While the Goods and Services Tax (GST) is frequently celebrated as India's most ambitious economic reform aimed at establishing a unified national market, a significant issue persists in contemporary economic discourse: the unequal regional impact of GST on informal economies and small business structures across different parts of India. Although GST was introduced under the vision of "One Nation, One Tax," its practical execution has resulted in different economic realities between economically disadvantaged states and industrially developed regions. Analysing the regional differences brought about by GST reforms is crucial to comprehending the long-term viability of India's fiscal unity. The GST framework accelerated formalisation and digital compliance in some urban-industrial regions, but it also increased operational challenges for small traders, informal l sectors, and rural business communities in less developed areas, according to several policy observations and economic assessments.
This research aims to fill the gap in comparative GST scholarship by examining the differing patterns of economic adaptation in Eastern and Western India through a qualitative method of research where government reports, economic surveys, policy papers, academic journals, and business analyses are accessed and used in the work. The study examines "The transition from localised tax systems to centralised digital taxation and its uneven consequences on regional commercial ecosystems." This paper also discusses how GST reforms have affected regional economic inclusion, business resilience, tax culture, and market accessibility, as well as the institutional and socio-economic implications of GST compliance among small businesses, informal markets, and emerging digital businesses. This study demonstrated the need for a more inclusive and regionally appropriate taxation structure for sustainable national growth and offered a thorough grasp of how GST reforms changed India's regional economic environment.
The introduction of the Goods and Services Tax (GST) in India on July 1, 2017, marked a watershed moment in the country's economic history, representing the culmination of a decades-long effort to unify India's fragmented indirect tax structure into a single, comprehensive framework. The reform, conceptualised under the vision of "One Nation, One Tax," sought to eliminate the cascading effect of multiple taxes—Central Excise Duty, Service Tax, Value Added Tax (VAT), Central Sales Tax (CST), Octroi, and Entry Tax, among others—and create a seamless national market where goods and services could flow freely across state boundaries. The GST Council, chaired by the Union Finance Minister and comprising state finance ministers, was established as the constitutional body responsible for recommending tax rates, exemptions, and threshold limits, thereby embodying the cooperative federalism that the reform promised to institutionalise. The constitutional foundation for GST was laid through the 101st Constitutional Amendment Act of 2016, which received presidential assent on September 8, 2016, and was the result of persistent advocacy by economists, policymakers, and political leaders spanning multiple decades, including former Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee's initial conceptualization in 2000 and the subsequent efforts of the Empowered Committee of State Finance Ministers under the chairmanship of Asim Dasgupta, the then Finance Minister of West Bengal.
However, beneath the celebratory narrative of fiscal unification lies a complex and often troubling reality: the uneven regional impact of GST on India's diverse economic landscape. India, with its vast territorial expanse and profound regional disparities, presents a unique challenge for any uniform economic policy. The distinction between Eastern and Western India is not merely geographical but also deeply economic, social, and historical. Western India, encompassing states such as Gujarat, Maharashtra, Rajasthan, and Goa, has historically been the industrial and commercial heartland of the nation, with well-developed infrastructure, robust manufacturing bases, established trade networks, and a relatively higher degree of formalisation in business operations. Cities like Mumbai, Ahmedabad, Surat, and Pune have long served as engines of industrial growth, attracting domestic and foreign investment, fostering entrepreneurial ecosystems, and maintaining sophisticated supply chains that extend across national and international borders. In contrast, Eastern India, comprising West Bengal, Bihar, Jharkhand, Odisha, and the northeastern states, has grappled with the legacy of deindustrialisation, particularly in the case of West Bengal, where the decline of the jute industry, the closure of numerous manufacturing units, and the flight of capital during the 1970s and 1980s created lasting economic scars. Bihar and Jharkhand, despite their rich mineral resources, have struggled with inadequate infrastructure, lower levels of literacy and digital literacy, and a predominantly agrarian and informal economic structure. Odisha, while witnessing significant mineral-based industrialisation, continues to face challenges in human development indicators and the diversification of its economic base.
The informal economy, which constitutes a substantial portion of India's economic activity, becomes a critical lens through which the regional disparities of GST can be examined. According to the International Labour Organisation (ILO) and various estimates by Indian economists, the informal sector employs approximately 90% of India's workforce and contributes significantly to the national GDP. Scholars such as Raghuram Rajan, former Governor of the Reserve Bank of India (RBI), have examined the structural constraints faced by the informal sector, including limited access to credit, absence of social security, and vulnerability to external shocks. The National Sample Survey Office (NSSO) and the Periodic Labour Force Survey (PLFS) have consistently documented the predominance of informal employment across India, with particularly high concentrations in Eastern Indian states. The GST, with its emphasis on digital compliance, invoice matching, and threshold-based registration, was designed to bring informal enterprises into the formal tax net, thereby expanding the tax base and enhancing revenue collection. However, this formalisation agenda, while laudable in theory, has encountered significant resistance and adaptation challenges in regions where informal practices are not merely economic choices but deeply embedded socio-cultural norms, survival strategies for marginalised populations, and responses to institutional deficiencies.
The digital dimension of GST compliance adds another layer of complexity to the regional disparity narrative. The GST Network (GSTN), the information technology backbone of the reform, requires taxpayers to file returns online, maintain digital records, and engage with a complex portal that demands a certain level of digital literacy and access to reliable internet connectivity. While Western Indian states, with their higher internet penetration rates, better digital infrastructure, and greater prevalence of computer literacy, have adapted relatively smoothly to these requirements, Eastern Indian states have faced formidable barriers. The Digital India initiative, launched by Prime Minister Narendra Modi in 2015, aimed to bridge this digital divide, but the ground reality remains starkly uneven. According to the Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (TRAI) and various digital inclusion reports, states like Maharashtra and Gujarat boast significantly higher broadband penetration and smartphone usage compared to Bihar, Jharkhand, and the northeastern states. This digital asymmetry translates directly into differential capacities for GST compliance, creating a scenario where the same tax law produces divergent experiences and outcomes across regions.
The scholarly literature on GST in India, while voluminous, has often focused on macroeconomic impacts, revenue implications, and sectoral analyses, with comparatively less attention devoted to the granular, region-specific experiences of small businesses and informal economies. Economists such as Arvind Subramanian, who served as the Chief Economic Advisor to the Government of India from 2014 to 2018, provided valuable insights into the design and implementation challenges of GST, including the multiple rate structure that departed from the ideal of a single rate. The GST Council's decision to adopt a four-tier tax structure—5%, 12%, 18%, and 28%, along with cess on luxury and sin goods—was a political compromise that reflected the federal bargaining process but also introduced complexity that disproportionately affected smaller businesses with limited accounting capabilities. Sushil Kumar Modi, the Deputy Chief Minister of Bihar and a member of the GST Council, has been vocal about the concerns of consuming states, particularly those in Eastern India, regarding revenue protection and the design of the compensation mechanism. The guaranteed compensation for revenue loss, promised for five years from the implementation of GST, was a crucial factor in securing state consent, but it also masked deeper structural concerns about the long-term fiscal autonomy and economic competitiveness of less developed states.
The concept of "tax culture," as developed by scholars such as Valérie A. Yakubu in the African context and applied to India by researchers like M. Govinda Rao, former Director of the National Institute of Public Finance and Policy (NIPFP), provides a useful framework for understanding regional variations in GST adaptation. Tax culture encompasses the attitudes, norms, and behaviours of taxpayers toward compliance, influenced by historical experiences with taxation, trust in government institutions, and the perceived fairness of the tax system. In Western India, with its longer history of commercial taxation under the Bombay Presidency and the princely states of Gujarat and Rajasthan, a more developed tax culture facilitated the transition to GST. The presence of established chartered accountant networks, tax consultancy firms, and business associations provided institutional support for compliance. In Eastern India, by contrast, the legacy of zamindari taxation, the relatively recent introduction of modern commercial taxes in many areas, and a historical suspicion of state extraction—compounded by experiences of political instability and administrative inefficiency—created a less conducive environment for voluntary compliance. The GST, by demanding a higher degree of self-assessment and digital engagement, inadvertently privileged regions with pre-existing institutional advantages while penalising those without such foundations.
