Religions do not encounter one another only through arguments over doctrine. They also meet in language, metaphor, memory and imagination. When a religious tradition enters a new linguistic and cultural world, the first question is rarely whether its vocabulary can be transferred word for word; the deeper question is whether its sacred universe can become intelligible without ceasing to be recognisably itself. The seventeenth-century Nabīvaṃśa of Saiyad Sultan provides an unusually revealing case of this problem. Composed in Bengali in the religiously plural environment of eastern Bengal and Arakanese-controlled Chittagong, the epic retells the history of prophecy and the life of Muhammad through a vocabulary that includes Niranjana, avatāra, aṃśa, Hindu cosmological motifs and Bengali epic conventions. Yet to describe this simply as “syncretism” is to miss the intellectual work taking place beneath the surface. The text is better understood as a sustained experiment in translation between religious horizons: an attempt to make Islamic salvation history intelligible within a Bengali world without abandoning the ultimate priority of Muhammad. Ayesha A. Irani's study of the Nabīvaṃśa demonstrates precisely this double movement: Islamic cosmology is translated through Bengali Vaiṣṇava, Dharma and Sāṃkhya concepts, while the resulting narrative simultaneously works toward the formation of a specifically Bengali Islamic community.
This problem can be illuminated through Hans-Georg Gadamer's hermeneutics. Gadamer's concept of the “fusion of horizons” describes understanding as an encounter in which a familiar horizon meets an unfamiliar one and both are placed within a newly negotiated field of meaning. Understanding, therefore, is not achieved simply by forcing the foreign into one's own conceptual system; it arises through mediation between the familiar and the strange. Paul Ricœur's later idea of “linguistic hospitality” similarly understands translation as an act of receiving the other language into one's own while temporarily inhabiting the other's linguistic world. Reading through these concepts, Saiyad Sultan's achievement becomes more than literary adaptation. The Nabīvaṃśa represents an act of religious and linguistic hospitality: Muhammad enters the Bengali imagination, but the Bengali imagination is simultaneously reorganised around Muhammad.
The central difficulty appears immediately in Sultan's treatment of the Nūr Muḥammadī, the primordial light associated with Muhammad. The Islamic vocabulary of nūr encounters the Bengali vocabulary of divine manifestation. Muhammad becomes intelligible through the term avatāra, while God is named Niranjana, and the primordial relation is expressed through aṃśa, or portion. At first sight, this appears to erase the theological distinction between Creator and creation. Yet the Islamic intellectual history behind Nūr Muḥammad is considerably older and more complicated than such a reading allows. Modern scholarship has traced the development of the idea through Sufi and Shiʿi intellectual traditions, including Sahl al-Tustarī, al-Ghazālī and later Ibn ʿArabī. The concept therefore cannot simply be dismissed as a Hindu import into Islam.
At the same time, an Islamic theological reading must preserve an important distinction. The Qur'an insists upon divine uniqueness: “There is nothing like Him” and “He neither begets nor is born.” The Qur'an also calls Muhammad an “illuminating lamp,” establishing a legitimate Islamic vocabulary of prophetic light without identifying Muhammad with God. The problem, therefore, is not whether light-language exists in Islam; it is what ontological status is given to that light. This distinction becomes essential when the Sultan's poetic language is compared with Sunni theological interpretations of Nūr Muḥammad.
The present study consequently asks a more precise question than whether the Nabīvaṃśa is “syncretic”: How does Saiyad Sultan translate Islamic prophetology into the Bengali religious imagination, and what does this translation reveal about the capacity of Islam to engage another civilisation without surrendering its claim to theological truth? The argument advanced here is that the Nabīvaṃśa should neither be reduced to Hinduization nor romanticised as uncomplicated religious harmony. It is a text of translation, contestation, incorporation and theological re. Its openness is real, but it is not relativistic. Sultan opens Islamic language to Bengali cultural forms precisely in order to place Muhammad at the centre of a universal history of revelation.
The historical setting of the Nabīvaṃśa is essential to understanding its method. Islam in Bengal did not develop in an empty cultural field. Muslim political power, commercial networks, Sufi institutions and local processes of conversion interacted with Hindu and Buddhist traditions, producing a social world in which religious identities were neither geographically isolated nor intellectually sealed. Asim Roy's classic The Islamic Syncretistic Tradition in Bengal interpreted Bengali Islam through the emergence of cultural mediators who translated Islamic concepts into local social and intellectual forms. Roy's larger thesis challenged the assumption that Islam in Bengal should simply be measured against a Middle Eastern standard and treated as a degraded or incomplete version of an “original” Islam.
