Union government and BJP leaders have publicly associated the UCC with equality and legal reform. Opposition parties and some community representatives have questioned the political approach and have raised concerns about consultation and possible effects upon minority identity. These are competing political positions rather than settled constitutional findings.

The Constitution itself provides a framework for navigating this conflict. Article 25 protects freedom of conscience and the freedom to profess, practise and propagate religion, but expressly subjects these rights to public order, morality, health and the other provisions of Part III. Article 25(2) further permits the State to regulate secular activities associated with religious practice and enact laws for social welfare and reform.

This distinction between religious belief and secular civil consequences has repeatedly informed constitutional jurisprudence. In John Vallamattom v. Union of India, (2003) 6 SCC 611, the Supreme Court invalidated Section 118 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925, finding discriminatory treatment of Christians in testamentary dispositions. The decision illustrates that a rule associated with a particular community does not automatically become immune from equality review.

At the same time, constitutional reform cannot be reduced to judicial invalidation. A sustainable UCC requires democratic legitimacy. Law governing intimate relations acquires legitimacy not merely through enactment but through social acceptance and effective implementation. The principle of constitutional morality becomes important here. Constitutional morality does not mean the eradication of social or religious diversity. Rather, it requires that individual rights remain protected even when social practices or majoritarian preferences point in another direction.

A meaningful consultation process should therefore include women from different communities, religious scholars, tribal communities, transgender persons, persons with disabilities, lawyers, academics, civil-society organisations and ordinary citizens. Consultation should not be treated as a procedural formality. The legitimacy of the UCC will ultimately depend upon whether citizens can see themselves within it. A code drafted without marginalised voices may be formally universal but socially incomplete.

5. Beyond Religious Personal Laws: UCC Through the Lens of Individual Rights

The most important conceptual shift in the UCC debate is from community-centred personal law to individual-centred constitutional rights. Traditional personal-law debates often ask whether a particular rule is authorised by religious doctrine or community custom. Constitutional law asks a different question: what rights does the individual possess against discrimination, deprivation of liberty and unequal civil status?

Article 14 guarantees equality before the law and equal protection of the laws. Article 15 prohibits discrimination on specified grounds, including sex and religion. Article 21 protects life and personal liberty. The Supreme Court has progressively interpreted Article 21 to include dignity, autonomy, privacy and decisional freedom.

In K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) v. Union of India, (2017) 10 SCC 1, the nine-judge Bench recognised privacy as a constitutionally protected right and linked privacy with dignity, autonomy and individual choice. The judgment specifically recognised the importance of personal decisions concerning family life, marriage, procreation and sexual orientation.

This constitutional development has direct implications for the UCC. Marriage is not simply a legal institution regulating property. It involves personal choice, bodily autonomy, companionship and family formation. Divorce involves economic security, dignity and the ability to exit an oppressive relationship. Succession determines economic independence and inter-generational power.

In Shafin Jahan v. Asokan K.M., (2018) 16 SCC 408, the Supreme Court held that an adult's choice of a life partner lies within the protected domain of personal liberty. Similarly, in Shakti Vahini v. Union of India, (2018) 7 SCC 192, the Court emphasised the constitutional protection of individual choice in marriage. These decisions indicate that the State's role is not merely to regulate family relations but to ensure that legal regulation does not destroy personal autonomy.

The UCC must therefore be evaluated through rights-based questions:

1. Does it guarantee equal capacity to marry?
2. Does it prevent discriminatory divorce practices?
3. Does it ensure equal inheritance?
4. Does it recognise the economic contribution of unpaid domestic labour?
5. Does it protect a deserted spouse from destitution?
6. Does it provide accessible remedies?
7. Does it recognise diverse family structures without unnecessary intrusion into private life?

These questions are more constitutionally meaningful than simply asking whether different communities are governed by identical rules.

The Supreme Court's judgment in Joseph Shine v. Union of India, (2019) 3 SCC 39, provides another important principle. The Court struck down the offence of adultery and rejected a paternalistic understanding of marriage in which women could be treated as subordinate or as the property of husbands. The judgment's emphasis on dignity, autonomy and gender equality is directly relevant to the design of contemporary family law.

A UCC founded upon individual rights would therefore not merely replace religious personal laws. It would transform the philosophical basis of family law-from status and community identity towards citizenship, equality and dignity.

6. Women and the UCC: From Formal Equality to Substantive Justice

Women are at the centre of the UCC debate because personal laws have historically regulated areas that profoundly influence women's economic and social position: marriage, divorce, maintenance, inheritance, guardianship and family property.