The COVID-19 pandemic, which struck India in early 2020 and necessitated prolonged lockdowns, further exposed and exacerbated the regional disparities in GST adaptation. The pandemic-induced economic contraction, estimated by the Reserve Bank of India and the Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation (MoSPI) to be among the most severe in India's post-independence history, disproportionately affected informal workers and small businesses. The Economic Survey of India, presented annually by the Ministry of Finance, documented the massive reverse migration of workers from Western industrial centres to Eastern and Northern rural hinterlands, highlighting the structural fragility of informal employment. The GST e-invoicing mandate, introduced in phases starting from October 2020 for large taxpayers and gradually extended to smaller entities, added another layer of compliance burden during a period of acute economic distress. While large corporations in Western India could absorb these costs and leverage their existing digital infrastructure, small traders in Eastern India faced existential threats to their business viability.
This research article seeks to address these gaps by providing a comprehensive comparative analysis of GST's impact on informal economies and regional business adaptation in Eastern and Western India. By integrating the insights of leading scholars, government reports, economic surveys, and empirical studies, the paper aims to illuminate the nuanced ways in which a uniform national tax reform interacts with deeply uneven regional realities. The study is organised into three main analytical sections: the first examines the structural foundations and implementation dynamics of GST in relation to regional economic disparities; the second analyses the specific impacts on informal economies, small businesses, and digital compliance across Eastern and Western India; and the third explores the institutional responses, adaptation strategies, and policy implications for achieving more inclusive fiscal federalism. The conclusion synthesises these analyses and offers recommendations for a more regionally sensitive taxation framework that can advance the original vision of "One Nation, One Tax" without sacrificing economic justice and spatial equity.
The primary objective of this research is to examine how GST reforms have produced divergent economic realities in Eastern and Western India, with particular attention to the informal sector and small business structures. The study seeks to move beyond aggregate national-level analyses to uncover the region-specific mechanisms through which GST compliance, digital formalisation, and tax culture interact with local economic conditions. A secondary objective is to contribute to the emerging literature on fiscal federalism and regional development by highlighting the tensions between centralised tax design and decentralised economic realities. The significance of this research lies in its potential to inform policy discussions on GST reform, particularly as the initial five-year compensation period for states concluded in 2022, and the GST Council grapples with questions of rate rationalisation, threshold adjustments, and the inclusion of petroleum products and real estate under the GST ambit.
The research also holds practical significance for the millions of small businesses and informal workers who constitute the backbone of India's economy but whose voices are often marginalised in policy debates. By foregrounding their experiences and adaptation strategies, the study aims to advocate for a more inclusive approach to tax reform that recognises regional diversity as a strength rather than an obstacle to national unity. The qualitative methodology employed—drawing on government reports such as the Economic Survey, the Report of the Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) of India, GST Council minutes, academic journals including the Economic and Political Weekly (EPW), the Journal of Indian Business Research, and business analyses from organizations such as the Confederation of Indian Industry (CII), the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FICCI), and the All India Manufacturers' Organization (AIMO)—ensures a robust empirical foundation for the arguments presented.
The conceptual framework of this study draws on multiple theoretical traditions to understand the regional dimensions of GST impact. First, the theory of fiscal federalism, as articulated by Wallace E. Oates in his seminal work "Fiscal Federalism" (1972) and subsequently developed by scholars such as Robin Boadway and Anwar Shah, provides insights into the trade-offs between central and decentralised taxation. Oates' "Decentralisation Theorem" suggests that, in the absence of economies of scale and inter-jurisdictional externalities, decentralised provision of public goods is more efficient because it allows for tailoring to local preferences. While GST represents a centralisation of tax authority, the persistence of regional disparities raises questions about whether the efficiency gains from a unified market are being offset by equity losses and adaptation costs in less developed regions.
Second, the literature on informality and development, exemplified by the work of Keith Hart, who first introduced the concept of the "informal sector" in his 1971 study of urban Ghana, and later developed by scholars such as Alejandro Portes, Manuel Castells, and Lauren Benton, offers tools for understanding why informal economies persist and how they interact with formal regulatory frameworks. In the Indian context, Jan Breman's extensive ethnographic work on informal labour in Gujarat, Barbara Harriss-White's research on the "shadow economies" of South India, and Ravi Srivastava's analyses of labour market segmentation provide crucial context for understanding the socio-economic foundations of informality. The GST, by imposing formal compliance requirements on informal enterprises, essentially demands a transformation in their mode of operation—a demand that may be feasible in regions with supportive institutional ecosystems but profoundly disruptive in others.
Third, the digital political economy framework, as developed by scholars such as Nick Couldry and Ulises A. Mejias in "The Costs of Connection" (2019) and applied to Indian contexts by researchers like Anuragini Nagar and Parminder Jeet Singh, helps explain how digital infrastructures can become new sites of exclusion and power asymmetry. The GSTN, while designed as a neutral technological platform, functions within a socio-economic context where digital access and literacy are unevenly distributed. This framework draws attention to the "datafication" of tax compliance and its implications for small businesses that lack the resources to hire professional accountants or invest in enterprise resource planning (ERP) software.
Fourth, the concept of "adaptive capacity," drawn from the resilience literature in ecological economics and applied to social systems by scholars such as C.S. Holling and Brian Walker, provides a lens for understanding how different regional business ecosystems respond to external shocks like GST. Adaptive capacity encompasses the resources, institutions, and social networks that enable communities to adjust to changing conditions. Western India's higher adaptive capacity, rooted in industrial diversification, educational attainment, and institutional density, contrasts sharply with Eastern India's more constrained capacity, shaped by historical underdevelopment and institutional fragility.
This study employs a qualitative research methodology, combining document analysis, secondary data interpretation, and comparative case study approaches. The primary sources include official government publications such as the Annual Reports of the Central Board of Indirect Taxes and Customs (CBIC), GST Council meeting minutes, state-wise GST collection data published by the Ministry of Finance, and reports by the Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) of India. Secondary sources comprise peer-reviewed academic articles, books by eminent economists, policy papers from think tanks such as the NIPFP, the Indian Council for Research on International Economic Relations (ICRIER), and the Observer Research Foundation (ORF), and business surveys conducted by industry associations. The comparative dimension focuses on select states from Eastern India (West Bengal, Bihar, Jharkhand, Odisha) and Western India (Maharashtra, Gujarat, Rajasthan, Goa), chosen for their representativeness of the broader regional economic patterns and the availability of reliable data.
The analysis proceeds through a systematic examination of the following dimensions: (1) pre-GST tax structures and their regional variations; (2) GST implementation experiences and initial adaptation challenges; (3) impact on informal sector employment and income; (4) digital compliance burdens and regional digital divides; (5) changes in tax culture and business practices; (6) institutional responses and support mechanisms; and (7) long-term implications for regional economic convergence or divergence. By weaving together these dimensions, the study constructs a comprehensive narrative of how GST has reshaped India's regional economic geography.
To comprehend the divergent impacts of GST on Eastern and Western India, it is essential to first understand the historical trajectories that shaped their distinct economic geographies. Western India's emergence as an industrial powerhouse can be traced back to the colonial period, when the Bombay Presidency became a centre of textile manufacturing, trade, and finance. The establishment of cotton mills in Mumbai (then Bombay) in the mid-nineteenth century, followed by the development of Ahmedabad as a major textile hub under the patronage of industrialists such as Seth Ranchhodlal Chhotalal and, later, the Sarabhai family, created an early industrial base that attracted skilled labour, capital, and entrepreneurial talent. The princely states of Gujarat, Saurashtra, and Kutch, with their mercantile traditions rooted in centuries of Indian Ocean trade, provided a cultural foundation for commercial enterprise that persisted through the colonial and post-colonial periods. The Marwari trading communities of Rajasthan, with their networks extending across North and East India, further contributed to the commercial dynamism of Western India.
The post-independence period saw the consolidation and expansion of Western India's industrial leadership. The development of Mumbai as India's financial capital, with the establishment of the Reserve Bank of India (1935, though nationalised in 1949), the Bombay Stock Exchange (1875, Asia's oldest), and numerous banking and financial institutions, created a sophisticated financial ecosystem that facilitated industrial investment. Gujarat, under the chief ministership of leaders like Jivraj Narayan Mehta and, subsequently, the long tenure of Narendra Modi as Chief Minister from 2001 to 2014, aggressively pursued industrialisation through business-friendly policies, infrastructure development, and the creation of special economic zones (SEZs). The "Gujarat Model" of development, characterised by streamlined bureaucratic processes, proactive land acquisition for industrial use, and aggressive promotion of manufacturing, became a template for other states and positioned Gujarat as one of India's most industrialised states by the early twenty-first century.
