Part I — The War That Created an Opening

The Silk Letter Movement (Reshmi Rumal Tehrik) emerged during the First World War as one of the earliest attempts to internationalise India's struggle against British rule. While later freedom narratives often focus on Gandhi, Bhagat Singh, Subhas Chandra Bose and the INA, this movement represented an earlier effort to connect Indian anti-colonial activists with Afghanistan, the Ottoman Empire and Germany.

The opportunity arose from the First World War. Britain entered the war on 4 August 1914, drawing India's soldiers, money and resources into the imperial war effort. The Ottoman Empire joined the Central Powers in November 1914, while Germany was already fighting Britain. For many Indian Muslims, the Ottoman Sultan's position as Caliph added religious and political significance to the international situation. British enemies therefore appeared to offer possible support for an Indian uprising.

The central figure was Maulana Mahmud Hasan (1851–1920), a prominent scholar associated with Darul Uloom Deoband, founded in 1866. Influenced by the experience of colonial rule and the memory of the 1857 uprising, Mahmud Hasan developed opposition to British rule. However, it would be inaccurate to portray the entire Deoband institution or all its scholars as participants in the conspiracy.

Another key figure was Ubaidullah Sindhi, who became involved through the Deobandi network. The strategy required several countries to cooperate: India would become the centre of resistance, Afghanistan a possible military gateway, the Ottoman Empire a source of political and religious influence, and Germany a potential provider of diplomatic or material assistance.

In 1915, Ubaidullah Sindhi travelled to Kabul, while Mahmud Hasan went towards the Hijaz. In Kabul, Ubaidullah encountered the Niedermayer–Hentig Expedition, a German-Ottoman mission seeking to persuade Amir Habibullah Khan to oppose Britain. Although this created an important connection, Habibullah never simply accepted the revolutionary programme and maintained a cautious position.

On 1 December 1915, the Provisional Government of India was established in Kabul. Raja Mahendra Pratap became president, Maulana Barkatullah prime minister, and Ubaidullah Sindhi was associated with it as home minister. It had great symbolic importance but no territory in India, an independent army or guaranteed Afghan support.

Meanwhile, Mahmud Hasan sought Ottoman assistance in the Hijaz, where Ghalib Pasha, the Ottoman governor, became significant. Communications associated with him, including the Ghalibnama, were interpreted as encouragement. However, such documents did not prove that the Ottoman government had committed itself to a full-scale intervention in India.

The situation worsened in June 1916, when the Arab Revolt began under Sharif Husayn of Mecca. Ottoman control weakened, and British influence increased. Communication between Kabul and the Hijaz nevertheless continued. Plans were developed for an organisation called Junud al-Rabbaniyya (Army of God), intended to coordinate resources from Afghanistan, the Ottoman Empire and Persia. It remained largely a proposed organisation rather than a functioning international army.

The famous silk letters formed part of this secret communication network. Written on silk cloth, they were easier to conceal and transport. In 1916, British intelligence obtained the correspondence, allowing officials to connect individuals, places and political plans across the network.

British investigations were not immediately perfect. Cleveland's first note, dated 14 September 1916, even contained an initial mistake about the authorship of two letters, later corrected.

Thus, the Silk Letter Movement stood between ambitious political vision and limited practical capacity. Its organisers created international contacts and a provisional government, but depended on foreign powers with their own interests, lacked sufficient military resources and operated through vulnerable communication networks. Once the letters were discovered, the British intelligence investigation began tracing the network across India, Afghanistan and the Middle East, leading eventually to the confrontation with Mahmud Hasan and his associates.

Part II — Building a Revolution Across Borders

Kabul, the Ottoman World and the Search for Allies
When Ubaidullah Sindhi reached Kabul in 1915, Afghanistan became a crucial link between Indian revolutionaries and the international conflict of the First World War. Its geographical position offered the possibility of connecting resistance inside British India with political and military forces beyond India's north-western frontier. The revolutionaries hoped Afghan cooperation could provide a territorial base, political legitimacy and pressure against British India. Yet Amir Habibullah Khan maintained neutrality and was unwilling to risk Afghanistan's independence by openly confronting Britain.