The mere existence of a common law does not automatically produce gender justice. Formal equality means that the same rule applies to everyone. Substantive equality asks whether the rule actually produces equal opportunities, autonomy and outcomes for persons situated within unequal social structures. This distinction is crucial. A formally gender-neutral inheritance law may operate unequally if women lack information about property rights. A formally equal divorce procedure may disadvantage women if litigation is financially inaccessible. A gender-neutral maintenance rule may become inadequate where one spouse has sacrificed employment for unpaid domestic labour.

The Supreme Court's family-law jurisprudence demonstrates the importance of substantive justice. Shah Bano recognised maintenance as a social-justice mechanism intended to prevent destitution. Danial Latifi v. Union of India, (2001) 7 SCC 740, subsequently interpreted the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986 in a manner that required a reasonable and fair provision for the divorced woman's future. The Court thereby preserved the statute while ensuring meaningful protection for the woman.

Shayara Bano further demonstrated that a personal-law practice could be tested against constitutional principles. The invalidation of instant triple talaq became a significant milestone in the constitutional discourse on gender equality.

The UCC should build upon this jurisprudence rather than merely codifying existing family law structures.

First, inheritance must be genuinely equal. Sons and daughters should possess equal succession rights, and marital status should not arbitrarily determine economic entitlement.

Second, marriage should be based upon free and informed consent. Legal rules should prevent child marriage, coercive marriage and fraudulent marital relationships.

Third, divorce should be accessible and non-discriminatory. A legal system that formally provides divorce but makes the remedy economically or procedurally inaccessible cannot claim substantive equality.

Fourth, maintenance should recognise economic vulnerability. The law must account for unpaid care work, interrupted careers, disability, age, childcare responsibilities and the economic consequences of marital breakdown.

Fifth, guardianship and parental responsibility should be based upon the best interests of the child rather than automatic preference for one gender.

Sixth, domestic violence and economic abuse must be addressed alongside family-law rights. Civil status cannot be separated from the conditions in which women actually live.

The UCC therefore presents an opportunity to move from equality in text to equality in lived experience. Its success should not be measured by how many personal laws it abolishes, but by whether fewer women lose homes, property, maintenance, parental rights or economic security because of the circumstances of their marriage.

7. Beyond the Binary: Transgender Rights and the Architecture of the UCC

The transgender question represents one of the most significant and least explored dimensions of the UCC debate. Much of traditional family law is drafted around binary categories-“husband” and “wife”, “man” and “woman”, “father” and “mother”. Yet constitutional jurisprudence has progressively recognised gender identity as an aspect of individual dignity and autonomy.

In National Legal Services Authority v. Union of India, (2014) 5 SCC 438, the Supreme Court recognised transgender persons as a constitutionally protected gender category and affirmed their entitlement to equality, dignity and fundamental rights. The judgment rejected the idea that constitutional rights depend upon conformity with traditional gender classifications. The decision is particularly important for the UCC because family law frequently determines legal status through gendered terminology.

If a future civil code is drafted entirely around a male-female marital structure, it risks creating a contradiction within constitutional law: transgender persons may possess constitutional recognition as equal citizens while the civil-law framework fails to recognise their family relationships adequately.

The Supreme Court's decision in Supriyo @ Supriya Chakraborty v. Union of India, 2023 INSC 920, is equally significant. The Constitution Bench did not recognise a fundamental right to marry for same-sex couples under the existing statutory framework, but it also made clear that statutory terms concerning marriage could not simply be interpreted to exclude transgender persons in heterosexual relationships merely because of their transgender identity. This distinction is critical. The constitutional question is not limited to same-sex marriage. It also concerns whether transgender persons are capable of participating equally in the institutions of marriage, family, inheritance and parenthood.

A future UCC should therefore consider gender-neutral terminology wherever constitutionally appropriate. Instead of relying exclusively upon “husband” and “wife”, legislation could use concepts such as “spouse” or “marital partners”, while retaining specific protections where biological or social realities justify them. Inheritance should not depend upon gender identity. Maintenance should be available to economically dependent spouses irrespective of sex or gender identity. Adoption and guardianship provisions should focus upon the welfare of the child and the suitability of the parent or guardian rather than stereotypical assumptions.

8. The Uttarakhand Model: A Laboratory for Gender-Inclusive Civil Law

Uttarakhand represents the first large-scale contemporary experiment with a comprehensive State-level UCC in India. The Uniform Civil Code, Uttarakhand, 2024 was passed by the State Legislature in February 2024 and notified in March 2024, while the Rules were subsequently brought into the administrative framework in 2025.

The significance of Uttarakhand lies not merely in the political symbolism of becoming the first State to implement a UCC, but in the fact that the constitutional debate has moved into practical administration. The Uttarakhand framework deals with marriage, divorce, succession and related matters and provides registration mechanisms. The State's official portal continues to record registrations and publish amendments, government orders and procedural material. This makes Uttarakhand a useful constitutional laboratory.