Maharashtra, with Mumbai as its capital and Pune as a major industrial and educational centre, maintained its position as India's leading state in terms of GDP contribution and industrial diversity. The development of the Maharashtra Industrial Development Corporation (MIDC) in 1962, the growth of the automotive sector in Pune (with companies like Tata Motors, Bajaj Auto, and Mercedes-Benz establishing manufacturing facilities), and the emergence of the information technology sector in Mumbai and Pune created a multi-layered industrial economy. Rajasthan, while less industrialised than Gujarat and Maharashtra, benefited from its strategic location, mineral resources (particularly zinc, lead, and gypsum), and the growth of tourism and handicraft industries. The state's relatively stable political environment and proactive industrial policies attracted investments in sectors such as cement, textiles, and renewable energy.
In contrast, Eastern India's economic trajectory has been marked by a combination of early industrial promise, subsequent deindustrialisation, and persistent underdevelopment. West Bengal, under British colonial rule, was the first centre of industrialisation in India, with the establishment of jute mills along the Hooghly River, the development of Kolkata (then Calcutta) as the imperial capital until 1911, and the emergence of a sophisticated Bengali bhadralok (middle-class) professional class. The partition of Bengal in 1947, which severed the jute-producing hinterland of East Bengal (now Bangladesh) from the jute mills of West Bengal, created a structural crisis that was exacerbated by the decline of the jute industry in the face of global competition and synthetic substitutes. The period from the late 1960s through the 1980s witnessed significant industrial unrest, the flight of capital to other states, and the closure of numerous manufacturing units—a process documented by scholars such as Amiya Kumar Bagchi in his work "The Political Economy of Underdevelopment" and more recently by Partha Chatterjee in his analyses of the "Bengal model" of development.
Bihar, historically one of India's most fertile agricultural regions and the seat of ancient empires, experienced a prolonged period of economic stagnation and social conflict in the post-independence period. The lack of industrialisation, poor infrastructure, caste-based social tensions, and political instability contributed to its emergence as one of India's poorest states. The bifurcation of Bihar in 2000, which created the state of Jharkhand, was intended to address the underdevelopment of the mineral-rich southern regions by providing focused governance, but both states have continued to struggle with low per capita income, high poverty rates, and limited industrial diversification. Odisha, despite its rich mineral resources (iron ore, coal, bauxite) and significant foreign direct investment in sectors such as steel and aluminium, has faced challenges in translating resource wealth into broad-based human development and economic diversification. The northeastern states, connected to mainland India by the narrow Siliguri Corridor, have grappled with geographical isolation, insurgency, and limited economic integration with national markets.
These divergent historical trajectories created fundamentally different economic structures by the time GST was introduced in 2017. Western India had a higher proportion of formal sector employment, larger average firm sizes, more sophisticated supply chains, and greater integration with national and global markets. Eastern India, conversely, had a larger informal sector, smaller and more fragmented businesses, weaker infrastructure connectivity, and lower levels of technological adoption. These structural differences would prove critical in determining how businesses in each region adapted to the demands of GST compliance.
The indirect tax structure that preceded GST was a complex mosaic of central and state taxes, each with its own administrative apparatus, rate structures, and compliance requirements. At the central level, taxes included Central Excise Duty (levied on the manufacture of goods), Service Tax (introduced in 1994 and expanded progressively), Customs Duty, Central Sales Tax (CST), and various cesses and surcharges. At the state level, the primary tax was the Value Added Tax (VAT), introduced in a phased manner from 2003 onwards to replace the earlier Sales Tax regime, along with Entry Tax, Octroi, and local body taxes in some states. This multiplicity of taxes created a "tax on tax" or cascading effect, where the tax paid at one stage could not be fully set off against the tax liability at subsequent stages, leading to inefficiencies and artificially inflated prices.
The regional implications of this pre-GST tax architecture were significant and often underappreciated in national-level policy discussions. States had considerable autonomy in setting VAT rates, determining the coverage of goods and services, and administering their tax collection machinery. This autonomy allowed states to tailor their tax policies to local economic conditions and political considerations, but it also created a fragmented internal market where the same product could be taxed at different rates in different states. For instance, Maharashtra had a relatively high VAT rate of 12.5% on many goods, while some northeastern states had lower rates to encourage industrialisation. The CST, levied at a nominal rate of 2% on inter-state sales, was a source of revenue for the originating state but created incentives for businesses to structure transactions to minimise its incidence, often through the establishment of depots and branch transfers.
For manufacturing states, particularly in Western India, the pre-GST regime had certain advantages. Gujarat and Maharashtra, with their large industrial bases, collected substantial revenues from Central Excise Duty and VAT, which funded their relatively better infrastructure and public services. The presence of large manufacturing units with professional accounting departments meant that compliance with central taxes was relatively manageable. The "Modvat" (Modified Value Added Tax) credit mechanism, introduced in 1986 and subsequently refined, allowed manufacturers to claim credit for excise duty paid on inputs, reducing the cascading effect to some extent. However, the credit mechanism was complex, prone to disputes, and did not extend across the central-state tax divide, meaning that excise duty paid on inputs could not be set off against VAT liability on outputs.
For consuming states, particularly in Eastern India, the pre-GST regime had different implications. Bihar, Jharkhand, and Odisha, with their relatively smaller manufacturing bases, were net importers of goods from other states. Under the destination-based VAT system, they collected tax on the final sale of goods within their territories, but the revenue potential was constrained by the prevalence of informal trade, lower per capita consumption, and administrative weaknesses in tax collection. West Bengal, despite its historical industrial base, had seen a significant decline in manufacturing and was increasingly dependent on the service sector, trade, and small-scale industries. The VAT administration in Eastern states was often characterised by lower levels of computerisation, greater reliance on physical verification, and higher levels of tax evasion, reflecting both resource constraints and governance challenges.
The Entry Tax and Octroi regimes added another layer of regional variation. Octroi, a tax levied by municipal bodies on goods entering their jurisdictions, was prevalent in Maharashtra (particularly in Mumbai and Pune) and Gujarat, despite being widely considered an inefficient and corruption-prone tax. The abolition of Octroi was a long-standing demand of industry associations, and its inclusion in the GST framework was seen as a major benefit of the reform. However, the transition away from Octroi also meant the loss of revenue for local bodies, which had to be compensated through alternative mechanisms. In Eastern India, Entry Taxes were levied by some states on goods entering from other states, ostensibly to protect local industries but often serving as revenue-raising measures. These taxes created additional barriers to interstate trade and compounded the fragmentation of the national market.
The service tax regime, administered by the central government, had its own regional implications. As the service sector grew in importance, particularly in Western Indian cities like Mumbai, Bangalore, and Hyderabad, service tax collection became increasingly significant. However, the service tax was levied on a "positive list" basis (taxing specified services rather than all services except exempted ones), which created complexity and litigation. Small service providers in Eastern India, such as local transporters, repair shops, and professional services, often operated below the tax threshold or in the informal sector, escaping the service tax net but also lacking the benefits of formalisation, such as input tax credits and access to institutional credit.
The compliance burden under the pre-GST regime was substantial, particularly for businesses operating across multiple states. A manufacturer in Gujarat selling goods in Maharashtra, Bihar, and West Bengal had to comply with Central Excise regulations, file service tax returns (if also providing services), register for VAT in each destination state, file CST returns for inter-state sales, and potentially deal with Entry Tax and Octroi requirements. This multiplicity of registrations, returns, and assessments created significant administrative costs, which were more easily borne by large corporations than by small and medium enterprises (SMEs). The GST, by subsuming most of these taxes into a single registration and return framework, promised to reduce this compliance burden. However, the realisation of this promise depended critically on the capacity of businesses to adapt to the new system—a capacity that varied significantly between Eastern and Western India.
The idea of a comprehensive goods and services tax in India had a long gestation period, reflecting the complexities of federal bargaining in a diverse democracy. The first serious proposal for a national VAT can be traced to the report of the L.K. Jha Committee in 1978, which recommended a gradual shift from excise duties to a manufacturing-cum-VAT. However, political and administrative constraints delayed implementation. The concept gained momentum in the 1990s and early 2000s under the economic liberalisation initiated by Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao and Finance Minister Manmohan Singh in 1991. The Kelkar Task Force on Indirect Taxes, chaired by Vijay Kelkar (who later served as Finance Secretary and Chairman of the 13th Finance Commission), recommended a comprehensive GST in its reports of 2002 and 2004, providing a detailed roadmap for implementation.
