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The civil war that erupted in Sudan on April 15, 2023, between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) marks one of the gravest humanitarian and political crises in recent African history. What began as a struggle for control between two rival generals—General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan (SAF leader) and Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as Hemedti (RSF leader)—has evolved into a national catastrophe. It is the tragic culmination of Sudan’s failed attempt to transition from decades of authoritarianism under Omar al-Bashir to democratic civilian rule after his ouster in 2019. Deep-rooted political rivalries, resource-based competition, and foreign interference have together transformed Sudan into a battleground not only for internal power but also for regional and global influence. The result is a multidimensional disaster that has displaced millions, crippled the economy, and threatened the fragile stability of the Horn of Africa and beyond.

The Historical Roots of Militarized Rivalry

Sudan’s modern history is defined by a recurring pattern of civil strife, coups, and military domination. After the overthrow of President Omar al-Bashir in 2019, the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) initially emerged as allies. Together, they established the Transitional Sovereignty Council—an interim body designed to guide the nation toward civilian rule. General Burhan assumed the role of head of state, while Hemedti served as his deputy, symbolizing a delicate but uneasy power-sharing arrangement.

The RSF, however, carried the shadow of its origins. It was born from the notorious Janjaweed militia—an Arab-dominated armed group responsible for atrocities during the Darfur conflict in the early 2000s. Under Bashir, the Janjaweed received state funding and free rein to suppress rebellion through mass violence, displacement, and sexual assaults. By 2013, the militia was rebranded as the Rapid Support Forces, formally integrated into the state structure but largely remaining loyal to Hemedti himself. Over time, Hemedti amassed substantial power and wealth, particularly through his control of lucrative gold mines and trade routes.

The post-2019 transition initially inspired optimism, yet it quickly descended into political paralysis. The SAF and RSF undermined the civilian-led government, culminating in a joint coup in October 2021 that toppled Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok and derailed the democratic process. The relationship between Burhan and Hemedti deteriorated sharply as both men sought to consolidate their own power. Their disagreement over the timeline and terms of integrating the RSF into the national army—Burhan pushing for immediate absorption, Hemedti demanding delay and autonomy—proved to be the spark that ignited full-scale war in April 2023. Beneath this dispute lay a deeper structural flaw: Sudan’s chronic inability to establish a unified state authority capable of subordinating the military to civilian control.

A Crisis of Unprecedented Humanitarian Scale

The consequences of this war have been catastrophic. What began as a power struggle between rival generals has spiraled into one of the world’s largest and fastest-growing humanitarian emergencies. Estimates of the death toll vary widely, but U.S. diplomatic sources suggest that as many as 150,000 people have been killed since the conflict began. By early 2025, over 12.3 million people had been displaced—making Sudan the epicenter of the world’s largest displacement crisis. Of these, 8.8 million remain internally displaced, while approximately 3.5 million have fled into neighboring states such as Chad, Ethiopia, and South Sudan—countries already struggling with instability and scarce resources.

The scale of food insecurity is equally alarming. Between June and September 2024, more than 25.6 million Sudanese—over half of the population—faced acute hunger, prompting the UN to classify Sudan as the site of the world’s largest hunger crisis. Vital infrastructure, including hospitals, schools, and agricultural systems, has been systematically destroyed. Over two-thirds of the main hospitals in conflict zones are no longer functioning. Reports from Darfur have resurfaced with chilling familiarity: ethnic violence, mass killings, and allegations of genocide. The RSF’s seizure of El Fasher in late October 2025, following an 18-month siege, was accompanied by reports of large-scale civilian massacres, evoking fears of another Rwanda-like tragedy if global attention continues to wane.

Economic Destruction and Geopolitical Fragmentation

The war’s economic toll has been devastating, eroding the foundations of Sudan’s already fragile economy. The estimated economic loss has surpassed $15 billion, with GDP growth collapsing to -20.8% in 2023 and a projected -23.4% in 2024. Agriculture—Sudan’s economic backbone, employing around 80% of its population and contributing nearly a third of its GDP—has been severely disrupted by the destruction of farmland, supply chain breakdowns, and mass displacement of rural laborers. Inflation has soared, the currency has depreciated sharply, and basic commodities have become unaffordable for ordinary citizens.

Sudan’s strategic geography has drawn in powerful external actors, turning the country into a stage for proxy competition. Its proximity to the Red Sea—a critical global shipping route—gives it immense geopolitical significance. The SAF has reportedly received military and intelligence support from countries such as Iran, Egypt, and Turkey, while the RSF is believed to have obtained weapons and funding from the United Arab Emirates (UAE), allegedly funneled through Chad and the Central African Republic. Wagner Group mercenaries, previously active in Libya and Mali, have also been linked to the RSF in exchange for access to Sudan’s gold reserves. This international entanglement transforms the Sudan conflict from a domestic war into a regional contest for influence, complicating peace efforts and ensuring that neither faction is easily weakened or isolated.

The paradox is stark: while global powers like the United States, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and the UAE publicly call for ceasefires—such as the failed September 2025 truce proposal—they remain divided in their actual alignments and interests, often indirectly sustaining the very conflict they claim to oppose.

The Limitations of Peace Initiatives

Multiple peace initiatives have been launched since 2023, yet most have collapsed due to mutual distrust, competing agendas, and ongoing military offensives. The Jeddah talks, co-facilitated by the U.S. and Saudi Arabia, produced several temporary truces that quickly unraveled. Similarly, the African Union’s (AU) roadmap has faced serious implementation hurdles, hampered by a lack of unified international backing and the warring parties’ strategy of using negotiations as tactical pauses rather than genuine steps toward peace.

The AU remains one of the few entities with moral and regional legitimacy to lead peace efforts, guided by its long-standing principle of “African solutions to African problems.” Yet for such efforts to succeed, the AU must overcome the fragmentation of external diplomacy and coordinate effectively with the UN, IGAD, and humanitarian agencies.

As of late 2025, fighting continues across major urban centers, including Khartoum, Omdurman, and Bahri, with fluctuating control between the SAF and RSF. The SAF has recently regained significant ground, retaking parts of Omdurman in January 2025 and breaking the RSF’s two-year siege of Obeid in February 2025. Meanwhile, the RSF and allied groups met in Nairobi in early 2025 to draft a “post-war charter,” signaling their intent to establish a rival political order should they fail to seize national power militarily. This move underscores the risk of Sudan fragmenting into parallel governments—each backed by foreign patrons—further prolonging the nation’s agony.

Sudan’s civil war is not merely a clash of two generals; it is the violent expression of decades of institutional decay, corruption, and marginalization. Without a decisive and coordinated global response—one that prioritizes humanitarian relief, peace enforcement, and long-term structural reform—Sudan risks sliding into a full-scale state collapse with repercussions across East Africa and the Red Sea corridor. The world must recognize that inaction or half-hearted diplomacy will only prolong the suffering of millions and entrench the militarization of politics in a region already burdened by conflict. Sudan today stands at a crossroads: either it becomes another failed state, or it serves as a painful lesson in the consequences of neglecting fragile transitions to democracy.

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