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Cybercrime has always been linked to immediacy, ready data theft, immediate financial frauds or ransomware attacks asking to be paid quickly. But the modern landscape of cyber threats shows a more long-term and more strategic enemy. Many criminals and even government-sponsored organisations today are pursuing long-term data theft techniques by stealing encrypted data, hoping that with the technological progress in the future, they will be able to steal more encrypted data. This solution is often known as Harvest Now, Decrypt Later (HNDL): it is associated with the expected emergence of quantum computing. The plan symbolises a paradigm shift in the logic of cybercrime when time is turned into an accomplice of the attackers, and encryption does not guarantee the long-term security of the message any longer.

Harvest Now, Decrypt Later: Strategic Logic.

The mathematical basis of modern encryption has formed the basis of the Harvest Now, Decrypt Later model. The current secure digital systems are mostly based on the public-key cryptographic RSA and Elliptic Curve Cryptography. The reason why these systems are said to be secure is the fact that it would take classical computers an impractical time, usually in the measurement of billions of years at a time, to crack them. Nonetheless, quantum computing

brings out a paradigm shift. As shown by researchers, quantum algorithms, especially the algorithm invented by Shor, can theoretically crack these encryption schemes within a practical time limit as soon as quantum computers of adequate power are available.

The indefinite storing of encrypted data at relatively low costs means that now attackers have incentives to accumulate as much encrypted data as possible. Data that holds long confidentiality periods, like that of government records, biometric data, healthcare and intellectual property are especially appealing according to cybersecurity researchers. The analysis on the Wikipedia of Harvest Now, Decrypt Later, points out the fact that such a measure is already altering the way the opponents are mounting espionage-oriented, cyber-related activities instead of immediate criminal endeavours.

Practical Evidence of Long-Term Data Harvesting.

Despite the lack of a proven high-profile event of quantum decryption, it is possible to refer to high-profile encrypted data theft that follows the HNDL threat model. The most memorable one was the breach of the United States Office of Personnel Management (OPM) in 2015. In this case, offenders stole sensitive background investigation files of about 21 million people, including fingerprints, security clearance information, and personal records. Most of the data had been coded, but subsequently, intelligence analysts expressing the future sensitivity of the stolen material, noted that it was among the priority in being decrypted at a later date once the cryptographic security measures were compromised. Similarly, intelligence reports in the United Kingdom have raised concerns about the possibility of mass theft of encrypted personal and government data by foreign actors. According to a report by The Times, the fact that there is no exploitation immediately implies that the stock is being hoarded as a technological asset in the future and not as an asset to be used currently, which was in line with HNDL behaviour.

Financial Systems and Quantified Risk.

The financial sector is the most prone to delayed decryption, which is caused by lengthy data retention demands and extensive dependency on cryptographic trust systems. A peer-reviewed report in the European Scientific Journal established that in excess of 60% of the financial institutions store encrypted transaction data and authentication records for over ten years to fulfil regulatory requirements. The research cautioned that any decryption event of the future, which was facilitated with quantum power, could reveal the data of transactions in the past, break the digital signatures, and erode confidence in the financial mechanism, many years after the initial stealing of the data.

The statistics of the industry support these fears. In a 2024 TechRadar Pro survey, more than two-thirds (65%) of large companies rate quantum computing as a larger threat to long-term cybersecurity than ransomware. It was interesting to note that organisations also raised the issue that encrypted messages stolen years ago might suddenly be deciphered, which generates retrospective breaches that cannot be fixed.

Healthcare Data as a High-Value Target.

Healthcare data is a good example of the threat of the Harvest Now, Decrypt Later approach. The most sensitive types of personal information are medical records, diagnostic histories, and genomic data, and they are frequently saved over a long period (decades). IBM's report on the Cost of a Data Breach (2023) reports that healthcare breaches have incurred the highest costs in all sectors over the last thirteen years, incurring an average of USD 10.9 million per data breach incident. Although the majority of healthcare breaches are publicly linked to ransomware, cybersecurity specialists warn that encrypted backups and archived records are

often stolen in the process of the attack, which implies that there must be other reasons to target the bank directly, than merely to extort the organisation with the threat of information exposure. In case these encrypted medical records are later decrypted, there is the likelihood that the information stored in them will forever be revealed: genetic predispositions, mental health history, chronic illness records, etc. Medical data cannot be altered once unveiled, and therefore,  late decryption can be quite damaging as opposed to financial data, in which it sometimes may be erased or substituted.

Implications for Government and National Security.

Harvest Now, Decrypt Later is among the most troubling cyber threats as far as national security is concerned. The documents of government communications, intelligence evaluations, and defence planning often have that much-needed confidentiality and span decades. The HNDL analysis of Wikipedia provides that the nation-state actors are the most probable practitioners of this strategy because of their extended time of operations and the availability of vast resources.