The first lesson is that legislative uniformity requires administrative infrastructure. A civil code cannot function effectively without registration authorities, accessible digital systems, grievance mechanisms, trained officials and judicial remedies.

The second lesson concerns privacy. When civil law requires citizens to register intimate family relationships or disclose personal information, safeguards against unnecessary disclosure become essential. This is particularly relevant to live-in relationships and vulnerable persons.

The third lesson concerns accessibility. Registration requirements that appear simple on paper may become burdensome for rural citizens, economically weaker persons, persons with disabilities and individuals lacking digital literacy.

The fourth lesson concerns gender. The effectiveness of a UCC cannot be established merely by demonstrating that women and men are governed by the same statutory provisions. Empirical evaluation must ask whether women actually obtain equal property, maintenance and decision-making rights.

The fifth lesson concerns transgender inclusion. A civil code must be assessed for the language it uses, the categories it creates and the administrative forms it requires. If a person must select only “male” or “female” to register a marriage or succession claim, formal constitutional recognition of transgender identity may become practically meaningless.

The Uttarakhand experience is therefore neither conclusive proof for nor against a nationwide UCC. It is an important empirical starting point. A constitutional laboratory should be judged through evidence: litigation patterns, administrative accessibility, women's economic outcomes, registration burdens, privacy complaints, implementation costs and experiences of marginalised communities. The first UCC experiment should therefore generate data for future law reform. The ultimate question is not whether Uttarakhand has achieved perfect uniformity. No law can achieve perfection at inception. The more meaningful question is whether the model can evolve through constitutional scrutiny, legislative amendment and empirical feedback.

9. Equality, Identity and Religious Freedom: The Constitutional Balancing Exercise

The most difficult constitutional problem surrounding the UCC is the relationship between equality and religious freedom. Article 25 protects freedom of conscience and the freedom to profess, practise and propagate religion. At the same time, the right is expressly subject to public order, morality, health and the other provisions of Part III. Article 25(2) also recognises the State's power to regulate secular activities associated with religious practice and enact social-welfare and reform legislation.

The constitutional structure therefore rejects two absolute propositions. The first would be that every personal-law rule is immune from constitutional scrutiny because it is connected with religion. The second would be that every practice associated with religion can automatically be replaced by a secular State rule. The correct approach requires constitutional balancing. John Vallamattom illustrates the first dimension: a statutory rule that discriminated against Christians in testamentary matters could not survive merely because it operated within a religious context. Shayara Bano demonstrates another dimension: a personal-law practice may be scrutinised through constitutional principles, including equality and non-arbitrariness. The challenge for a UCC is therefore to distinguish between religious identity and civil consequences.

The State need not determine what a citizen believes. It may, however, establish common civil consequences concerning inheritance, marital status, maintenance and legal capacity, provided such legislation satisfies constitutional requirements. This balancing exercise must also recognise minority rights. A constitutional democracy cannot define equality simply as the numerical majority's conception of uniformity. Equality must protect minorities against both legal discrimination and majoritarian cultural domination.

The concept of constitutional morality becomes especially important. It asks lawmakers to evaluate civil institutions against constitutional values rather than merely prevailing social morality. The Supreme Court's gender jurisprudence demonstrates this transformation. In Joseph Shine, the Court rejected a patriarchal understanding of marriage that treated the wife as subordinate to the husband. In NALSA, the Court rejected gender identity as a basis for exclusion from constitutional citizenship. Taken together, these decisions suggest that the constitutional future of personal law lies neither in unrestricted community autonomy nor in mechanical uniformity.

It lies in a model of constitutional pluralism: diversity may survive, but not at the cost of fundamental rights. The UCC should therefore establish common rights and protections while respecting legitimate religious freedom that does not produce constitutionally impermissible discrimination.

10. From Uniformity to Inclusion: Designing a UCC for a Diverse India

The final question is not whether India should choose uniformity or diversity. The deeper question is how India can construct a civil-law framework in which equality and diversity coexist without allowing either to become a justification for injustice. A future UCC should begin with constitutional principles rather than with the mechanical compilation of existing personal laws.

First, the code should be gender-neutral in structure but gender-sensitive in protection. Marriage, succession and guardianship should not presume male authority. At the same time, special protections may be necessary where women face structural disadvantage.

Second, inheritance rules should establish equal property rights. Economic equality within families is indispensable to meaningful gender equality.

Third, maintenance law should recognise the economic consequences of caregiving and domestic labour. Equality cannot mean pretending that all spouses enter marriage with identical economic resources.

Fourth, matrimonial remedies should be accessible, affordable and timely. Rights that can be exercised only through expensive and prolonged litigation remain incomplete rights.

