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The current practice in the Indian legal system is to widen the application of Article 21 and the Constitution's assurances of rights to everyone, including non-human beings. This study unfolds and analyzes the aspects of animal protection and scrutinizes the recent judgments in India.

Introduction

The novel phenomenon in Indian law is to enhance the scope of Article 21 and the Constitutional rights not just for humans but also for non-humans. Every species has a right to life and security, subject to local laws that may include taking that right away for reasons of human necessity, as observed by the Supreme Court of India. A disturbance from the basic environment, which includes all forms of life, including animal life, which are necessary for human life, falls within the meaning of Article 21 of the Constitution, even as it protects the rights of humans. The word “life” has been given an expanded definition and is protected under Article 21 of the Constitution. After that, High Courts in many states are developing animals, High Court of Tripura outlawed animal sacrifice because the term "life" in Article 21 of the Indian Constitution is broad enough to embrace all living things, including people, animals, insects, and birds, and since taking life also requires following the proper legal procedures. Nowhere in the law is animal sacrifice permitted in the name of religion. The Constitution's Article 25 (1) protection of the freedom of religion does not extend to the right to sacrifice animals. The entire animal kingdom, including avian and aquatic species, has been deemed legal persons by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana. These persons have the same rights, obligations, and liabilities as living individuals. The Delhi High Court ruled that all birds have the fundamental right to free flight and that no human has the right to hold them in tiny cages for any reason, whether commercial or otherwise. As ordered by the High Court of Uttarakhand, further observed that owners who abandon their animals including cows, oxen, bulls, and buffaloes are also guilty of cruelty

The legal status of animals in judicial activism

The Ramlila Maidan case established that the Constitution provides more than just basic human rights protection. The catena of judgments also mentions preserving and protecting people, animals, plants, rivers, hills, and the natural world. Our Constitution affirms both individual rights and obligations as well as collective life and responsibility on one hand. Subject to the laws of the land, which may include denying a species' life for reasons of human necessity, every species has a right to life and security. While human rights, Article 21 of the Constitution also safeguard life.

The term "life" has an expanded definition, and any disturbance to the basic environment which includes all forms of life, including animal life that is required for human life, is considered a violation of Article 21. Recently, in the case of T. N. Godavarman Thirumulpad v. Union of India, the Supreme Court of India accepted and applied eco-centric principles.

“Ecocentrism places a strong emphasis on the natural world, where non-human animals are seen as having intrinsic worth.”

In other words, obligations to non-humans exist independently of human interests and human interests do not always take primacy. Ecocentrism, therefore, emphasizes the value of living things and nature, which encompasses both humans and other species. The Supreme Court very skilfully interpreted the significance of migratory birds for improved ecology in Sachidanand Pandey v. State of West Bengal, and in Tarun Bharat Sangh v. Union of India, the Court restrained the issuance of mining permits for lime and dolomite stones in the Sariska Tiger Park to protect wild animals. The Supreme Court appealed for the preservation of the environment and wildlife after citing a directive from Emperor Asoka that was issued in the third century BC.

In Navin M. Raheja v. Union of India, the court took into account Article 48A of the Constitution, the Wildlife (Protection) Act of 1972, and the Forest Act of 1927 for the protection of wild animals. The judiciary also intervened in cases involving the management of wildlife, such as WWF v. Union of India and the Centre for Environmental Law. The Central and State Governments were given orders by the case to provide forest guards with updated weapons and communication equipment as soon as possible to deal with current wildlife crimes. Here, the Supreme Court of India roughly classified the genesis and growth of public interest litigation into three phases. First Phase concerns cases handled by this Court in which directives and orders were primarily issued to safeguard the fundamental rights under Article 21 of marginalized groups and sections of society who are unable to approach this court or the High Courts due to extreme poverty, illiteracy, and ignorance. The cases about ecology, environment, forests, wildlife, mountains, rivers, historical sites, etc. Are dealt with in the second phase. The third phase focuses on court-issued directives for upholding integrity, transparency, and probity in governance.