Governments have realised this threat and have started moving to post-quantum cryptography. In 2024, the U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology published its initial quantum-resistant cryptography standards, which precisely state that the threat is real, rather than hypothetical, as violent attacks on sensitive data are now present and can be impacted despite the advent of quantum computers.

Imminent Cyber Threats: Artificial Intelligence, Body-Hacking, and Mind Games.

Besides long-term encrypted data theft, cybersecurity experts are also alarmed by the growing number of problems related to the AI-driven attacks acting autonomously. Also known

as shadow agents, such programs can scan the networks, identify weaknesses, and launch attacks without the need for a human operator. These systems extend the privacy of cybercriminals, and it enables an intrusion to be made on a continual basis even in circumstances where human intruders are not online. More risks to companies include model poisoning, in which attackers intentionally alter AI training data, audit to induce wrongful output or disclose personal data. Equally, quick hijacking may deceive AI systems like chatbots, which would then bypass the security systems within the companies and divulge secrets.

With new technologies in the form of wearable devices and connected health technology, new gateways of cybercrime have been formed. Body-hacking means theft of sensitive information on devices, such as smartwatches, fitness trackers or smart medical equipment. Personal health data, locations and or functionality of devices can be monitored or even compromised by hackers. The worst possible result with bio-ransom attacks is that essential medical equipment (like a heart monitor and a prosthesis) is held hostage and must be paid a ransom. These threats also indicate that cybercrime has ceased to be restricted only to traditional IT systems, but has also become a major challenge to physical and biological systems.

Another changing approach in current cybercrime is the psychological manipulation. Attackers can impersonate trusted people through deepfake technologies and AI-created content in video calls or messages and make so-called live clones. Such attacks utilise human faith, and could be applied to steal money, passwords, or other vital information. Moreover, synchronised actions on social media may produce mood variations, disseminating fake or frightening data to update the behaviour of people, the stock exchange, or the political choice. These tricks depict the manner in which the technology, as well as human perception, are being aimed at by cybercriminals.

Though these AI, body-hacking, and mind-game attacks are not specifically related to threats of quantum encryption, they are a significant aspect of contemporary cybercrime. They show how criminals are evolving and becoming more advanced, targeting autonomous systems, personal devices, and psychological weaknesses. Organisations should thus implement holistic cybersecurity approaches that deal with technical and human-oriented threat factors in addition to equipping themselves with the possibility of future threats from quantum computing facilities.

Preventive Measures and Future Outlook

The increasing trend in cybercrimes, whereby criminals are employing the Big Wait advantage, requires organisations to evolve with the type of security provided in the future. A post-quantum cryptography (PQC) adoption is one of the most urgent steps and entails a set of algorithms particularly hardened to withstand attacks by quantum computers. Algorithms standardised by other agencies, such as NIST, are quantum-resistant and have already been standardised, and governments and businesses are encouraged to migrate to quantum-resistant algorithms before quantum computers are capable of breaking classical encryption.

The other important measure is cryptographic agility, which enables organisations to modify or change encryption algorithms quickly as new threats arise. This will work to guarantee that long-term attacks are not a possibility, as even if data is stolen today in the form of encrypted data, it can be covered retroactively through the rotation of the algorithm. As an illustration, certain financial institutions have started putting into place systems where the cryptography protocols in databases and communication channels are automatically updated, minimizing delay decryption attack threats.

The management of the data lifecycle is also important. One of the recommendations that organisations move forward with is to categorise sensitive data based on its retention period and confidentiality needs. Enterprises reduce their vulnerability to future quantum attacks by ensuring that the encryption standards are stronger when protecting long-lived data, such as personal health information or government records, and regularly reviewing the encryption standards. Simultaneously, backup and archival programs have to guarantee that the encrypted copies are safely stored, and redundancy and authentication mechanisms are employed to exclude the prospect of unauthorised leakage.

In the future, governments, the private industry and academia will be required to collaborate and track the advancement of quantum computing and make appropriate adjustments in cybersecurity measures. Cybersecurity experts assume that in the upcoming ten years, there will be a possibility of commercially viable quantum computers, which would render today's encrypted information quite likely. Companies that implement quantum-safe measures today will not only secure their assets at this time but also be able to withstand this threat in the future.

The shift toward the future, long-range approach to cybercrime fundamentally changes the perspective on data security in terms of the way it has to be perceived. The encoding that highlights the method of privacy provided by Harvest Now, Decrypt Later attacks reveals that it is no longer adequate, since it cannot last the test of time due to increasing computer advances in the future. Practical hacks, industry-specific data-keeping and an increasing government worry recommend that there is a desire amongst the attackers to have a post-quantum world. A company that does not develop could find that its most confidential data was leaked many years ago, and only now it has been revealed, when the organisation is no longer able to react to the event. Being ready to counter the cyber threats in the quantum era is consequently not an obligation that lies in the future but a current need.

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