The Vajpayee government (1999-2004) took significant steps toward GST, with the appointment of the Empowered Committee of State Finance Ministers, chaired by Asim Dasgupta, then Finance Minister of West Bengal, to design a model GST law. The committee's work, spanning several years and involving extensive consultations with stakeholders, laid the groundwork for the eventual legislation. However, the change of government at the centre in 2004 and the complexities of securing state consensus delayed progress. The United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government under Manmohan Singh continued the process, and the 13th Finance Commission, chaired by Vijay Kelkar, strongly advocated for GST in its 2009 report, estimating significant efficiency gains from its implementation.
The political breakthrough came with the election of the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) government under Narendra Modi in 2014. The Modi government, with its strong parliamentary majority, prioritised GST as a key reform initiative. Finance Minister Arun Jaitley played a crucial role in building consensus with state governments, addressing their concerns about revenue loss and loss of fiscal autonomy. The 101st Constitutional Amendment Act, passed by Parliament in August 2016 and ratified by the required number of states, provided the constitutional framework for GST. The Act created the GST Council as a constitutional body under Article 279A, with the power to make recommendations on tax rates, exemptions, threshold limits, and other aspects of GST administration.
The GST Council, in its initial meetings, made several critical decisions that shaped the contours of the reform. The decision to adopt a dual GST model—with Central GST (CGST) and State GST (SGST) levied concurrently on intra-state supplies, and Integrated GST (IGST) on inter-state supplies—reflected the federal compromise necessary to secure state participation. The four-tier rate structure (5%, 12%, 18%, and 28%) was a departure from the ideal of a single rate advocated by economists like Arvind Subramanian, but it was deemed necessary to address concerns about revenue neutrality and the impact on essential goods and services. The inclusion of a compensation mechanism, guaranteeing states 14% year-on-year revenue growth for five years from the base year of 2015-16, was the critical sweetener that secured the agreement of manufacturing states, which feared revenue loss from the shift from origin-based central taxes to destination-based GST.
The political economy of GST implementation was deeply influenced by the divergent interests of producing and consuming states. Western Indian states like Gujarat and Maharashtra, major manufacturing centres, stood to lose revenue from the abolition of Central Excise Duty (which was origin-based) and the shift to destination-based GST. However, they also stood to gain from the creation of a seamless national market, which would reduce logistics costs and enhance the competitiveness of their industries. Eastern Indian states, as net consumers, stood to gain from destination-based taxation but were concerned about their administrative capacity to collect GST and the potential for tax evasion in their large informal economies. The compensation mechanism addressed some of these concerns, but the underlying structural differences in economic capacity and institutional strength remained.
The rollout of GST on July 1, 2017, was preceded by extensive preparations, including the development of the GST Network (GSTN) IT infrastructure, taxpayer registration drives, and awareness campaigns. However, the initial implementation was marred by technical glitches, confusion about return filing procedures, and the complexity of the multiple-rate structure. The initial requirement for filing three monthly returns (GSTR-1 for outward supplies, GSTR-2 for inward supplies, and GSTR-3 as a composite return) proved burdensome, particularly for small businesses, and was subsequently simplified. The introduction of the Composition Scheme, with lower tax rates and quarterly filing for businesses with turnover up to Rs. 1 crore (later raised to Rs. 1.5 crore), was an attempt to ease the compliance burden for small taxpayers, but it also created a dual structure that some critics argued undermined the integrity of the GST framework.
The informal economy constitutes a defining feature of India's economic landscape, and its interaction with GST provides a critical lens for understanding regional disparities. The informal sector, as defined by the International Labour Organisation (ILO) and adopted by India's National Statistical Commission, encompasses all unincorporated private enterprises owned by individuals or households engaged in the sale and production of goods and services operated on a proprietary or partnership basis and with less than ten total workers. This definition captures a vast array of economic activities, from street vending and small retail shops to home-based manufacturing, construction labour, and unregistered service providers. According to the Economic Survey 2018-19, the informal sector accounts for roughly 52% of India's GDP and employs approximately 93% of the workforce, though these figures are subject to considerable measurement challenges.
The measurement of informality in India has evolved significantly over time. The National Sample Survey Office (NSSO), established in 1950 and now subsumed under the National Statistical Office (NSO), has conducted periodic surveys of unorganised enterprises, with the most recent being the 73rd round (2015-16) on Unincorporated Non-Agricultural Enterprises. The Periodic Labour Force Survey (PLFS), introduced in 2017-18 to replace the earlier Employment-Unemployment Surveys, provides more frequent data on employment characteristics, including informal employment. However, the boundaries between formal and informal are often blurred, with many enterprises operating in a "semi-formal" space—registered under some laws but not others, maintaining partial records, and employing a mix of formal and informal labour arrangements.
Scholars have offered various conceptualisations of informality that go beyond the purely legalistic definition. Hernando de Soto, in his influential work "The Other Path" (1989) and "The Mystery of Capital" (2000), argued that informality arises from excessive regulation and bureaucratic barriers that push entrepreneurs into extra-legal status. In the Indian context, scholars like Jan Breman, in his extensive ethnographic studies of labour in Gujarat (notably "Footloose Labour: Working in India's Informal Economy," 1996), have emphasised the exploitative dimensions of informality, where workers lack social security, legal protections, and bargaining power. Barbara Harriss-White, in her research on the "shadow economies" of South India (including works like "India Working: Essays on Society and Economy," 2003), has highlighted the embeddedness of informality in social structures of caste, gender, and patronage, arguing that informal economic relations are not merely responses to state failure but are constitutive of local power structures.
The GST, by design, seeks to bring informal enterprises into the formal tax net through the mechanism of registration and compliance. Any business with an aggregate turnover exceeding the threshold limit (initially Rs. 20 lakh for most states and Rs. 10 lakh for special category states, later raised to Rs. 40 lakh for goods and Rs. 20 lakh for services) is required to register under GST. Registered businesses can claim input tax credit (ITC) on their purchases, creating an incentive for buyers to purchase from registered suppliers and thereby pulling unregistered suppliers into the formal net. This "formalisation through the value chain" mechanism was one of the key arguments advanced by proponents of GST, including Arvind Subramanian in the government's Economic Surveys.
However, the formalisation agenda encounters significant obstacles in regions where informality is not merely a matter of tax evasion but a survival strategy rooted in structural economic conditions. In Eastern India, where formal sector employment opportunities are limited and social safety nets are weak, informal enterprises serve as critical buffers against poverty and unemployment. A small kirana (grocery) shop in rural Bihar, a handloom weaver in West Bengal's Nadia district, or a cycle repair mechanic in Jharkhand's Ranchi operates with extremely thin profit margins, limited capital, and minimal access to institutional credit or business development services. For such enterprises, the costs of GST compliance—including registration, maintaining digital records, filing monthly or quarterly returns, and potentially hiring accountants or tax consultants—can be prohibitive relative to their turnover. The choice between registering under GST and remaining below the threshold or operating entirely outside the system is not simply a matter of tax optimisation but a fundamental question of business viability.
The digital dimension of GST compliance represents one of the most significant barriers to adaptation for informal and small businesses, and this barrier is experienced unevenly across Eastern and Western India. The GSTN portal, accessible at www.gst.gov.in, serves as the primary interface between taxpayers and the GST administration. All registration applications, return filings, payment of taxes, refund claims, and compliance-related communications are conducted through this portal. The system requires taxpayers to maintain detailed records of outward and inward supplies, reconcile their purchase registers with the auto-populated data from their suppliers' returns, and file returns within specified due dates to avoid penalties and interest charges.
The digital infrastructure necessary for GST compliance includes reliable internet connectivity, computing devices (computers or smartphones), and the skills to navigate the GSTN portal and associated software.
According to the Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (TRAI) and the Internet and Mobile Association of India (IAMAI), there are significant regional disparities in digital access and literacy. As of 2017-18, Maharashtra and Gujarat had internet penetration rates significantly above the national average, with Mumbai, Pune, Ahmedabad, and Surat boasting robust broadband infrastructure and high smartphone adoption rates. The presence of Common Service Centres (CSCs), cyber cafes, and GST Suvidha Providers (GSPs)—private entities authorised to provide GST compliance services—was more extensive in Western Indian cities, creating an ecosystem of support for businesses transitioning to digital compliance.