Yet the word syncretism has limitations. It can suggest that two already-completed religions were simply mixed together, producing a third hybrid product. Nabīvaṃśa does something more dynamic. It does not merely place Muhammad beside Krishna, Rama or Śiva. It reorga the Bengali sacred past around an Islamic prophetic genealogy. Richard Eaton therefore makes a particularly important observation: although Sultan uses Indic terms such as avatāra, the epic retains a fundamentally Judeo-Islamic conception of prophecy. Its religious history is linear rather than cyclical; prophets appear successively as humanity's religious understanding becomes corrupted, and the sequence culminates in Muhammad.
This is precisely where translation becomes a more useful category than simple syncretism. Avatāra does not necessarily mean that Sultan has adopted the full Vaiṣṇava doctrine of incarnation. Rather, it functions as a cultural equivalent through which the Bengali reader can read something analogous to the Islamic nabī. The same is true of Niranjana. The name gives Bengali readers a familiar linguistic door through which to approach the Islamic conception of the one God. The conceptual vocabulary changes; the direction of the sacred history does not.
Irani's research makes this even clearer. She describes Sultan's project as a form of “vernacular translation” that includes lexical, literary, performative, theological and ideological dimensions. The Nabīvaṃśa helped establish a grammar of creative translation through which Arabic-Persian Islamic traditions could become Bengali. Translation here is therefore not the mechanical replacement of Arabic words by Bengali words. It is the relocation of a sacred world.
Gadamer helps explain why this matters. A tradition becomes intelligible to another community only when its concepts enter a horizon in which they can be recognised. Sultan's strategy can therefore be seen as an early form of intercultural hermeneutics. He does not ask the Bengali reader first to become linguistically Persianized or Arabized and only after encounter Islam. He brings Islamic sacred history into the language already inhabited by the reader.
Ricœur's idea of linguistic hospitality adds another dimension. Hospitality does not mean that the host ceases to be the host. It means that the foreigner is allowed to enter one's linguistic house. The Nabīvaṃśa performs t. Bengali does not cease to be Bengali; Islam does not cease to be Islam. Instead, Islamic salvation history is made to speak in Bengali forms.
The result is consequently not an absence of boundaries but a negotiation of boundaries. The text is open at the level of language, metaphor and cultural memory while remaining directional at the level of salvation history. That distinction will become crucial in understanding Muhammad's position in the epic.
The most intellectually difficult aspect of the Nabīvaṃśa is Sultan's treatment of Muhammad as primordial light. Here the Bengali conceptual vocabulary intersects with a substantial Islamic intellectual genealogy.
The idea of Nūr Muḥammad developed through several currents of Islamic thought. Modern scholarship has shown that the concept cannot be assigned exclusively to one sectarian tradition. Khalil Andani's study traces its development from early Shiʿi and Sufi thinkers through figures such as Jaʿfar al-Ṣādiq, Sahl al-Tustarī, al-Ghazālī and others, while the broader Sufi tradition eventually connected it with the al-Ḥaqīqa al-Muḥammadiyya, the Muhammadan Reality.
In Sultan's Bengali formulation, this primordial light is placed at the beginning of creation. Irani's textual analysis is particularly important here: Sultan calls the historical Muhammad Nūr Muhammad, thereby presenting him not merely as the final prophet but as the manifestation of a primordial prophetic principle that precedes the historical biography of Muhammad.
The Bengali imagination provides Sultan with an additional vocabulary for explaining this idea. The language of avatāra allows Muhammad to be understood as a divine manifestation, while aṃśa gives a conceptual image for the relation between the divine source and the created light. Irani argues that the Islamic doctrine of the primordial Muhammad is reflected through Bengali cosmological ideas including the sacred syllable oṃ, Sāṃkhya principles, the Dharma tradition and Vaiṣṇava avatāravāda.
But this is precisely where theological precision becomes necessary.
If avatāra is read literally according to its full theological meaning in a particular Hindu system, Muhammad becomes an incarnation of God. Such an understanding cannot simply be equated with orthodox Islamic tawḥīd. The Qur'an's theology establishes an absolute distinction between God and His creation. Allah is One, incomparable and ungenerated. Consequently, an academic reading must distinguish Sultan's poetic-cultural equivalence from a claim that Islamic theology accepts incarnation.