Non-human beings under Article 21

The Indian judiciary has been extending the reach of the Constitution and Article 21 to include non-human animals as well as citizens and people. According to the Supreme Court, Article 21 of the Constitution protects life in addition to protecting human rights. The term “life” has been given a wider definition, and any disturbance to the basic environment which includes all forms of life, including animal life that is necessary for maintaining human life, is considered a violation of Article 21 of the Constitution. When reading the Cattle Trespass Act of 1871, the High Court of Gujarat concluded that cattle, like people, have life within them. The Court holds that even animals have the right to assert that their freedom cannot be taken away except in compliance with the law.

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Numerous laws acknowledge animals’ rights. The High Court of Delhi determined that conducting the bird trade violated the rights of the birds. Despite established law that states that birds have a basic right to fly, cannot be imprisoned, and must be left free in the skies, no one seems to care if they have been treating the animals cruelly or not. They are intended for the same thing. However, they are illegally imported into other nations where they lack access to adequate food, water, medical care, and other necessities that are mandated by law. Fundamental rights for birds include the right to a dignified existence and the prohibition against cruelty by anyone. As a result, all birds have the fundamental right to the sky, and no human has the right to hold them in tiny cages for their own or other purposes. The Gujarat High Court ruled that keeping birds in cages would amount to their illegal confinement and be a breach of their freedom to dwell in the open sky and free air in Muhammad Bhai Jalalbhai Serasiya v. the State of Gujarat. As a result, the High Court ordered that such illegally imprisoned birds be released into the open sky or air.

The Madras High Court ruled in S. Kannan v. Commissioner of Police, that all types of birds, including poultry, must be protected from cruelty of any kind, noting that “the birds and animals are entitled to co-exist alongside humans.” The Court further issued orders outlawing any additional bird or animal fights intended to amuse onlookers, including cockfights.

In response to a petition filed by PETA India21, the National Green Tribunal, Principal Bench, New Delhi took proactive action and ordered all state governments to outlaw the production, sale, storage, purchase, and use of synthetic Manjha or Nylon thread and all other similar synthetic threads used for kite flying. The respondents were also instructed to impose a nationwide import ban on all synthetic Manjha or Nylon thread. Throughout the nation’s whole length and breadth, it is used at festivities. By using such nylon or synthetic thread, many birds have been killed, and rare, endangered birds like the Indian White Rumped Vulture regularly suffer injuries or even perish.

In Narahari Jagadish Kumar vs. State of Andhra Pradesh case was related to preventing organizing cock fights with betting during the Sankranthi festival in Krishna, West Godavari, and East Godavari Districts of Andhra Pradesh. The High Court issued directions to State Government as well as District authorities to take stringent steps to stop such bloody and gruesome throughout the year. In the line of A. Nagaraja case also held that the right to dignity and fair treatment was not confined to human beings alone but animals as well.

“Animals also had a right not to be tortured by human beings, and from being inflicted with unnecessary pain or suffering.”

Any disturbance from the basic environment which included all forms of life, including animal lives which were necessary for human life, falls within the ambit of Article 21.

The Uttaranchal High Court recently declared the glaciers, including Gangotri and Yamunotri, rivers, streams, rivulets, lakes, air, meadows, dales, jungles, forests, wetlands, grasslands, springs, and waterfalls, legal entities or legal persons or juristic persons or juridical persons or artificial persons having the status of a legal person, with all corresponding rights, duly recognized legal persons.

Additionally, they received privileges that were comparable to legal or basic rights. The High Court of Uttarakhand used the doctrine of parents patriae to issue orders in response to a public interest petition for the welfare of cows and other stray cattle, specifically to prohibit the illegal slaughter of cows and the sale of their meat, to protect stray cattle and provide shelter for them, and to prevent the illegal transportation of cattle. The legal, social, and biological aspects of non-human animals are significant factors in “Animal Law,” a relatively recent topic where attitudes toward them have evolved. Was v. Rights The phrase “animal” was hardly unknown fifty years ago?