In contrast, Eastern Indian states lagged considerably in digital infrastructure. Bihar, according to TRAI data, had one of the lowest internet penetration rates among major Indian states in 2017, with significant rural-urban divides within the state. Jharkhand, despite its mineral wealth, faced challenges in extending broadband connectivity to its tribal-dominated and hilly regions. West Bengal, while having better connectivity in Kolkata and its surrounding areas, saw sharp drops in digital access as one moved toward the northern districts, the Sundarbans region, and the tribal belts of Jangalmahal. Odisha's coastal districts had relatively better connectivity compared to its western and southern hinterlands. The northeastern states, connected to the rest of India by a narrow corridor and characterised by difficult terrain, faced the most severe digital infrastructure deficits.
These digital disparities translated directly into differential capacities for GST compliance. A small trader in Ahmedabad could relatively easily access a GST practitioner or GSP to assist with registration and return filing, leveraging the city's dense network of chartered accountants, company secretaries, and tax consultants. The cost of compliance, while not negligible, was manageable within the context of Gujarat's relatively higher income levels and business turnover. In contrast, a similar trader in Patna or Bhubaneswar might face significant challenges in finding affordable and reliable GST compliance services. The cost of travelling to district headquarters or state capitals to access GST help centres, combined with the opportunity cost of time spent away from business operations, added to the compliance burden.
The GSTN portal itself, despite continuous improvements, faced numerous technical issues in its initial years that disproportionately affected less digitally savvy users. Server downtime, slow loading speeds, errors in auto-populated data, and difficulties in generating electronic waybills (e-waybills) for the movement of goods created frustration and uncertainty. For businesses in Western India with dedicated staff or outsourced IT support, these issues were inconveniences that could be managed. For small businesses in Eastern India, where the proprietor often handled all aspects of the business, including compliance, technical glitches could mean missed filing deadlines, blocked input tax credits, and cascading financial difficulties.
The introduction of e-invoicing, mandated for businesses with turnover above specified thresholds (initially Rs. 500 crore from October 2020, progressively lowered to Rs. 5 crore from August 2023), added another layer of digital complexity. E-invoicing requires businesses to generate invoices on their internal billing systems, upload them to the Invoice Registration Portal (IRP) for validation and the assignment of an Invoice Reference Number (IRN) and QR code, and then use the authenticated invoice for GST return filing. While large corporations in Western India could integrate e-invoicing APIs into their existing ERP systems, small and medium enterprises in Eastern India often lacked the technical capacity for such integration. The cost of purchasing e-invoicing software or subscribing to GSP services for e-invoicing represented a significant additional expense for businesses already struggling with thin margins.
The digital divide in GST compliance also intersected with generational and educational divides. Younger entrepreneurs with formal education and exposure to digital technologies found it easier to adapt to GST requirements than older business owners who had operated successfully for decades using manual bookkeeping and personal relationships. In Western India, where educational attainment levels were higher and digital literacy programs more widespread, this generational transition was somewhat smoother. In Eastern India, where literacy rates (particularly digital literacy) were lower and the average age of small business proprietors often higher, the adaptation challenge was more acute.
A study by the National Council of Applied Economic Research (NCAER) on GST's impact on MSMEs documented numerous cases of older traders in Eastern India choosing to wind up their businesses or operate below the GST threshold rather than grapple with digital compliance requirements.
The impact of GST on informal and small businesses varied significantly across sectors, and these sectoral effects had distinct regional manifestations given the different sectoral compositions of Eastern and Western Indian economies. In manufacturing, the GST promised to reduce the tax burden by allowing seamless input tax credit across the production chain, eliminating the cascading of central and state taxes. For organised manufacturing units in Western India, particularly in sectors like textiles, chemicals, pharmaceuticals, and engineering goods, this promise was largely realised. Large manufacturers in Gujarat and Maharashtra benefited from the elimination of Central Excise Duty complexities, the ability to claim ITC on services (which was not available under the previous regime), and the reduction in logistics costs due to the abolition of check posts at state borders.
However, for informal manufacturing units in Eastern India, the benefits were less clear-cut and often outweighed by compliance costs. The handloom and powerloom sectors, concentrated in West Bengal (Shantipur, Phulia, Bishnupur) and parts of Bihar and Odisha, faced significant challenges. These sectors are characterised by small, decentralised production units, often operating as household enterprises or tiny workshops with minimal capital investment. The weavers typically purchase yarn from traders, often on credit, and sell their finished products to middlemen or directly in local markets. Under the pre-GST regime, many of these transactions were unregistered and untaxed, with the weavers operating below the tax threshold or entirely in the informal sector. GST registration requirements disrupted these established supply chains, as registered traders preferred to source from registered suppliers to claim input tax credit. Weavers who could not or would not register found their market access restricted, while those who registered struggled with the compliance burden and the need to maintain formal accounts.
The trade sector, encompassing wholesale and retail distribution, experienced perhaps the most direct and immediate impact of GST. The abolition of the CST and Entry Tax created a genuine national market, reducing the tax-induced fragmentation that had previously required businesses to maintain warehouses in multiple states. Large trading houses and organised retail chains in Western India benefited from simplified logistics and the ability to optimise their supply chain networks. The reduction in transit times due to the elimination of border check posts, where trucks were often detained for hours or days for tax verification, was particularly beneficial for time-sensitive goods and just-in-time manufacturing systems.
However, for small retailers and wholesale traders in Eastern India, the impact was more mixed. The kirana stores, which dominate India's retail landscape and are particularly prevalent in Eastern Indian towns and cities, faced competitive pressure from organised retail and e-commerce platforms that could more easily navigate GST compliance. The requirement to issue tax invoices, maintain purchase records, and file regular returns added to the operational complexity of small shops that had traditionally operated on thin margins and cash transactions. The reverse charge mechanism, under which the recipient of goods or services is liable to pay GST instead of the supplier, created additional confusion and cash flow problems for small traders purchasing from unregistered suppliers.
The services sector, which constitutes an increasingly important share of India's GDP, also experienced differentiated regional impacts. Western Indian cities like Mumbai, Pune, and Ahmedabad, with their concentration of IT services, financial services, and professional services, had a higher proportion of service providers who were already in the tax net under the pre-GST service tax regime. The transition to GST for these providers was primarily a matter of adjusting to the new rate structure and compliance procedures.
In contrast, Eastern Indian cities, where the services sector was dominated by small, unregistered providers—local transporters, repair and maintenance services, small eateries, tuition centres, and health clinics—saw a much larger share of the sector brought into formal taxation for the first time.
The construction sector, a major employer of informal labour across India, presented particular challenges. Construction services were brought under GST at the rate of 18% (with some exceptions for affordable housing), and the sector's complex subcontracting chains created significant compliance difficulties. In Western India, where the construction industry was more organised and large developers dominated the market, GST compliance was manageable, though the sector faced issues with blocked input tax credits due to the inverted duty structure (where the tax rate on inputs was higher than on outputs). In Eastern India, where construction was characterised by small, unorganised contractors, informal labour arrangements, and frequent use of unregistered subcontractors, GST implementation was deeply disruptive. The requirement for registered contractors to ensure that their subcontractors were also registered, or to pay GST under reverse charge, created tensions in established business relationships and increased costs.
The labour market implications of GST's impact on informal enterprises extend beyond the immediate business owners to the vast workforce employed in the informal sector. According to the ILO's "India Employment Report 2024" and various analyses by Indian labour economists, including T.S. Papola and Alakh N. Sharma, informal employment is characterised by low wages, absence of social security benefits, job insecurity, and limited legal protections. The disruption caused by GST to informal enterprises had direct consequences for employment, income, and livelihood security.
In Western India, where the informal sector coexists with a large formal sector, workers displaced from informal enterprises had relatively better prospects for alternative employment. The industrial dynamism of Gujarat and Maharashtra, with their diverse manufacturing and service sectors, provided some absorption capacity for workers transitioning out of informal employment. However, even in Western India, the initial period of GST implementation saw reports of job losses in sectors like textiles, where small powerloom units struggled with compliance costs and reduced demand. The Gujarat Chamber of Commerce and Industry (GCCI) and the Maharashtra Chamber of Commerce, Industry and Agriculture (MACCIA) documented cases of small units closing down or downsizing, with consequent job losses for informal workers.