The arrival of the German-Ottoman Niedermayer–Hentig Expedition in 1915 created new possibilities. The expedition sought to persuade the Afghan ruler to enter the war against Britain, while Ubaidullah attempted to connect this effort with the Indian independence movement. However, contact did not become a formal alliance. Habibullah continued balancing Afghan interests against British pressure and the uncertain prospects of the Central Powers.

Despite these limitations, the Kabul network achieved an important political development. On 1 December 1915, the Provisional Government of India was established in Kabul, with Raja Mahendra Pratap as president and Maulana Barkatullah as prime minister; Ubaidullah Sindhi was associated with it as home minister. The government controlled no Indian territory and possessed no independent army, but its symbolic importance was considerable. It attempted to present Indian independence as an international political question and sought support from Afghanistan, Germany, the Ottoman Empire and other potential allies.

Mahmud Hasan and the Ottoman Connection

While Ubaidullah worked in Kabul, Maulana Mahmud Hasan pursued support in the Hijaz. His journey in 1915 was based on the hope that the Ottoman authorities could assist the Indian struggle. Because the Ottoman Sultan was regarded by many Indian Muslims as the Caliph, the Ottoman connection carried both political and religious significance. Nevertheless, Ottoman leaders had their own wartime priorities and could not simply commit themselves to the Indian revolutionary programme.

An important figure in this connection was Ghalib Pasha, the Ottoman governor of the Hijaz. Mahmud Hasan and his associates sought support that could strengthen opposition to British rule in India. But the political situation changed dramatically in June 1916, when Sharif Husayn of Mecca launched the Arab Revolt against Ottoman rule with British support. The Ottoman position in the Hijaz weakened while British influence expanded, making Mahmud Hasan's mission increasingly difficult.

The movement's greatest weakness was therefore its dependence on actors with different objectives. Mahmud Hasan sought the end of British rule in India; Ubaidullah hoped Afghanistan would support the struggle; the Provisional Government wanted international recognition; Germany sought to weaken Britain during the war; the Ottoman Empire was fighting for its survival; and Afghanistan wanted to protect its own independence. Their interests sometimes overlapped, but they never formed a completely unified alliance.

For this reason, the Silk Letter Movement should not be portrayed as a fully operational international army waiting to invade India. The evidence demonstrates genuine diplomatic contacts, political planning and revolutionary ambition, but also incomplete organisation and dependence upon foreign governments.

The Architecture of the Silk Letter Network

By 1916, communication connected the different parts of the movement. Messages travelled between Kabul, the Hijaz and Indian contacts, carrying information about political plans and possible resistance. Some important messages were written on silk handkerchiefs, which could be folded and concealed more easily than ordinary documents. Ironically, the method chosen to protect the correspondence eventually helped British intelligence identify the conspiracy.

The surviving letters are valuable because they allow historians to examine the movement's actual plans rather than relying only on later memories. British intelligence did not immediately understand everything. Officials had to compare handwriting, names, journeys and reports from different locations. Cleveland's “First Note on the Silk Letters,” dated 14 September 1916, initially contained an error concerning the authorship of two letters. Both were written in Ubaidullah Sindhi's hand, leading investigators to attribute both to him; later evidence suggested that one had been written on behalf of Maulana Muhammad Mian Mansoor Ansari. This illustrates that British intelligence reconstructed the conspiracy gradually rather than possessing a complete picture from the beginning.

The correspondence nevertheless revealed enough to alarm the colonial government. It showed connections between Indian activists and political networks outside British India and referred to plans for an organisation associated with Junud al-Rabbaniyya, or the “Army of God.” The name could suggest a fully equipped army, but the surviving evidence does not support that interpretation. The organisation was primarily a revolutionary and political project whose military development depended upon circumstances that never materialised.

The British authorities nevertheless viewed the network seriously because it appeared within a wider wartime environment of anti-British activity. The Ghadar movement, for example, was also attempting to encourage rebellion among Indian soldiers. British officials feared that separate revolutionary networks might eventually connect during a global war when the empire was already under pressure.

The Silk Letters therefore became an important intelligence breakthrough. Once the correspondence was connected to known activists, British investigators could trace names, journeys and relationships. Kabul became connected to the Hijaz, the Hijaz to India, and Indian revolutionaries to foreign political networks.