However, there was no correlation between the frequency of use and any improvement in the meaning’s clarity. Analysis of the phrase as it is used in law and culture as a whole raises more questions than it answers, raising the question of whether the phrase is even useful as a vehicle for meaningful communication. Therefore, there is a progression in animal laws from economic goals through logical targets to ethical justifications. In parallel, animal rights have been developed, and the legal framework has evolved from conservation to protection to wellbeing.

The doctrine of parens patriae in animal protection

In the famous A. Nagaraja case, the Supreme Court ruled that because animals are incapable of caring for themselves in contrast to humans, they have rights that must be protected under the doctrine of parens patriae. In a similar vein, the High Court of Himachal Pradesh has cited the parens patriae theory in addition to other constitutional clauses to defend the fundamental rights of animals. The High Court has ruled that it is unlawful to sacrifice any animals or birds in any place of religious observance, adoration, or precincts, or during any religious gathering or procession on a public street, way, or location. Additionally, the State Government has been ordered to start printing and distributing pamphlets to raise awareness. According to the “New Environment Justice Jurisprudence” and parens patriae principles, the courts have a responsibility to safeguard the environment.

The idea of parens patriae acknowledges the State’s role as a parent and guardian of its citizens, especially when those persons are unable to defend themselves. The State is required to implement all protective measures that a social welfare State is committed to under Articles 38, 39, and 39-A of the Preamble to the Constitution, read with directive principles. It’s interesting to note that this idea was accepted in India before the establishment of the Constitution. The Supreme Court acknowledged the State’s responsibility as parens patriae while allowing the applicants to proceed with their case.

The petitioner’s personality to bring a lawsuit on behalf of future generations, according to the Court, “may only be grounded on the concept of intergenerational responsibility.” Infants, fools, and lunatics are only a few of the different types of people over whom the sovereign authority has some semblance of guardianship due to their need for protection as a result of their legal disabilities. The establishment of a system of wardship, which gave the Crown the authority to exercise different legal rights on behalf of those who were deemed unable to properly manage their affairs and were referred to as “wards,” marks the beginning of the parens patriae jurisdiction in the 1272–1307 reign of King Edward I.

The sovereign has the right to exercise Parens Patriae jurisdiction, and as such, must safeguard those with disabilities who lack an appropriate guardian in the public good. The meaning of the phrase “Parens Patriae” varies depending on the nation; whilst in England, it refers to the King, in America it refers to the people. The concept behind the parens patriae doctrine is that for the State to fulfill its duties, it must guard and preserve the rights and privileges of its citizens. According to Airedale, the parens patriae (father of the country) jurisdiction was under the control of the Crown and dates back to the 13th century.

This idea, which had its beginnings in British law as early as the 13th century, said that it was the King’s responsibility as the Sovereign to protect the person and property of individuals who were unable to defend themselves. The parens patriae jurisdiction that originally belonged to the King has been transferred to the Court as a branch of the State. This Latin phrase, which means “parent of his or her country,” was first used in Roman law to refer to the emperor as the physical representation of the State. According to this idea, the government has the right to bring a lawsuit on behalf of a citizen, particularly if that citizen has a legal impediment to doing so 

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To preserve and conserve the Ganga and Yamuna rivers, the Uttarakhand High Court recently declared the Ganga and Yamuna rivers, all of their tributaries, streams, and every natural water flowing flow continuously or intermittently of these rivers to be juristic or legal persons or living entities while exercising parens patrie jurisdiction. These rivers now have the status of a legal person with all of the corresponding rights, duties, and liabilities of a living person. In the case of Lalit Miglani v. the State of Uttarakhand. The Uttaranchal High Court declared the glaciers, including Gangotri and Yamunotri, rivers, streams, rivulets, lakes, air, meadows, dales, jungles, forests, wetlands, grasslands, springs, and waterfalls, legal entities or legal persons or juristic persons or juridical persons or artificial persons having the status of a legal person, with all the corresponding rights, duties, and liabilities of a living person, to protect the rights of the parties Additionally, they received privileges that were comparable to legal or basic rights.