In Eastern India, where alternative employment opportunities were scarcer, the displacement effects were more severe. The large informal sector in states like Bihar and Jharkhand serves as a critical safety net for populations with limited access to formal sector jobs or agricultural livelihoods. The disruption of informal manufacturing and trading enterprises by GST compliance requirements threatened this safety net. The reverse migration of workers during the COVID-19 pandemic, documented extensively in reports by the Centre for Monitoring Indian Economy (CMIE) and various academic studies, highlighted the structural fragility of informal employment. While the pandemic was an exogenous shock, the GST-induced stresses on informal enterprises in the preceding years had already weakened the resilience of these livelihood systems.
Women's employment in the informal sector deserves particular attention, given the gendered dimensions of informality documented by scholars such as Bina Agarwal and Naila Kabeer. In Eastern India, women are disproportionately represented in certain informal activities, including home-based manufacturing (bidi rolling, agarbatti making, tailoring), small retail, and domestic services. The disruption of these activities by GST had gender-specific impacts, reducing household incomes and potentially increasing women's vulnerability. The lack of digital literacy among women in rural Eastern India compounded their difficulties in adapting to GST requirements, as many women-run enterprises lacked the skills or support systems to navigate the GSTN portal.
The GST's impact on labour markets also intersected with the broader debate on formalisation and social protection. Proponents of GST argued that bringing informal enterprises into the formal tax net would, over time, lead to better working conditions, access to social security schemes, and improved productivity. The formalisation of enterprises would, in this view, create a virtuous cycle where businesses gain access to institutional credit, participate in formal supply chains, and invest in technology and skills. However, critics, including scholars like Jayati Ghosh and Prabhat Patnaik, have argued that formalisation imposed from above, without adequate support mechanisms, can be destructive rather than transformative. The "pushing out" of informal enterprises from the market, rather than their "pulling up" into formal status, risks exacerbating poverty and inequality, particularly in regions with limited formal sector capacity.
The implementation of GST in India has been characterised by a continuous process of refinement and adaptation, driven by feedback from stakeholders, revenue considerations, and the political dynamics of the GST Council. The GST Council, which meets periodically to review the functioning of the tax and recommend changes, has emerged as a unique institution of cooperative federalism, bringing together the Union Finance Minister and state finance ministers in a deliberative forum. However, the Council's decisions have not always adequately addressed the concerns of less developed states and small businesses, reflecting the structural power imbalances within the federal system.
One of the most significant early responses to compliance difficulties was the introduction and subsequent expansion of the Composition Scheme. Initially, the scheme allowed small taxpayers with turnover up to Rs. 75 lakh to pay tax at a nominal rate (1% for manufacturers, 2.5% for restaurants, 0.5% for other suppliers) and file quarterly returns instead of monthly returns. The threshold was subsequently raised to Rs. 1 crore and then to Rs. 1.5 crore, and the scheme was extended to service providers as well. While the Composition Scheme reduced the compliance burden for eligible taxpayers, it also denied them the ability to claim input tax credit and to make inter-state supplies, creating a dual structure that some critics argued fragmented the GST base. For businesses in Eastern India, where many small traders and manufacturers operated at scales appropriate for the Composition Scheme, the scheme provided a lifeline but also limited their growth potential by restricting inter-state trade.
The simplification of the return filing process was another major area of reform. The original three-return system (GSTR-1, GSTR-2, GSTR-3) proved unworkable, with GSTR-2 (which required taxpayers to validate and modify auto-populated purchase data) being particularly problematic. The GST Council eventually moved to a simplified system with a single monthly return (GSTR-1 for outward supplies and a simplified GSTR-3B as a summary return), with the promise of a fully automated return system (ANX-1 and ANX-2) that has faced repeated delays. For small businesses in Eastern India with limited accounting capacity, even the simplified system remained challenging, but it was a significant improvement over the initial design.
The e-waybill system, introduced in April 2018 after initial delays and technical issues, represented an attempt to balance the need for tax compliance monitoring to facilitate interstate trade. The requirement for e-waybills for the movement of goods above specified value thresholds (Rs. 50,000) replaced the earlier system of physical verification at state borders. While e-waybills reduced transit delays and corruption at check posts, they added another compliance layer for businesses. In Western India, where large-scale manufacturing and trade required frequent inter-state movement of goods, businesses quickly adapted to the e-waybill system, often integrating it with their logistics management software. In Eastern India, where trade volumes were smaller and transportation more fragmented, the e-waybill requirement created additional burdens for small transporters and traders who had to navigate the digital system for each consignment.
The COVID-19 pandemic prompted significant temporary modifications to GST compliance requirements. The GST Council, in a series of meetings in 2020, waived late fees for delayed filing, extended deadlines, and reduced interest rates on delayed payments. The pandemic also accelerated the adoption of digital technologies, as businesses of all sizes were forced to embrace online operations. However, the pandemic's disproportionate impact on informal workers and small businesses, particularly in Eastern India, highlighted the structural vulnerabilities that GST compliance had already exposed. The economic contraction of 2020-21, estimated at 7.3% by the Ministry of Statistics, reversed years of growth and pushed many informal enterprises into closure or severe distress.
The conclusion of the five-year compensation period for states in June 2022 raised new questions about the sustainability of GST revenue sharing and the fiscal health of states. The compensation mechanism, funded by a cess on luxury and sin goods, had guaranteed states 14% revenue growth from their base year revenues. While most states received substantial compensation payments during the first five years, the end of the guarantee period exposed underlying revenue concerns. States like Bihar, Jharkhand, and Odisha, which had hoped that GST would boost their revenue collections by bringing informal trade into the tax net, found that their SGST collections remained below expectations, constrained by the large informal sector and administrative weaknesses. The debate over extending the compensation period, which pitted consuming states against the central government, reflected the persistent tensions in the federal fiscal architecture.
The adaptation to GST has varied significantly across states, reflecting differences in administrative capacity, political will, and the structure of state economies. Western Indian states, with their relatively stronger institutional frameworks, have generally been more effective in GST administration and taxpayer support. Gujarat, for instance, established dedicated GST cells within its commercial tax department, conducted extensive taxpayer education programs, and leveraged its existing digital infrastructure to facilitate compliance. The Gujarat government's "Vibrant Gujarat" summit, a biennial investors' summit initiated in 2003 under then Chief Minister Narendra Modi, had already created a culture of business-friendly governance that extended to tax administration. The state's GST implementation was supported by a network of help centres, workshops, and online resources that eased the transition for businesses.
Maharashtra, with its large tax base and sophisticated commercial tax department, faced the challenge of administering GST for one of India's most complex economies. The state established GST Seva Kendras (service centres) to assist taxpayers, and the Maharashtra State Tax on Professions, Trades, Callings and Employments Act was harmonised with GST requirements. However, Maharashtra also faced significant revenue challenges, particularly from the abolition of Octroi (which had been a major source of revenue for municipal corporations like Mumbai and Pune) and the shift from origin-based central taxes to destination-based GST. The state's ability to manage these challenges was supported by its overall fiscal strength and diversified revenue base.
Rajasthan, while less industrialised than Gujarat and Maharashtra, pursued proactive measures to support GST adaptation, including the establishment of GST training centres and the integration of GST compliance into its MSME development programs. The Rajasthan government's focus on promoting startups and digital enterprises under its "Rajasthan Startup Policy" created synergies with GST formalisation, as new businesses were more likely to adopt digital compliance practices from inception.
In contrast, Eastern Indian states faced more severe institutional constraints in GST implementation. Bihar, with its large informal economy and limited administrative capacity, struggled to expand the GST taxpayer base beyond the formally registered businesses that were already in the tax net. The state's commercial tax department, historically understaffed and under-resourced, faced difficulties in conducting outreach to small traders and informal enterprises. The Bihar government's initiatives, such as the "Bihar Startup Policy" and MSME support schemes, provided some support for formalisation, but the scale of the informal sector dwarfed these efforts. The state's reliance on central transfers and its limited own-source revenue constrained its ability to invest in GST administration infrastructure.