The movement's greatest strength was its transnational vision. Its organisers understood that the British Empire operated across borders and believed anti-colonial resistance could similarly cross borders. Yet this international character was also its weakness. The revolutionaries depended on Afghanistan, the Ottoman Empire and Germany without controlling their policies, while secure communication became increasingly difficult.

By the middle of 1916, British officials were moving from suspicion to identification. The discovery of the silk correspondence transformed scattered intelligence into a documented investigation. The international network that had once offered the revolutionaries their greatest hope was now becoming the very mechanism through which the colonial state could trace them.

The next stage of the struggle would therefore move from diplomacy and secret correspondence to British intelligence investigations, arrests and imprisonment.

Part III — When the British Discovered the Letters

The Silk Letter Movement entered its most consequential phase in 1916, when British intelligence began to understand the network behind the correspondence. Britain was already concerned about the Ghadar movement, wartime propaganda, revolutionary activity through Afghanistan and the Middle East, and German efforts to weaken British rule. The Silk Letters provided documentary evidence connecting Indian activists with Kabul, the Hijaz and wider international political networks.

From Suspicion to Documentary Evidence

The British did not discover the entire conspiracy in one dramatic moment. Intelligence officers gradually assembled information from different sources. An important document was Cleveland's “First Note on the Silk Letters,” dated 14 September 1916. Cleveland initially believed that two letters written in the same hand had both been written by Ubaidullah Sindhi. Later evidence indicated that one had been written by Ubaidullah on behalf of Maulana Muhammad Mian Mansoor Ansari. This shows that British intelligence reconstructed the network step by step rather than simply decoding an already understood conspiracy.

The correspondence revealed a network extending from British India to Kabul and the Hijaz, with connections to wider Muslim and Central Powers diplomacy. The letters contained plans for resistance and organisational coordination. During the First World War, British officials considered possible cooperation between Afghanistan, German agents, Ottoman interests and Indian revolutionaries a serious security threat.

The wider wartime context intensified their concern. India was supplying soldiers and resources to the British war effort, while the Ghadar movement attempted to encourage rebellion among Indian troops. The Silk Letter network therefore appeared as part of a broader international challenge to British imperial security.

The involvement of religious scholars further concerned the colonial authorities. Maulana Mahmud Hasan, a senior scholar associated with Deoband, and Ubaidullah Sindhi, who operated through religious and intellectual networks, possessed influence extending through students, scholars and personal relationships. The British therefore faced figures capable of connecting revolutionary ideas with wider social networks.

The Colonial Crackdown

Once the letters provided investigators with names and connections, the British response became more systematic. According to the historical account of the Jamiat Ulama-i-Hind, the crackdown resulted in the arrest of 222 ulama across India. The organisation also identifies Mahmud Hasan and Maulana Husain Ahmad Madani among those detained in the Hijaz. Since the figure of 222 comes from an institutional historical account, it should be treated with that qualification rather than as an uncontested statistic.

For Mahmud Hasan, the consequences were particularly serious. The political situation in the Hijaz deteriorated after the Arab Revolt began in June 1916. British influence expanded while Ottoman authority weakened. Mahmud Hasan and Husain Ahmad Madani were detained in the Hijaz and subsequently transferred through Egypt. The movement was therefore changing from international coordination into a struggle for the survival of its principal organisers.

The British response was also bureaucratic. Intelligence reports, intercepted correspondence, interrogation records and political assessments were used to reconstruct the network. Later colonial records, including material associated with the Rowlatt Committee, became important sources for understanding the conspiracy.

Yet these records must be treated critically. Much of the surviving documentation came from colonial authorities themselves. British officials had a political interest in presenting revolutionary activities as threats to imperial security, and their reports could contain assumptions or mistakes. Historians must therefore compare different records rather than accept every colonial claim uncritically.

What the Letters Actually Revealed

The central historical lesson of the Silk Letters is the distinction between intention and capacity. The correspondence demonstrates that the revolutionaries genuinely attempted to create an international network and discussed organised resistance. It does not prove that they possessed the military strength required to overthrow British rule.

The movement was not a single, centrally controlled organisation but a network of people, ideas and political projects connected through correspondence and personal relationships. Mahmud Hasan was a central figure, while Ubaidullah Sindhi, Muhammad Mian Mansoor Ansari, Raja Mahendra Pratap and Maulana Barkatullah were connected with different parts of the wider effort. Their common objective was to weaken British rule, although their individual roles differed.