The petitioner asked the respondents in a pro bono public case before the Uttarakhand High Court to restrict the passage of horse carts from Nepal to India and from India to Nepal through District Champawat as well as to vaccinate and examine horses near the border. Finally, the High Court issued several directives for the welfare of animals and ruled that every animal in the animal kingdom, including avian and aquatic species, is a legal person with the same rights, obligations, and liabilities as a living being. As the human face for the care and protection of animals, all of the citizens of the State of Uttarakhand were declared persons in loco parentis.

Recently, the Uttarakhand High Court issued nearly 30 mandatory directives for the welfare of cows and other stray cattle in response to a public interest petition, using the “Doctrine of parents patriae High Court of “ to uphold the prohibition of illegal cow slaughter and meat sales, the protection of stray cattle and their shelter, as well as the prevention of illegal cattle transportation. Parens patriae is Latin for “parent of the nation.” The “royal prerogative” concept serves as the foundation for the parens patriae common law action.

Parens patriae public nuisance claims for water and air pollution were used in several interstate environmental lawsuits in the early twentieth century. By the turn of the twentieth century, states were suing other states using their parens patriae powers to protect natural resources and territory.

Judicial confront on cruelty to animal

In the case of Moti Lal v. Central Bureau of Investigation, the appellant was detained in connection with an offense that was prohibited by Sections 9, 39(3), 44, 49, 50, 51, 57, and 58 of the Wild Life (Protection) Act, Sections 429, 379, and 411 of the Indian Penal Code, and Sections 10 and 15 of the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act. Through a notification from the Central Government, the Central Government’s decision to transfer the investigation was contested in a Writ Petition before the High Court of Allahabad, which was dismissed. An appeal was then filed with the Supreme Court of India. The appellant argued that the Wild Life Act is a special law as defined by Section 5 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and that it contains comprehensive provisions for investigation, inquiry, search, seizure, compounding of offenses, trial, and punishment. As a result, the Police Force Establishment was not authorized to investigate the case under the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, according to the appellant. He further stated that, by the notification issued under Section 3 of the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, the Special Police Force’s investigative authority is restricted concerning crimes committed within Union Territories.

In this case, the Supreme Court did not determine that the High Court’s order was invalid or unlawful. Here, the Indian Penal Code and the Wild Life Act had been violated, and the Central Government had issued a notification under Sections 5 and 6 of the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act authorizing the CBI to investigate. The design of Section 50 of the Wild Life Act makes it crystal apparent that police officers have the authority to look into offenses, search for, and seize contraband. No other specific rule to the contrary requires the Code of Criminal Procedure to be observed during the trial of offenses.

In the case Narahari Jagadish Kumar v. State of Andhra Pradesh, three writ petitions were filed to declare the respondents’ failure to carry out the provisions of the A.P. Gaming Act, 1974 and the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act, 1960 against antisocial elements who organized cockfights with betting, sold illegal alcohol, engaged in gambling, and mistreated animals and birds during the Sankranthi festival in the Krishna, West Godavari.

As per the petitioner's Knives, blades, and iron claws were fastened to the legs of the rooster to make the fight bloody and gruesome throughout the year.

“Cock fights were a cruel sport in which cocks and roosters were forced to fight or sometimes to death.”

Such cock cocks or roosters were subjected to needless pain and suffering in contravention of Sections 3 and 11(1)(m)(ii) and (n) of the 1960 Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act. District Collectors and District Superintendents of Police used to turn a blind eye to the events since they were political patronage. Additionally, it was claimed that cockfighting contests, in which two specially bred roosters were trained to fight and given steroids to make them stronger,

The deadly sport of cockfighting used to make spectators insensitive to the agony and misery of animals, and it encouraged individuals to shirk their constitutionally mandated need to have compassion for all living things. (1) By the Supreme Court’s rulings in Geeta Seshamani v. Union of India 45 and Gauri Maulekhi v. Union of India 46, the Government of A.P. should establish SPCAs in all Districts as soon as possible and, in any case, no later than 31.01.2017.