West Bengal, despite its historical administrative sophistication, faced unique challenges due to the large size of its informal sector and the legacy of its pre-GST tax structure. The state's commercial tax department had administered VAT for over a decade, but the transition to GST required significant retraining and reorganisation. The West Bengal government's approach to GST was initially marked by caution, with the state's representatives in the GST Council raising concerns about revenue loss and the impact on small businesses. The state's Finance Minister, Amit Mitra, was a vocal participant in GST Council deliberations, advocating for higher threshold limits and simpler compliance procedures for small taxpayers. West Bengal also faced the challenge of integrating its extensive bazaar (market) economy, particularly in Kolkata and district towns, into the GST framework. The city's historic trading communities, operating in markets like Burrabazar and Posta, had established practices of cash transactions, informal credit arrangements, and minimal record-keeping that were difficult to reconcile with GST requirements.
Jharkhand and Odisha, with their significant mineral-based industrial sectors, saw relatively better GST compliance in the organised mining and manufacturing segments but struggled with the informal and semi-formal sectors. Jharkhand's tribal-dominated economy, with its reliance on forest produce, small-scale agriculture, and local trade, presented particular challenges for a tax system designed for formal commercial transactions. Odisha's coastal districts, with their concentration of trade and services, had better GST adaptation than their western and southern hinterlands, where poverty and informality were more prevalent.
The northeastern states, with their special category status and limited economic base, received some concessions in GST design, including higher threshold limits for registration and compensation for revenue loss. However, the fundamental challenge of administering a complex digital tax system in regions with poor connectivity, limited technical expertise, and fragile institutional frameworks remained. The North Eastern Council (NEC) and various central government ministries provided support for GST implementation, but the gap between policy design and ground-level capacity persisted.
Businesses across India developed various strategies to adapt to GST, and these strategies reflected the resource constraints and institutional environments of different regions. In Western India, large corporations and organised businesses invested in ERP systems, hired dedicated GST compliance teams, and engaged professional tax consultants to optimise their tax positions. The presence of a well-developed ecosystem of chartered accountants, company secretaries, and GST practitioners in cities like Mumbai, Ahmedabad, and Pune facilitated this adaptation. Industry associations such as the Confederation of Indian Industry (CII), the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FICCI), and local bodies like the Gujarat Chamber of Commerce and Industry (GCCI) played active roles in educating members, lobbying for policy changes, and sharing best practices.
Small and medium enterprises (SMEs) in Western India also adapted, though with greater difficulty. Many SMEs invested in GST-compliant accounting software, subscribed to GSP services, and participated in training programs offered by industry associations and government agencies. The relatively higher turnover and profit margins of Western Indian SMEs provided some cushion for these compliance costs. Some SMEs restructured their operations to remain below the GST threshold, while others chose to register and absorb the compliance costs in anticipation of long-term benefits from input tax credits and access to formal supply chains.
In Eastern India, adaptation strategies were more constrained by resource limitations. Small traders and informal enterprises employed a range of coping mechanisms, including operating below the GST threshold, shifting to unregistered suppliers or customers, and maintaining dual sets of accounts (one for GST and one for actual transactions). These strategies, while often necessary for survival, carried significant risks, including penalties for tax evasion and exclusion from formal supply chains. Some businesses choose to exit the market entirely, particularly in sectors with thin margins and intense competition.
The role of GST practitioners and tax consultants was particularly important in Eastern India, where businesses often lacked the internal capacity for compliance. However, the supply of qualified GST practitioners was limited, and their services were often expensive relative to the means of small businesses. The government's initiative to train and certify GST practitioners, administered through the National Academy of Customs, Indirect Taxes and Narcotics (NACIN), helped to some extent, but the demand far outstripped supply in many Eastern Indian districts.
The emergence of digital platforms and fintech solutions provided new avenues for GST compliance, but their adoption was uneven. Platforms like ClearTax, Tally Solutions, and various GSPs offered simplified GST filing solutions, but their user base was concentrated in urban and semi-urban areas with better digital infrastructure. In rural Eastern India, where smartphone penetration was growing but digital literacy remained low, these platforms had limited reach. The government's own initiatives, such as the GST Practitioner module and the Sahaj and Sugam return forms for small taxpayers, were steps toward simplification but did not fully address the structural barriers faced by informal enterprises.
The experience of GST implementation in Eastern and Western India carries significant implications for the broader project of fiscal federalism and inclusive development in India. The tension between the goal of national tax uniformity and the reality of regional diversity is not unique to GST but is particularly acute in this case because of the tax's comprehensive scope and its direct impact on every business transaction. The findings of this study suggest several policy directions for making India's tax system more inclusive and regionally sensitive.
First, there is a need for greater differentiation in GST compliance requirements based on business size, sector, and regional context. While the Composition Scheme provided some differentiation, its limitations (particularly the denial of input tax credit and inter-state supply rights) created a rigid threshold effect that discouraged business growth. A more graduated approach, with simplified compliance procedures for small businesses that do not fully exclude them from the benefits of formalisation, could help bridge the gap between the informal and formal sectors. The concept of a "GST-lite" for micro-enterprises, with minimal record-keeping requirements and quarterly filing, has been advocated by scholars such as Arvind Panagariya and deserves serious consideration.
Second, the digital infrastructure for GST compliance needs to be significantly strengthened in underserved regions. This includes not only improving internet connectivity and GSTN portal reliability but also expanding the network of GST Seva Kendras, Common Service Centres, and trained GST practitioners in rural and semi-urban areas. The Digital India initiative, while ambitious, needs to be more closely integrated with GST administration to ensure that digital tax compliance does not become a new form of exclusion. Investments in digital literacy programs, particularly targeting women and marginalised communities in Eastern India, are essential for equitable GST implementation.
Third, the GST Council's decision-making processes need to be more responsive to the concerns of less developed states and small businesses. While the Council has made numerous adjustments to GST rates and procedures, the pace of change has often lagged behind the needs of stakeholders. Greater representation of MSME associations, informal sector representatives, and civil society organisations in GST Council consultations could improve the responsiveness of the tax system. The establishment of regional GST advisory committees, with representation from state governments, industry associations, and academic experts, could provide more granular feedback on regional implementation challenges.
Fourth, the revenue-sharing arrangements under GST need to be revisited to ensure that less developed states have adequate resources for development and GST administration. The Finance Commission's recommendations on tax devolution and grants-in-aid play a crucial role in this regard, but the GST compensation experience highlighted the vulnerabilities of states dependent on central transfers. A more robust equalisation mechanism, perhaps through a dedicated GST development fund for backward regions, could help address the structural disadvantages faced by Eastern Indian states.
Fifth, the linkages between GST formalisation and social protection need to be strengthened. If GST is to serve as a pathway from informality to formality, it must be accompanied by measures that make formalisation attractive and feasible for small businesses. This includes easier access to institutional credit (through schemes like the Pradhan Mantri MUDRA Yojana), social security coverage for informal workers (through the Employees' State Insurance Corporation and Employees' Provident Fund Organisation schemes), and business development services. The formalisation agenda should not be seen as merely a revenue-raising strategy but as part of a broader vision of inclusive economic development.
Sixth, sector-specific policies are needed to address the unique challenges of informal sectors with significant employment, such as handlooms, handicrafts, construction, and small retail. These sectors often have strong cultural and regional identities, and their preservation is important not only for economic reasons but also for social and cultural continuity. GST exemptions or concessional rates for handmade products, support for artisan clusters, and integration of informal workers into cooperative structures could help these sectors adapt without losing their essential character.
Seventh, the institutional capacity of state tax administrations in Eastern India needs substantial strengthening. This includes not only technical training in GST procedures but also investments in office infrastructure, computerisation, and taxpayer service delivery. The central government, through NACIN and other institutions, has a role to play in capacity building, but state governments must also prioritise tax administration in their budget allocations. Performance-based incentives for state tax officials, tied to measures of taxpayer satisfaction and compliance ease rather than merely revenue collection, could improve the quality of administration.
Eighth, the research and evidence base for GST policy needs to be expanded. While there is a growing body of literature on GST's macroeconomic impacts, micro-level studies of how specific businesses, sectors, and regions have adapted remain limited. Academic institutions, think tanks, and government agencies should collaborate on longitudinal studies tracking the evolution of informal enterprises under GST, the determinants of compliance behaviour, and the distributional impacts of tax reform. Such evidence is essential for designing policies that are grounded in reality rather than abstract models.