The letters demonstrate the transnational character of early Indian anti-colonial politics. The revolutionaries understood that the British Empire operated across borders and attempted to challenge it through international connections involving Afghanistan, the Ottoman Empire, Germany and the wider Muslim world.

Yet this strategy also created a major weakness. The revolutionaries needed foreign assistance but could not control foreign governments. Germany wanted to weaken Britain; the Ottoman Empire was fighting for survival; Afghanistan sought to protect its independence; and Indian revolutionaries wanted to end colonial rule. Their interests sometimes overlapped but were never identical.

The network's international character also made secrecy difficult. The more people, countries and communication routes became involved, the more opportunities existed for British intelligence to gather information and trace names, journeys and correspondence.

By late 1916, the strategic initiative had shifted decisively. The revolutionaries had hoped to exploit the First World War to create an opportunity for insurrection. Instead, the war enabled the British Empire to deploy a powerful intelligence system against them. The silk letters, originally intended to preserve secrecy, had become evidence in a colonial investigation.

Mahmud Hasan's mission had been disrupted, Ubaidullah's network was under pressure, and the movement was losing the time and political space it required.

But suppression did not end the political story. The next stage would take Mahmud Hasan and his associates from secret correspondence into imprisonment and political mobilisation. For Mahmud Hasan especially, the journey from the Hijaz to Malta would mark a decisive transition from wartime revolutionary politics to the mass movements that emerged in India after the war.

The British had stopped the conspiracy. They had not stopped the political aspirations of the men behind it.

Part IV — Malta, Defeat and the Transformation of Resistance

From the Hijaz to Malta

The British discovery of the Silk Letters led to the imprisonment of some of the movement's most important figures. Maulana Mahmud Hasan and Maulana Husain Ahmad Madani, detained in the Hijaz after the collapse of Ottoman authority there, were taken to Egypt for interrogation. On 15 February 1917, they were transferred from Egypt, and about a week later they were sent to Malta, where they remained interned for more than three years. British administrative records connect their deportation and internment with their alleged anti-British and pro-Ottoman activities.

The journey from the Hijaz to Malta symbolised the collapse of the revolutionary strategy. Mahmud Hasan had travelled towards the Ottoman world hoping to secure assistance against British rule; he now found himself imprisoned by the same empire he had attempted to challenge. The revolutionary project that had crossed international borders had been transformed into a colonial imprisonment.

Mahmud Hasan remained in Malta until 1920. His imprisonment coincided with major changes in Indian and international politics. The First World War ended in November 1918, the Ottoman Empire was defeated, and the future of the Caliphate became uncertain. In India, opposition to British rule intensified. The Rowlatt Act was passed in March 1919, granting extraordinary powers to the colonial government, while the Jallianwala Bagh massacre on 13 April 1919 profoundly damaged the legitimacy of British rule.

Thus, while Mahmud Hasan was physically isolated in Malta, India was moving towards a new era of mass political mobilisation.

From Secret Correspondence to Public Politics

The failure of the Silk Letter strategy did not end the political activity of the ulama associated with it. Instead, the post-war period saw the emergence of new forms of organised political action. During the Khilafat Conference in Delhi in November 1919, ulama resolved to establish the Jamiat Ulama-i-Hind. Its first general session was held at Amritsar on 28 December 1919, under the chairmanship of Maulana Abdul Bari Farangi Mahalli.

The formation of the Jamiat represented an important change in political method. In 1915–16, Mahmud Hasan and his associates had relied upon secrecy, international diplomacy and the possibility of military assistance from abroad. By 1919, Muslim scholars were creating a formal organisation capable of holding conferences, issuing resolutions and participating in public political campaigns.

This transformation was not an instantaneous rejection of revolutionary politics. It resulted from several developments: the collapse of the Silk Letter network, the end of the First World War, Mahmud Hasan's imprisonment, the Khilafat question, the Rowlatt legislation, Jallianwala Bagh and the rise of Mahatma Gandhi's mass politics. The Jamiat subsequently worked closely with the Indian National Congress during the Khilafat and Non-Cooperation movements.