The District Collectors of all the Districts, more specifically those of West Godavari, East Godavari, Krishna, and Guntur, shall form joint inspection teams for each Mandal in their respective Districts, consisting of a police officer not below the rank of Sub-Inspector of Police, the Tahsildar, and a representative of the Animal Welfare Board of India or a member of a non-governmental organization championing the cause of animals or persons involved in the prevention of cruelty to animals. Upon learning about playgrounds and cockpits, the District Collect, the Commissioners of Police, or the Superintendent of Police of the District, should act right away to prevent conducting cockimpose Section 144 Cr.P.C. if necessary.

The Joint Fights and May Inspection Team should have the right to enter any property and seize any cocks or roosters that were meant to be set up for cockfights as well as any equipment used or meant to be utilized for the fights and any money raised to discourage betting at such events. Each District Collector, Commissioner of Police, and Superintendent of Police, especially from those four Districts, should ensure that the provisions of the A.P. Gaming Act of 1974 and the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act of 1960 are effectively implemented. They should also take personal responsibility for any violations.

The cruelty to the many elephants held by private individuals in the State of Kerala was the subject of the Writ Petition in Wildlife Rescue and Rehabilitation Centre vs. Union of India case. Every person who has control, custody, or possession of a captive animal is required by Section 40 of the Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972 to report to the Chief Wild Life Warden or the designated officer the number and description of the animal, or article of the foregoing description, under his control, custody, or possession, as well as the location where such animal or article is kept. According to Section 2(5) of the Act, Indian elephants (Elephas maximus) are considered “captive animals” in this situation.

While the State contended that unless the elephants were protected by Sections 21 or 22 of the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act, 1960, there was no rationale for their registration. However, it was also suggested that an animal does not need to be registered under the 1960 Act unless it is performing. The Kerala Captive Elephants (Management and Maintenance) Rules, 2012 were created by the State Government, according to the Court, and under Rule 8(13), each owner is required to keep an Elephant Data Book that is specific to each captive elephant as determined by the Chief Wildlife Warden.

The Court also decided that the District Committee established by the Rule of 2012 would take the necessary actions to ensure that the festival committees established to ensure the successful conduct of festivals or the individuals responsible for organizing events where elephants are exposed are required to abide by numerous regulations. To ensure adequate and efficient control, the Court further ordered that the Temples or Devaswom register with the district committee.

Indian judiciary on performing animal

In contrast to Rule 2 (h) of the Performing Animals (Registration) Rules, 2001, which defined a performing animal as an animal used at or for any entertainment including a film or an equine event to which the public is admitted, the term “performing animal” refers to any animal that is used at, or for entertainment to which the public is admitted through the sale of tickets. In 1991, the Ministry of Environment and Forests (MoEF) issued a notification under Section 22 of the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act, 1960, outlawing the training and exhibition of bears, monkeys, tigers, panthers, and dogs. This notification was contested by the Federation v. Union of India Indian Circus before the Delhi High Court, but a corrigendum was later released that excluded dogs from the original notification.

A Committee was established on the Delhi High Court’s instruction, and based on the Committee’s report, a notification removing dogs from its scope was published on October 14, 1998. The Supreme Court was once more asked to rule on the validity of the notification, but it was upheld. In a later notification, dated 11.7.20 11, the MoEF prohibited “Bulls” from the display and from being trained as performers. The position of performing animals in India, according to A. Nagaraja. The validity of Section 22 of the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act, 1960, and the Notification under Section 22, which states that no person shall train or exhibit any of the animals specified therein, namely, bears, monkeys, tigers, panthers, and lions, was the main issue in the case N.R. Nair v. Union of Indi, which was decided. A notification under Section 22 was previously issued on March 2nd, 1991, prohibiting the training and exhibition of dogs, tigers, panthers, bears, and monkeys.

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The Indian Circus Federation appealed this Notification to the Delhi High Court. After the Notification was published, a correction was made in which “dogs” were removed from the original Notification. The Government of India established a committee after a Division Bench of the Delhi High Court issued an order on August 21, 1997, consisting of the Additional Inspector General (Wildlife), the Director of the Wildlife Institute of India, the Member Secretary of the Central Zoo Authority, the Additional IGF (Retd. ), and the Director of Animal Welfare. The aforementioned Committee provided a comprehensive Report, and by it, the contested Notification dated October 14, 1998, was published under Section 22 prohibiting the exhibition and training of bears, monkeys, tigers, panthers, and lions. The current petitioner once more contested the aforementioned Notification in the Kerala High Court, but the High Court affirmed the validity of the aforementioned.