Fifth, the code should recognise the constitutional autonomy of individuals. Adults should retain meaningful freedom regarding marriage, family formation and intimate relationships, subject to legitimate legal restrictions.

Sixth, transgender persons must be incorporated directly into the architecture of family law. The code should avoid unnecessary gender binaries and should ensure equal access to marriage-related rights, succession, maintenance, guardianship and other civil protections consistent with constitutional and statutory law.

Seventh, the code must protect privacy. Registration and digital governance should not turn intimate family relationships into unnecessarily public information. Puttaswamy requires that privacy, dignity and autonomy remain central considerations.

Eighth, tribal and customary communities require careful constitutional treatment. Cultural practices protected by the Constitution cannot simply be erased in the name of uniformity. At the same time, custom should not become an automatic shield for practices that violate fundamental rights.

Ninth, the process of drafting must be participatory. Women, religious minorities, tribal communities, transgender persons, persons with disabilities, legal experts and civil-society organisations must have meaningful opportunities to contribute.

Tenth, the implementation of a UCC should be evaluated through measurable outcomes. Legislators should ask whether women's property ownership has improved, whether maintenance orders are accessible, whether litigation has decreased, whether registration systems are usable, and whether marginalised citizens experience greater legal security.

India does not require a civil code merely because different communities presently follow different rules. It requires civil-law reform where differences create unjust inequalities, uncertainty, discrimination or denial of individual autonomy.

The ultimate test of a UCC will not be whether every Indian family follows identical ceremonies or cultural practices. The test will be whether every citizen enjoys equal civil status before the law. A woman should not become economically vulnerable because of the religion into which she was born. A daughter should not inherit less because of gender. A divorced spouse should not face destitution because of the personal law applicable to the marriage. A transgender person should not find the legal institution of family closed to them because legislation was drafted around an outdated binary. The constitutional promise of equality is larger than uniformity.

The Uniform Civil Code represents one of the most complex constitutional projects confronting contemporary India because it sits at the intersection of equality, religion, identity, federalism, gender and individual autonomy. Article 44 provides a constitutional direction, but its implementation cannot be separated from the Fundamental Rights guaranteed by Part III.

The history of Indian constitutional jurisprudence reveals that the relationship between personal law and constitutional rights has never been static. Shah Bano brought maintenance and gender justice into the constitutional discourse. Sarla Mudgal highlighted the complications arising from divergent personal-law regimes. John Vallamattom demonstrated that discriminatory civil provisions cannot be protected merely through religious association. Danial Latifi showed the importance of substantive protection for divorced women. Shayara Bano reaffirmed constitutional scrutiny of discriminatory personal-law practices. Puttaswamy placed privacy and autonomy at the centre of personal decision-making. NALSA transformed the constitutional recognition of transgender persons. Joseph Shine rejected patriarchal assumptions embedded within matrimonial relationships. Shafin Jahan protected individual choice in marriage, while Supriyo exposed the continuing complexities surrounding the legal recognition of diverse family relationships.

The emergence of Uttarakhand's UCC has transformed Article 44 from an essentially aspirational provision into a contemporary legislative experiment. The subsequent state-level movement demonstrates that India's UCC debate is likely to proceed through multiple constitutional and legislative laboratories rather than necessarily through one immediate national enactment.

But the pursuit of uniformity must not become an obsession with sameness. A uniform law can still be unjust. A formally neutral rule can still reproduce structural inequality. A gender neutral provision can still disadvantage those who bear unequal social burdens. A code drafted without transgender persons can be formally universal while remaining substantively exclusionary. Therefore, the future UCC should be evaluated through the constitutional principle of substantive equality. The question should not merely be: “Will every citizen be governed by the same law?”It should also be: Will every citizen have equal dignity?

References:

1. Constitution of India, Arts. 14, 15, 21, 25, 26, 37 and 44.
2. Mohd. Ahmed Khan v. Shah Bano Begum, (1985) 2 SCC 556.
3. Sarla Mudgal v. Union of India, (1995) 3 SCC 635.
4. Danial Latifi v. Union of India, (2001) 7 SCC 740.
5. John Vallamattom v. Union of India, (2003) 6 SCC 611.
6. National Legal Services Authority v. Union of India, (2014) 5 SCC 438. 
7. Shayara Bano v. Union of India, (2017) 9 SCC 1.
8. K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) v. Union of India, (2017) 10 SCC 1.
9. Joseph Shine v. Union of India, (2019) 3 SCC 39; Supriyo @ Supriya Chakraborty v. Union of India, 2023 INSC 920.
10. Law Commission of India, Consultation Paper on Reform of Family Law (2018); Government of Uttarakhand, Uniform Civil Code, Uttarakhand, 2024 and Uniform Civil Code Rules, 2025.

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