Mahmud Hasan returned to India at a crucial moment. He reached Bombay on 8 June 1920, after his release from Malta. According to the Jamiat's historical record, Mahatma Gandhi, Maulana Shaukat Ali and Maulana Abdul Bari Farangi Mahalli were among those who received him. His return symbolised the transition from the secret international politics of the war years to the mass politics of post-war India.

On 19 July 1920, Mahmud Hasan issued a fatwa supporting non-cooperation with British rule, according to the Jamiat's historical account. The position was subsequently supported by many other ulama. This was significant because the political struggle was now being directed towards withdrawal of cooperation from colonial institutions rather than dependence upon foreign military intervention.

The contrast with 1916 was striking. The earlier strategy relied on coded letters, international diplomacy and possible armed assistance from outside India. The emerging strategy relied on political organisation, public mobilisation and non-cooperation within India. The arena of resistance was moving from diplomatic networks and frontier politics to schools, courts, government institutions, markets and public meetings.

The Legacy of a Failed Strategy

The transformation should not be presented as though the Silk Letter Movement directly caused the Non-Cooperation Movement. The latter emerged from several developments, including the Rowlatt agitation, Jallianwala Bagh, the Khilafat question and Gandhi's growing influence. The formation of the Jamiat Ulama-i-Hind likewise reflected wider Muslim political mobilisation after the First World War. The Silk Letter episode is better understood as part of the political experience through which sections of the Muslim scholarly leadership moved from clandestine revolutionary activity towards organised mass politics. Its failure exposed the limitations of international revolutionary strategy: Afghanistan did not abandon neutrality, substantial Ottoman and German assistance did not materialise, secure communication failed, and revolutionary mobilisation inside India did not develop as planned.

By September 1920, the Jamiat had approved the Non-Cooperation resolution at Calcutta, followed by its Delhi session in November. According to its historical account, the resolution received support from 500 ulama. Mahmud Hasan died in Delhi on 30 November 1920, only months after returning from Malta.

Thus, the Silk Letters represent not only a failed conspiracy but also a story of political adaptation. The wartime strategy collapsed, but resistance continued through public organisation, Khilafat mobilisation and mass non-cooperation.

Part V — A Failed Conspiracy or a Forgotten Turning Point?

The easiest way to describe the Silk Letter Movement is as a failed conspiracy. British intelligence discovered the correspondence, its principal organisers were detained, foreign assistance never materialised, and the planned uprising did not occur. Yet this alone does not explain its historical importance. The more significant question is what the movement reveals about the possibilities imagined by Indian anti-colonial activists during the First World War and how their political strategy changed after 1916.

The movement was neither the fully developed revolution sometimes portrayed in commemorative accounts nor an insignificant conspiracy created by colonial intelligence. The surviving correspondence and British records show that Maulana Mahmud Hasan, Ubaidullah Sindhi and their associates attempted to establish an international network connecting Indian activists with Afghanistan, the Ottoman world and the Central Powers. The Provisional Government of India, established in Kabul on 1 December 1915, Ubaidullah's activities in Afghanistan, Mahmud Hasan's mission in the Hijaz and the intercepted correspondence all demonstrate the seriousness of the project.

At the same time, the revolutionaries lacked the independent military resources required to carry out the revolution they imagined. Their strategy depended heavily upon foreign governments whose interests did not necessarily coincide with Indian nationalism.

The Measure of Failure

What exactly failed?
The attempt to secure Afghan military cooperation did not produce the intervention the revolutionaries wanted. The Provisional Government in Kabul never gained control over Indian territory or international recognition. Ottoman support could not be transformed into sustained military assistance, while German interest in weakening Britain remained tied to the wider First World War. Most importantly, the revolutionaries could not convert their international contacts into a coordinated uprising inside British India.

This distinction between political imagination and operational capacity is essential.

The revolutionaries correctly understood that the British Empire was an international system supported by military, diplomatic and economic connections extending across continents. They therefore attempted to construct a counter-network across the same geopolitical space. But their resources were far smaller than those of the empire they sought to challenge.

Afghanistan illustrates the problem. Kabul was strategically important, but Amir Habibullah Khan had strong reasons to avoid war with Britain. The German-Ottoman mission created an opportunity, but diplomatic contact did not become an Afghan commitment to the revolutionary cause.