A Civil Appeal was brought before the Supreme Court of India in opposition to this High Court ruling. According to the appeal, no order could be made denying the appellants possession of the animals. The circus proprietors were forbidden from training or showing any of the five animals mentioned in the contested Notification, albeit the Court did not address this issue. The Supreme Court concurred with the High Court’s ruling that neither the High Court nor this Court could determine whether the Government’s decision to issue the contested Notification was proper given that it fell under the purview of the 1960 Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act.

The Supreme Court recently vibrated the rights of animals under our Constitution, laws, culture, tradition, religion, and etiology among Indian citizens in the landmark case Animal Welfare Board of India vs. A. Nagaraja, raising awareness of animal law across the country. The Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act, 1960, which is a welfare law, was determined to be incompatible with the Tamil Nadu Regulation of Jallikattu Act, 2009, and was therefore declared to be unconstitutional for violating Article 254(1) of the Indian Constitution. In our opinion, the so-called tradition and culture are overshadowed or ignored by the PCA Act and welfare legislation. The way that Jallikattu and Bullock cart races are held has nothing to do with Tamil tradition or culture.

The Ministry of Environment and Climate Change, Fresh Delhi, released new notification on January 7th, 2016. The Preventing Cruelty to Animals Act of 1960, specifically names:

  1. Bears
  2. Monkeys
  3. Tigers
  4. Panthers
  5. Lions

With effect from the date of notification, bulls shall not be shown or trained as performance animals.

However, it should be noted that bulls may still be displayed or trained as performers at events like Jallikattu in Tamil Nadu and bullock cart races in Maharashtra, Karnataka, Punjab, Haryana, Kerala, and Gujarat by local traditions. Bullock cart races on a good track shouldn’t last longer than two kilometers at such an event, while Jallikattu should take place within a radial distance of 15 meters. The Animal Husbandry and Veterinary Department must make sure that bulls are in the good physical condition and that no medications are being administered improperly.

The Hon’ble Supreme Court ruled in Civil Appeal No. 5387 of 2014 that five freedoms should be completely protected during such activities in a ruling dated May 7, 2014. Additionally, it is stipulated that the District Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, the State Animal Welfare Board, or the District Authorities should properly monitor the Jallika bullock cart races to ensure that no unnecessary pain or suffering is inflicted on the animals during the event. There was a request for a stay on this Notification in multiple writ proceedings.

There was a request for a stay on this Notification in multiple writ proceedings. The petitioners argued that, despite the conditions that the Central Government recently added in a Notification dated January 7, 2016, treating bull rings in this way would not be justified in light of the compassion enshrined in the PCA Act and the fundamental obligations engrafted under Article 51A of the Indian Constitution. However, the Attorney General said that because the Animal Welfare Board and other petitioners’ fundamental rights remained unaffected, the writ petitions could not be upheld under Article 32 of the Indian Constitution.

The Court did not completely forbid the use of bulls in the A. Nagaraja Jallikattu case, but it did ask that precautions be taken to prevent cruelty to the bulls. The State also claimed that banning the century-old sport of Jallikattu might hurt culture. While Petitioners harshly attacked such sports, arguing that they should be outlawed since they are distinct from those involving living things. Finally, the Court ordered a stay on the Ministry of Environment, Forestry, and Climate Change’s January 7, 2016, notification.

According to the Supreme Court’s ruling in the review petition Nagaraja v. Animal Welfare Board of India, there was a direct conflict between the two statutes, and the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act, 1960, encompassed the entire subject. On the other hand, taming of bulls was permitted by the 2009 Tamil Nadu Regulation of Jallikattu Act. Since both were contradictory, they could not coexist in Nagaraja. The decision in A. Having considered all factors, the court dismissed the review petition because it found no overt errors in the analysis that would have justified exercising its review authority.