Interestingly, Sunni traditions themselves contain a substantial literature on prophetic light. Dawat-e-Islami's presentation of the Nūr Muḥammadī, drawing upon the Razavi tradition and classical authorities, explicitly describes Muhammad's light as a created reality and cites the well-known report attributed to Jābir concerning the creation of the Prophet's light before other created things. Dawat-e-Islami also reproduces discussions from Aḥmad Riḍā Khān's Fatāwā Riḍawiyya, where the crucial qualification is maintained: Allah is not a material substance from which a part could literally separate and become another being. The divine and the created must therefore not be confused.
This is an important corrective to the claim that the language of Nūr Muḥammad automatically negates tawḥīd. Within a particular Sunni-Sufi theological framework, one can affirm an exalted Muhammadan light while simultaneously insisting that God remains absolutely unlike creation. Dawat-e-Islami's materials explicitly preserve this distinction, stating that Allah is pure transcendence and that nothing literally separates from His divine essence to become created.
There is, however, genuine disagreement within Sunni scholarship. Some scholars accept Nūr Muḥammad as a metaphysical or devotional doctrine, while others reject the claim that the Prophet was literally created from divine light on the grounds that the relevant reports are not sufficiently established in the Qur'an and rigorously authenticated Sunnah. The academic value of this disagreement is precisely that it prevents us from treating “the Sunni view” as a single undifferentiated position.
The Nabīvaṃśa therefore occupies an interesting middle ground. Its language is more poetically expansive than the language of a formal Sunni creed, but its metaphysical vocabulary has genuine precedents in Islamic mystical thought. The task of the researcher is not to force Sultan into a modern sectarian category, but to ask which Islamic intellectual resources made his Bengali formulation possible.
The third level of the argument concerns the philosophical implications of Nūr Muḥammad. Here the thought of Ibn ʿArabī becomes particularly relevant, although one must avoid claiming that Sultan simply reproduced Ibn ʿArabī's metaphysics.
For Ibn ʿArabī, the Muhammadan Reality functions within a cosmological structure in which divine names and attributes become manifest through creation. Later Sufi metaphysics developed the language of the Perfect Human (al-insān al-kāmil), with Muhammad occupying the paradigmatic position. The Muhammadan Reality is therefore not reducible to the biological person born in Mecca; it becomes a metaphysical principle through which the relationship between the divine and the created order can be contemplated. Modern scholarship on Nūr Muḥammad has extended this development from early light traditions toward more elaborate metaphysical accounts.
The relevance to Sultan lies in the structure of mediation. The Bengali poet needs to explain how one God can stand behind the diversity of prophets, cultures and sacred histories. He therefore constructs a prophetic genealogy in which the divine message repeatedly enters human history. Muhammad becomes both beginning and culmination: primordial as Nūr, historical as Prophet, and final as Messenger.
This should not automatically be confused with the philosophical claim that “everything is literally God.” Even within Sunni discussions of Waḥdat al-Wujūd, the distinction between divine Being and created manifestation remains a major interpretive issue. Dawat-e-Islami's presentation of Aḥmad Riḍā Khān's position, for example, describes existence as belonging essentially to Allah while created things are understood as manifestations, reflections or shadows rather than independent divine beings.
This provides a useful conceptual bridge to Nabīvaṃśa. If creation is understood as dependent upon the One Creator, then recognising divine signs in different peoples and traditions does not necessarily require theological relativism. The existence of plurality does not imply plurality of ultimate sources. In Islamic terms, multiplicity can be understood within tawḥīd.
This is also where the Qur'anic understanding of religious history becomes important. The Qur'an asks Muslims to believe in Abraham, Ishmael, Isaac, Jacob, Moses, Jesus and the prophets, and explicitly commands believers not to reject the prophets as a class. The Qur'an also describes itself as confirming earlier scripture while functioning as a criterion over it. Thus Islamic universality is not constructed through the simple denial that other peoples ever received divine guidance. On the contrary, Islamic revelation presents itself as part of a larger history of prophetic communication.
This provides a theological explanation for something that might otherwise appear paradoxical in Sultan: Islam can recognise elements of truth outside its immediate historical community without accepting every later religious formulation as equally true.
That distinction is central to an understanding of Islam as an “open civilisation.” Openness here should not mean doctrinal indifference. It means the capacity to encounter other intellectual worlds, absorb languages, appropriate literary forms, and enter into cultural exchange while maintaining a central theological grammar.
The Nabīvaṃśa exemplifies this grammar. Its Bengali vocabulary is open; its literary form is open; its cosmological imagery is dialogical; its historical imagination is expansive. But its narrative is not directionless. The succession of prophets ultimately converges upon Muhammad.