The Goods and Services Tax, heralded as India's most ambitious tax reform and the realisation of a long-cherished vision of "One Nation, One Tax," has fundamentally reshaped the country's economic landscape since its implementation on July 1, 2017. This research has examined the uneven realities that have emerged from this transformative reform, focusing on the divergent experiences of Eastern and Western India and the profound implications for informal economies, small businesses, and regional economic adaptation. The analysis reveals that while GST has delivered significant benefits in terms of creating a seamless national market, reducing tax cascading, and enhancing revenue collection in some sectors, its implementation has also exposed and exacerbated deep-seated regional disparities that threaten the inclusive vision of India's economic development.
The historical trajectories of Eastern and Western India, shaped by colonial legacies, post-independence industrial policies, and decades of divergent growth patterns, created fundamentally different economic structures by 2017. Western India, with its well-developed manufacturing base, sophisticated financial institutions, robust infrastructure, and higher levels of formalisation, possessed the institutional and human capital necessary to adapt to GST's demands. The region's businesses, ranging from large corporations to small and medium enterprises, could leverage existing digital infrastructure, professional services, and industry networks to navigate the complexities of GST compliance. The benefits of input tax credits, simplified logistics, and access to national markets were realised more fully in this context, reinforcing Western India's position as an economic powerhouse.
Eastern India, by contrast, confronted GST from a position of structural disadvantage. The legacy of deindustrialisation in West Bengal, prolonged economic stagnation in Bihar, the challenges of tribal development in Jharkhand, and the persistent underdevelopment of large parts of Odisha and the northeastern states created an economic environment where informality was not a marginal phenomenon but the dominant mode of survival for millions. The GST's digital compliance requirements, while technically neutral, functioned as a significant barrier in regions with limited internet connectivity, low digital literacy, and scarce professional support services. The costs of registration, return filing, record maintenance, and invoice matching were not merely administrative inconveniences but existential threats to the viability of small enterprises operating on razor-thin margins.
The informal economy, which employs the vast majority of India's workforce and constitutes a substantial share of its GDP, emerged as the critical terrain where the regional disparities of GST were most starkly manifested. The formalisation agenda embedded in GST design assumed that bringing informal enterprises into the tax net would create a virtuous cycle of growth, credit access, and productivity improvement. However, this assumption underestimated the structural constraints that perpetuate informality—limited capital, inadequate infrastructure, weak institutional support, and the absence of social safety nets. In Eastern India, where these constraints are most severe, GST compliance often led not to formalisation but to market exit, displacement of workers, and increased economic vulnerability. The choice between registering under GST and remaining outside the formal system was not a simple calculation of tax optimisation but a complex decision shaped by survival imperatives, social networks, and the limited alternatives available to informal entrepreneurs.
The digital divide emerged as a critical mediating factor in GST adaptation, transforming what was intended as a neutral technological platform into a mechanism of regional exclusion. The GSTN portal, e-waybills, e-invoicing, and the myriad other digital interfaces required for compliance assumed a level of technological access and literacy that remains unevenly distributed across India. Western Indian states, with their higher internet penetration, better digital infrastructure, and more extensive ecosystems of GST practitioners and service providers, adapted to these requirements with relative ease. Eastern Indian states, particularly their rural and semi-urban areas, faced a digital compliance burden that often exceeded their capacities, creating a scenario where the same tax law produced fundamentally different experiences for taxpayers in different regions. The COVID-19 pandemic, by accelerating digitalisation while simultaneously devastating informal livelihoods, highlighted both the potential and the perils of digital tax governance in a structurally unequal society.
The institutional responses to these challenges, while significant in their cumulative effect, have not been sufficient to address the structural roots of regional disparity. The GST Council's numerous rate adjustments, threshold modifications, and procedural simplifications demonstrate a commendable willingness to learn from experience and respond to stakeholder feedback. The expansion of the Composition Scheme, the simplification of return filing, and the temporary relief measures during the pandemic provided tangible benefits to small taxpayers. However, these adjustments have been largely reactive rather than transformative, addressing symptoms rather than underlying causes. The fundamental design of GST, with its emphasis on comprehensive coverage, invoice matching, and digital compliance, remains biased toward formal, organised, and digitally connected businesses—precisely the kind of enterprises that are more prevalent in Western than in Eastern India.
The state-level variations in GST administration and adaptation further underscore the importance of institutional capacity in determining reform outcomes. Western Indian states, with their stronger bureaucratic traditions, better-funded tax departments, and more developed business ecosystems, were able to support their taxpayers more effectively. Eastern Indian states, constrained by limited resources, weaker administrative capacity, and larger informal sectors, struggled to provide the outreach, education, and support services necessary for equitable GST implementation. The federal structure of GST, while designed to promote cooperation, has not fully addressed the asymmetries in state capacity that shape how the reform is experienced on the ground.
The policy implications of this analysis are far-reaching and demand a fundamental rethinking of how national tax reforms can be designed and implemented in a country as diverse as India. The tension between uniformity and differentiation, between the efficiency gains of a single national market and the equity imperatives of regional development, is not easily resolved. However, several directions for reform emerge from this study. A more graduated and context-sensitive approach to GST compliance, with simplified procedures for micro-enterprises and region-specific support mechanisms, could reduce the exclusionary impacts of the current system. Investments in digital infrastructure and literacy, particularly in underserved regions, are essential prerequisites for equitable tax governance. The strengthening of state institutional capacity, through both central support and state-level prioritisation, can improve the quality of tax administration and taxpayer services. The linkage between tax formalisation and social protection needs to be made explicit and robust, ensuring that the transition from informality to formality is accompanied by tangible benefits rather than merely additional burdens.
The scholarly contributions to this debate, from the foundational work of fiscal federalism theorists like Wallace Oates to the applied analyses of Indian economists like Arvind Subramanian, M. Govinda Rao, and Vijay Kelkar, provide valuable frameworks for understanding these challenges. The empirical research on informal economies by scholars such as Jan Breman, Barbara Harriss-White, and Ravi Srivastava illuminates the social and economic foundations of informality that tax policy must engage with. The digital political economy perspectives offered by researchers studying India's digital transformation highlight the risks of technological solutionism in governance. This research has sought to integrate these diverse strands of scholarship into a coherent analysis of GST's regional dimensions, contributing to the emerging literature on comparative GST studies and the political economy of tax reform in developing countries.
Looking ahead, the future of GST in India will be shaped by ongoing debates about rate rationalisation, the inclusion of currently excluded sectors (petroleum products, electricity, real estate), and the evolution of the federal fiscal architecture. The conclusion of the initial compensation period in 2022 has opened new questions about revenue sharing and state fiscal autonomy that will require careful negotiation. The experiences documented in this study suggest that any future reforms must be evaluated not only in terms of their national-level efficiency and revenue implications but also in terms of their distributional impacts across regions, sectors, and enterprise sizes. The vision of "One Nation, One Tax" can only be realised in a meaningful sense if it is accompanied by policies that ensure "One Nation, One Opportunity" for businesses and workers across all parts of India.
The comparative study of Eastern and Western India's adaptation to GST reveals a fundamental paradox at the heart of contemporary economic reform in developing countries: policies designed to create level playing fields often end up tilting them further in favour of those who are already ahead. The GST, by demanding a level of formalisation, digitalisation, and institutional capacity that is unevenly distributed, has inadvertently reinforced the historical advantages of developed regions while imposing new burdens on less developed ones. Addressing this paradox requires not merely technical adjustments to tax design but a deeper commitment to inclusive development that recognises the structural inequalities shaping India's economic geography.
In conclusion, the transition from localised tax systems to centralised digital taxation under GST represents a profound transformation of India's fiscal and economic landscape. This transformation has accelerated formalisation and enhanced efficiency in some contexts while creating new forms of exclusion and vulnerability in others. The uneven realities that have emerged from this reform challenge policymakers, scholars, and civil society to rethink the relationship between national unity and regional diversity, between formalisation and livelihood security, and between technological progress and social justice. As India continues to evolve its tax system and broader economic policies, the lessons from GST's regional implementation should inform a more nuanced, inclusive, and context-sensitive approach to governance—one that honors the vision of "One Nation, One Tax" not by imposing uniformity from above but by building the capacities and creating the conditions for all regions and all citizens to participate equitably in the nation's economic life. Only through such an approach can India's fiscal federalism fulfil its promise of combining national strength with regional equity, and only then can the ambitious project of GST truly serve as a foundation for sustainable and inclusive national growth.
References,