Judiciary on the protection of stray animals

The Supreme Court also ordered the Municipal Corporations to restrict wandering stray cattle roaming out of dairies and to remove unattended stray animals including cattle, bulls, dogs, and pigs from the city, according to the Milkmen Colony Vikash Samity vs. State of Rajasthan case. The High Court had issued directions, including moving dairies outside the city as stray animals were roaming freely in public places, including High Court corridors.

In the legal case Animal Welfare Board of India vs. People for Elimination of Stray Troubles, it was discussed how to strike a balance between killing dogs that pose a threat and treating animals cruelly. In response to decisions made by the High Courts of Bangalore, Kerala, and Karnataka, a Special Leave to Appeal was filed. The Kerala High Court issued a ruling in 2006 dismissing the writ suit that was brought to protect stray dogs. However, on November 4, 2015, a different Division Bench issued a decision, holding that The Animal Birth Control (Dogs) Rules, 2001 shall take precedence over the provisions of the Kerala Municipality Act, 1994, and the Kerala Panchayat Act, 1994.

The Court ruled that there can be no question that there must be sympathy for dogs and that they should not be killed arbitrarily, but there is no question that human lives must be saved and that no one should suffer from a dog attack as a result of an administrative error. One side made the case that dogs served human society in a variety of ways for many years and were legally and constitutionally protected by the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act and Article 51A of the Indian Constitution.

The lives of people cannot be sacrificed in the name of sympathy for dogs, the other side claims because a stray dog’s bite poses a threat to civilization. The Court decided the case while acknowledging that love for canines and respect for human lives, which was appropriately referred to as a wonderful gift of nature, can coexist peacefully. Furthermore, it was decided that all municipal corporations had a responsibility to build infrastructure by the law and regulations.

By the Supreme Court of India, local governments are required to provide a sufficient number of dog pounds, animal kennels, and shelters that may be run by animal welfare organizations. In addition, they must provide the necessary number of dog vans with ramps for the capture and transportation of street dogs, as well as one driver, two trained dog catchers, and an ambulance or clinic.

Wild animal conservation

The respondent in Regional Deputy Director vs. Zavaray S. Poonawala wanted to bring a trophy of a stuffed leopard that he had shot in Zambia into India. However, Schedule I of the Wild Life (Protection) Act of 1972 and the Convention of International Trade on Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora both listed the leopard as a protected and forbidden species (CITES). Respondent’s initial application to the Regional Deputy Director of Wild Life Protection was turned down because Respondent was required to obtain clearance and certificates from DGFT and CITES whenever necessary, and in the absence of any such permission, the Deputy Inspector General could not grant approval (Wild Life).

Later, the Joint Director of DGFT issued a license allowing “The applicant to get the clearance and certificate from DGFT and CITES Authorities wherever required.” Following the authorization, CITE S issued a letter stating concern about the circumstances behind the authorization. As stated in Appendix I of the CITES, CITES was required to control the export and import of species. The DGFT acted quickly and sent the respondent a “show cause notice” under Section 124 of the Customs Act of 1962 for the confiscation of the aforementioned trophy that it was attempting to import.

According to the respondent’s defense, the Chief Wildlife Warden was the appropriate party to issue approval under the Wild Life (Protection) Act of 1972. Respondent filed a writ petition in the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution challenging the legality of the letter from CITES as well as the “show cause notice” issued by the Customs Authorities under Section 124 of the Customs Act after the “show cause notice” was issued by the Customs Authorities. The DGFT and the Chief Wildlife Warden were the competent authorities to provide the approvals, and the respondent received the necessary clearances from both agencies, according to the High Court, which granted the writ petition on two points.

Second, according to the High Court, CITES’ only responsibility was to ensure that the imported item was not used for commercial gain. It had no jurisdiction to examine the permission issue. The Supreme Court claimed that the conditions for the DGFT and Chief Wildlife Warden’s licenses had not been met by the respondent. To oversee the worldwide trade in specific species subject to the restrictions outlined in the treaty, the international treaty known as CITES was created in Washington in 1973. This international Convention was created with the express purpose of uniting all signatory nations to prevent the extinction of animal species.

