In a significant move that could reshape India's constitutional framework regarding ministerial accountability, Home Minister Amit Shah has introduced three crucial bills to the Lok Sabha during the ongoing parliamentary session. These legislative proposals, dated in August 19, 2025, aim to establish unprecedented mechanisms for the removal of high-ranking elected officials from their ministerial positions under specific circumstances.
The three bills under consideration are:
- The Constitution (130th Amendment) Bill, 2025
- The Jammu and Kashmir Reorganisation (Amendment) Bill, 2025
- The Government of Union Territories (Amendment) Bill, 2025
The proposed legislation establishes a stringent automatic removal mechanism for senior political figures. Under these provisions, several categories of high-ranking officials would face mandatory removal from their ministerial positions if they meet specific detention criteria. The scope of coverage includes Prime Ministers, Chief Ministers, and Ministers across States and Union Territories. The initiation for removal is clearly defined that any official who faces arrest and remains in continuous custody for 30 consecutive days on charges that carry potential imprisonment of five years or more will be automatically removed from office by the 31st day.
The removal authority varies depending on the official's position. The President holds the power to remove the Prime Minister, Chief Ministers possess authority over State Ministers in their jurisdiction, Governors can remove Chief Ministers, and Lieutenant-Governors have similar powers over Chief Ministers in Union Territories.
Constitutional Justification
The government's rationale for these amendments centres on maintaining constitutional morality and public trust. According to the statement of objects and reasons circulated among Lok Sabha members, elected representatives are expected to represent the hopes and aspirations of the Indian population. The legislation emphasises that these officials should excel in political interests and focus exclusively on public welfare.
The government argues that ministers facing serious criminal allegations while in custody may compromise constitutional morality and delay good governance principles. This situation, they contend, ultimately erodes the constitutional trust that citizens place in their elected representatives. The absence of existing constitutional provisions for removing ministers under such circumstances has prompted these amendments to Articles 75, 164, and 239AA of the Constitution.
Territorial Application and Legal Framework
The legislative framework operates across different territorial jurisdictions through a three-pronged approach. The constitutional amendment bill will govern the entire nation except for the union territories of Jammu and Kashmir and Puducherry. These two territories have distinct governance structures established under the Jammu and Kashmir Reorganization Act 2019 and the Government of Union Territories Act 1963, respectively, necessitating separate legislative amendments.
The two additional bills specifically address the removal processes for Chief Ministers and Ministers in Puducherry and Jammu and Kashmir, ensuring comprehensive coverage across all administrative territories.
First Concern: Selective Application to Ministerial Positions
A fundamental inconsistency emerges in the proposed amendments' selective focus on ministerial positions while leaving legislative membership unaffected. Under these provisions, a detained minister loses their ministerial role but retains their position in Parliament or state legislative assemblies.
This distinction appears contradictory to the stated objective that elected representatives should embody public hopes and aspirations while acting in the public interest. If the underlying principle is that officials should maintain impeccable character and conduct, the differentiation between ministers and legislators lacks a logical foundation.
Furthermore, if the practical concern is that ministerial work suffers due to official unavailability, similar considerations apply to legislative representation. Constituencies would effectively lose their parliamentary or assembly representatives during detention periods, creating a representation vacuum.
Second Concern: Arbitrary Distinction Between Offence Categories
The amendments' restriction to serious charges (crimes punishable by five years or more imprisonment) appears logically flawed. From a practical standpoint, detention for any alleged offence would prevent an official from effectively discharging their duties, regardless of the offence's perceived severity.
This arbitrary classification between "serious" and "non-serious" offences undermines the legislation's stated purpose. If unavailability due to detention is the primary concern driving these amendments, the distinction based on potential sentence length serves no logical purpose and may create unnecessary legal complications.
Third Concern: Fundamental Shift in Disqualification Doctrine
These amendments represent a dramatic departure from India's existing disqualification framework, which traditionally requires conviction in a court of law before removing someone from legislative membership and, consequently, ministerial positions. The proposed changes essentially reverse the presumption of innocence until proven guilty.
This shift is particularly concerning given the potential for political manipulation. In India's complex political landscape, the possibility of fabricated or politically motivated charges cannot be dismissed. The amendments could inadvertently provide tools for political persecution rather than genuine accountability measures.
Parliamentary Passage: Political and Legal Requirements
The three bills face different parliamentary approval requirements due to their distinct legal nature. Bills 2 and 3, being statutory amendments to existing laws, require only simple majority approval in Parliament, making their passage relatively straightforward in the current political environment.
However, Bill 1 faces more stringent requirements as a constitutional amendment. Article 368 of the Constitution mandates special majority requirements; a simple majority of the entire House strength plus two-thirds of members present and voting must approve the amendment.
The current political landscape may influence the bills' success differently. While the statutory amendments (Bills 2 and 3) are likely to pass given the government's parliamentary strength, the constitutional amendment faces higher hurdles due to its special majority requirement.
The political implications extend beyond mere numbers, as these amendments could set precedents affecting opposition parties' leaders as well. This reality may influence voting patterns and political calculations across party lines.
Balancing Accountability and Constitutional Safeguards
These proposed amendments raise fundamental questions about the balance between political accountability and constitutional protections. While the intention to maintain high standards of conduct among elected officials is commendable, the execution appears problematic on multiple fronts.
The legislation's selective application, arbitrary offence categorisation, reversal of the presumption of innocence, and failure to address underlying judicial systemic issues suggest that more comprehensive reform is needed. Rather than quick-fix constitutional amendments, India would benefit more from systematic judicial reforms that ensure speedy, fair resolution of cases involving high-ranking officials.
The true test of these amendments will be whether they enhance public trust in democratic institutions or inadvertently provide tools for political manipulation. As Parliament deliberates on these crucial bills, the focus should remain on strengthening democratic accountability while preserving fundamental constitutional safeguards that protect both the innocent and the integrity of the democratic process itself.
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