The same difficulty existed in the Ottoman sphere. Mahmud Hasan sought Ottoman assistance because the empire was Britain's enemy and because the Ottoman Caliph held symbolic importance for many Indian Muslims. Yet the Ottoman Empire was fighting for its own survival. After the Arab Revolt began in June 1916, its position in the Hijaz became even more difficult.

The Colonial Archive and the Problem of Memory

Another difficulty concerns the sources. Much of what is known about the Silk Letter Movement comes from the colonial archive. British intelligence reports, intercepted correspondence, the Sedition Committee Report of 1918 and other official records are essential for reconstructing the movement.

Yet these sources cannot be treated as completely neutral. British officials had a political interest in presenting revolutionary networks as threats to imperial security and sometimes worked with incomplete information. The documented mistake in Cleveland's September 1916 assessment concerning the authorship of two letters demonstrates that intelligence reports were part of an evolving investigation.

Nationalist and institutional histories present another challenge. They rightly highlight the sacrifices of Mahmud Hasan, Ubaidullah Sindhi and other scholars, but commemorative accounts can sometimes make an ambitious political plan appear more operationally powerful than the surviving evidence supports.

The most balanced conclusion therefore lies between these extremes: the Silk Letter Movement was a genuine transnational revolutionary project whose ambitions exceeded its practical capabilities.

From Armed Conspiracy to Mass Politics

The movement's deeper significance may lie in what happened after its failure.

Mahmud Hasan's imprisonment in Malta from 1917 to 1920 coincided with major changes in India and the world. The First World War ended in November 1918; the Ottoman Empire collapsed; the Rowlatt legislation was introduced in March 1919; and the Jallianwala Bagh massacre occurred on 13 April 1919. Indian politics was entering a new period of mass mobilisation.

Among the ulama associated with Mahmud Hasan, political organisation also changed. During the Khilafat Conference in Delhi in November 1919, scholars resolved to establish the Jamiat Ulama-i-Hind. Its first general session was held at Amritsar on 28 December 1919.

Mahmud Hasan returned to India on 8 June 1920, at a crucial moment in the Khilafat movement. According to the Jamiat's historical account, Mahatma Gandhi, Maulana Shaukat Ali and Maulana Abdul Bari Farangi Mahalli were among those who received him in Bombay. On 19 July 1920, Mahmud Hasan issued a fatwa supporting non-cooperation with British rule, according to the same account.

This should not be interpreted as proof that the Silk Letter Movement directly caused the Non-Cooperation Movement. The latter emerged from several developments, including the Rowlatt agitation, Jallianwala Bagh, the Khilafat question and Gandhi's leadership. Nevertheless, there was a meaningful institutional and generational connection: sections of the Muslim scholarly leadership that had experienced clandestine resistance during the war were now participating in organised mass politics.

The political method had changed, even though opposition to colonial rule remained.

What the Silk Letters Changed

The Silk Letters did not come close to overthrowing British rule in 1916. There is no reliable evidence that a large revolutionary army was assembled and waiting to invade India. Nor did the British Empire face an imminent military collapse because of Mahmud Hasan's network.

But the movement nevertheless challenged important assumptions about India's freedom struggle.

First, it demonstrated that Indian anti-colonial politics could operate beyond India's geographical boundaries. Kabul, the Hijaz and European diplomacy became part of the strategic imagination of Indian revolutionaries.

Second, it demonstrated that sections of the Muslim scholarly leadership were willing to engage directly with the political struggle against colonial rule. Figures such as Mahmud Hasan and Ubaidullah Sindhi used religious, intellectual and international networks for political purposes.

Third, it revealed both the possibilities and dangers of transnational alliances. Foreign support could strengthen an anti-colonial movement, but foreign governments ultimately pursued their own interests.

Finally, the movement's failure formed part of a broader political transition. By 1919–20, some of the same political circles were participating in the Jamiat Ulama-i-Hind, the Khilafat movement and Non-Cooperation. The political energy of the earlier revolutionary period had not disappeared; it had been redirected.

Comprehensive Analytical Framework

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3. Government of India, Home Department. (1916–1918). Intelligence and political records concerning revolutionary activities and the Silk Letter conspiracy [Archival records]. National Archives of India.
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