Richard Eaton's interpretation is especially significant because it prevents the argument from becoming overly romantic. The epic does not merely place Islam and Hinduism on an equal theological plane. Rather, it incorporates Hindu figures into a prophetic history that culminates in Muhammad. Irani similarly shows that Sultan's reconfiguration of Hindu sacred figures and texts expands the narrative field of Islamic prophetology while ultimately establishing Muhammad's centrality.
Consequently, Sultan's openness is better described as integrative universalism than as relativism. He does not abandon the Islamic claim to a universal revelation; he makes that claim intelligible through the cultural resources of Bengal.
The final body of the argument must therefore return from metaphysics to Muhammad himself. The deepest question raised by Nabīvaṃśa is not simply why Sultan uses Hindu vocabulary. It is why he uses that vocabulary to construct a particular understanding of prophetic history.
Sultan's innovation is to provide Bengal with a sacred genealogy in which local religious figures can be placed within the history of divine communication. Irani calls this a “new prophetology for Bengal.” Her analysis shows that Sultan effectively creates a Purāṇa–Qurʾān salvation history in which Hindu divinities and sacred traditions are brought into an enlarged Islamic narrative.
This is more than accommodation. It is a form of theological translation.
The Bengali reader already possesses a world populated by divine manifestations, sacred genealogies, cosmic cycles and incarnational figures. The Sultan does not destroy that conceptual world at the entrance. Instead, he reo it. Krishna, Rama and other figures can be placed within a prophetic framework; Niranjana can function as a Bengali name for the One God; avatāra can become an intelligible equivalent for prophetic descent; and Muhammad can be positioned as the culminating figure of this extended sacred history.
The strategy is therefore simultaneously inclusive and corrective.
It is inclusive because the reader's existing religious memory is taken seriously. It is corrective because that memory is reorganised around a new theological centre. The result is neither simple replacement nor simple preservation. It is conversion through reinterpretation.
This helps explain why Irani describes the Nabīvaṃśa as an important instrument in the formation of Bengali Islam. Its achievement was not simply that it told Bengalis about an Arabian prophet. It established Muhammad inside Bengali cultural memory. The Prophet ceased to be linguistically foreign even though his historical origin remained Arabian.
This is perhaps the most important meaning of the title Muhammad Avatāra. The phrase is provocative precisely because it exposes the problem of religious translation. Muhammad does not become Krishna; rather, the conceptual vocabulary of avatāra becomes a vehicle through which the Bengali audience is taught to understand Muhammad.
In this sense, Sultan's project can be compared with what Gadamer describes as the transformation that occurs when horizons encounter one another. The Bengali horizon changes because Muhammad enters it, but Islam also becomes culturally Bengali through the process. Ricœur's linguistic hospitality provides a complementary formulation: the foreign sacred narrative is welcomed into the host language, but the host language is itself transformed through receiving it.
The importance of this process becomes even clearer when the contemporary question of religious antagonism is introduced. A religious identity constructed exclusively through opposition to the religious “other” possesses little capacity for intellectual encounter. The Nabīvaṃśa presents another historical possibility. Sultan demonstrates that a Muslim intellectual could enter deeply into another civilisation's vocabulary without surrendering the centrality of his own prophetic tradition.
That historical example complicates both extremes. On one side is the claim that religious fidelity requires cultural isolation. On the other is the claim that genuine pluralism requires all religions to be declared equally true. Sultan's text belongs to neither position. It suggests a third possibility: one can affirm one's own revelation while developing an interpretive language capable of recognising and engaging another civilisation.
The Qur'anic conception of religious history itself allows such a position. Muslims are instructed to affirm the prophets before Muhammad, including Moses and Jesus, while simultaneously regarding Muhammad as the bearer of the final revelation. The Qur'an thus creates an unusual combination of continuity and finality: continuity of revelation, finality of Muhammad.
The Nabīvaṃśa transforms this theological structure into Bengali epic form.
The significance of Nabīvaṃśa finally lies in a distinction that is often lost when religion is discussed through the binary categories of “orthodoxy” and “syncretism.” Saiyad Sultan's epic is neither adequately described as an accidental mixture of Hinduism and Islam nor adequately understood by extracting every Indic term and declaring it Islamic in an uncomplicated sense. It is a text of translation under conditions of religious plurality.
Asim Roy's concept of a Bengali Islamic syncretistic tradition remains valuable because it draws attention to the cultural mediation through which Islam became historically rooted in Bengal. But Eaton's intervention is equally necessary: the presence of Hindu terminology does not erase the fundamentally Islamic structure of Sultan's prophetology. Irani's work brings these perspectives into a more sophisticated synthesis by demonstrating that Sultan's project was one of vernacular translation, the transformation of Islamic cosmology, biography and salvation history into a Bengali intellectual world.