The effort needed to control international trade in wild plants and animals as well as international collaboration to protect some species from over-exploitation. To foster this kind of cooperation, CITES was created. As a result, the High Court’s decision was overturned because it was unconstitutional.

The Supreme Court authorized the height increase of the Sardar Sarovar Dam in the Narmada Bachao Andolan case without considering the impact of the high dam on the local population or nature. The effect of the reservoir on the flora and fauna of the surrounding area was not recognized by the court. However, in the Narmada Bachao Andolan Tennessee Valley case, when the US Supreme Court barred further reservoir construction because doing so would violate the Endangered Species Act of 1973 by driving the “snail darter” extinct, the American verdict from 1978 was not applied.

The mandates that all government organizations make sure that any action they sanction, finance, or carry out is not likely to affect the survival of a wild species that are endangered or threatened. Although the Tennessee Valley Authority had started building, it was also at this time that the Endangered Species Act of 1973 was passed, designating the snail darter as an endangered species. The most crucial aspect of the Narmada Bachao Andolan case was the absence of any endangered species in the construction zone and the absence of such legislation in India.

Wildlife fosters a sense of awe, claims the Supreme Court. The preservation of the natural balance is essential. In the end, by preserving these species, we conserve this lovely, sensitive, and wholly unique world that serves as our home.

“By protecting species, we also protect the fundamental commodities and services that support human health and wellbeing and enable us to live our lives: fresh air, clean water, food, fibers, medicines, energy, fertile soils, control of the climate, transportation, and recreational and spiritual values.”

Our goal is to find solutions that will preserve the amazing variety of life that exists on our planet.

Protection of animals in the zoo

The Preamble and Section 24 of the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act make it plain that the welfare of animals is the most important factor, according to the Supreme Court. In the case Union of India vs. Kamth Holiday Resorts Pvt. Ltd., where a Central Government officer leased out the snack bar in the forest, the Supreme Court supported the tourism industry but disagreed with the claim that the lease for a snack bar and restaurant was required for visiting tourists in the reserved forest.

The Court was not opposed to business or commercial development, but national parks and sanctuaries were established to protect wildlife, and it was crucial to maintain the area’s ecological balance. Tourism should be conducted in a way that does not inconvenience visitors to uphold all of the policy requirements set forth by the court in the Forest Friendly Camps Pvt. Ltd. case. The local community, local economy, and employees should all benefit from it.

Ownership of wild animals

No state, group, or individual may assert ownership over wild animals in a forest, according to the Supreme Court of India. According to Section 2(36) of the Wild Life (Protection) Act of 1972, a “natural animal” is any animal listed in Schedules I through IV that is found in a wild state of nature. According to Section 2(37), “Wild Life” refers to any animal, bee, butterfly, crustacean, fish, moth, or land flora that is a component of any habitat. Except as permitted by Sections 11 and 12, Section 9 forbids hunting the wild species listed in Schedules I, II, III, and IV.

A person is required to make a declaration under Section 40 of the Act, inventories may be prepared and inquiries may be made by the Chief Wild Life Warden under Section 41, and certificates may be issued under Section 42, but no state or others are granted ownership of wild animals. While no state may claim ownership of wild animals, it is the responsibility of the state to protect and conserve them for the sake of the nation’s ecological and environmental security.

Conclusion

Since India’s independence, the Supreme Court has continuously worked to conserve the nation’s natural resources. Again, against the backdrop of growing global awareness in the 1970s, the court made significant efforts to preserve the environment and wild creatures in the wild. However, the most recent Supreme Court trend evolved animals not to defend humans but for nature itself. Regarding this, the Union of India v. Wild Centre for Environmental Law, The Thirumulpad v. Union of India, and the more recent T. N. Godavarman cases, which marked the transition in India from anthropocentric to ecocentric environmentalism, are significant. The Supreme Court’s ruling in Animal Welfare Board of India vs. A. Nagaraja added a new dimension to animal law in this nation. As a result, the judiciary, in particular the High Courts of the states, are now following the trend of protecting animals from slaughter, experiments, entertainment, trade, and other inhumane activities along with its explanations for abiding by the law.

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