The theological question surrounding Nūr Muḥammad further confirms this complexity. The idea of prophetic light has a genuine history within Islamic mystical thought, and Sunni traditions have preserved different interpretations of it. Dawat-e-Islami's Razavi-oriented materials affirm an exalted Muhammadan light while simultaneously insisting that nothing literally separates from Allah's essence and becomes a created being. Other Sunni scholars reject a literal cosmological reading of the doctrine because they find insufficient authenticated evidence for it. Therefore, the academic conclusion should not be that “Islam teaches that Muhammad is a portion of God.” That would reproduce the very theological confusion that the research should investigate. The more defensible conclusion is that Sultan's language participates in a historical field of Islamic speculation about prophetic light while translating that field through Bengali categories of divine manifestation.
The same distinction applies to Waḥdat al-Wujūd. In its sophisticated Sufi formulations, the doctrine does not simply announce that Creator and creation are identical. Sunni discussions have repeatedly distinguished divine Being from created manifestations, even when describing the created world as dependent upon, reflective of or disclosed through divine Being. Thus, the philosophical vocabulary of unity can coexist with an uncompromising doctrine of divine transcendence, provided that the distinction between God as Necessary Being and creation as contingent existence is maintained.
This is where the idea of Islam as an open civilisation becomes analytically useful. Openness does not mean that Islam possesses no boundaries. Rather, it means that its civilisation historically possessed the capacity to translate, absorb, reinterpret and respond to intellectual materials originating outside its immediate cultural birthplace. Arabic Islam became Persian Islam, Turkish Islam, Indian Islam and Bengali Islam without requiring Muslims in every region to reproduce Arab cultural forms. The Nabīvaṃśa is one of the clearest literary demonstrations of this process.
Its openness, however, should not be confused with theological relativism. From the standpoint of Islamic theology, Islam understands itself not as a religion invented in seventh-century Arabia but as the continuation and completion of the primordial submission to the One God associated with Abraham and the earlier prophets. The Qur'an explicitly places Muhammad within a chain that includes Abraham, Ishmael, Isaac, Jacob, Moses and Jesus. It simultaneously presents the Qur'an as confirming and exercising authority over previous scripture. In this theological framework, the plurality of historical religions does not necessarily imply a plurality of ultimate divine sources.
That claim, however, must be distinguished from an academic claim about religious truth. A historian or comparative religion scholar can document that Islam presents itself as the continuation of primordial monotheism; the proposition that Allah is objectively the true God is a theological confession rather than an empirically demonstrable conclusion of historical method. Likewise, the claim that Muhammad is the definitive prophetic model is central to Islamic belief, while its ultimate truth belongs to the theological rather than merely historical register.
Yet this distinction does not weaken the importance of the Nabīvaṃśa. It clarifies what kind of argument can legitimately be made from it.
The epic demonstrates that Islamic universalism need not be constructed through cultural uniformity. Muhammad can be presented in Bengali without becoming merely a Bengali cultural hero; Islamic cosmology can converse with Vaiṣṇava and other Bengali cosmologies without simply dissolving into them; and a Muslim author can engage the sacred vocabulary of another civilisation without abandoning the claim that revelation has a final prophetic centre.
The paradox is therefore productive: the more deeply Sultan enters the Bengali religious imagination, the more deliberately he places Muhammad at the centre of it. Openness becomes the method through which universality is communicated.
For contemporary discussions of religious antagonism, this is perhaps the most valuable lesson of Nabīvaṃśa. Its historical importance does not lie in proving that all religions are identical, nor in demonstrating that theological differences do not matter. Its importance lies in showing that difference does not make dialogue impossible. Sultan's Bengali Islam was born not by eliminating the religious vocabulary of Bengal but by entering it, translating within it and ultimately transforming its sacred geography.
The Nabīvaṃśa therefore invites a different understanding of Islamic civ: not a civili closed within one language, one ethnicity or one inherited cultural form, but a civilisation capable of receiving languages, intellectual traditions and cultural memories while continuing to articulate its own theological centre. In the Sultan's world, the Bengali horizon does not disappear before Islam; it becomes the very horizon through which Islam speaks.
And Muhammad, rather than appearing simply as a foreign Arabian figure, becomes the prophetic figure through whom this newly translated world understands its own place within a universal history of revelation.
That is why the Nabīvaṃśa deserves to be read again—not merely as an artefact of “syncretic” Bengal, but as a sophisticated record of what happens when a universal religion encounters a civ different from its own and chooses translation rather than silence, engagement rather than isolation, and theological conversation rather than cultural erasure.
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