In the winter of 2025, as Bihar’s Assembly results rolled in, the political battle shifted from rallies to rumors. A senior Rashtriya Janata Dal leader claimed that every Electronic Voting Machine used in the state carried 25,000 votes already stored inside, arguing that this invisible “head start” had stolen at least 25 seats from his party. Within hours, news channels, WhatsApp forwards, and Instagram reels turned the charge into a viral narrative of “rigged machines” and “stolen mandates.”
The Election Commission of India responded with unusual force. In a detailed public statement, it dismissed the allegation as “technically impossible” and “procedurally false,” pointing out that Indian EVMs have no internet, Wi‑Fi, Bluetooth, or external connectivity, always begin at zero for every candidate, and must pass a mandatory mock poll in front of party agents before any real vote is cast. The Commission also highlighted statutory documents signed by the RJD’s own polling agents—mock poll certificates, Form 17C, and sealing records—with no recorded objections, arguing that these very signatures contradicted the claim of pre-loaded votes.
Hundreds of kilometres away in West Bengal, another kind of electoral anxiety was taking shape. Here, the controversy centred not on machines but on names: allegations of fake voter cards, duplicate or suspicious entries in electoral rolls, and identical EPIC numbers appearing across states. As the Election Commission pushed through revision exercises and special verification drives, activists warned that flawed clean‑up operations or scams riding on these drives—such as fraudsters misusing “SIR” or OTP‑based verification messages—could end up deleting genuine voters or manipulating who stayed on the list.
Together, Bihar’s “25,000 pre-loaded votes” and Bengal’s “fake voters and vanishing names” tell a deeper story about India’s elections in the age of virality. In a democracy with more than 900 million eligible voters, the real question is no longer just whether EVMs are secure or rolls are accurate. It is this: what is proven fact, what is political myth, and what lies in the dangerous grey zone between them—where half-truths, misread data, and emotionally charged content spread faster than any official clarification, slowly eroding public trust in the very act of voting.
Agenda
- Introduction: Viral distrust around Indian elections post-Bihar 2025 and West Bengal voter fraud claims
- Section 1: Bihar’s “Pre-Loaded EVM” Storm — Allegations and technology facts
- Section 2: VVPAT — The paper trail validating electronic votes
- Section 3: CCTV, strongrooms, and layered security protocols safeguarding EVM custody
- Section 4: Real voter identity challenges — Electoral roll manipulation in West Bengal
- Section 5: The new battlefield — Social media reels, misinformation, and scams like SIR OTP fraud
- Section 6: Trust and transparency — Balancing myth busting with acknowledgement of weaknesses
- Conclusion: Democracy’s resilience depends on secure systems and informed, vigilant citizens
Bihar’s “Pre-Loaded EVM” Storm: Claim vs. Code
- The Allegation
Bihar’s 2025 Assembly election did not end at the counting centres; it spilt onto phone screens and social feeds. In the days after the results, senior RJD leader Jagdanand Singh alleged that every Electronic Voting Machine used in the state already contained 25,000 votes before polling began, arguing that such “pre-fed” numbers had robbed his party of dozens of seats and distorted the popular mandate. The claim was quickly clipped into short videos, turned into Instagram explainers and partisan reels, and circulated in WhatsApp groups as proof that the game had been “fixed” long before the first voter pressed a button.
This script felt familiar. Whenever outcomes disappoint, sections of losing parties across India have repeatedly blamed EVMs rather than strategy, candidate selection, or local anti-incumbency. From earlier Assembly contests to national elections, allegations of “hacked machines” or “remote control from Delhi” have surfaced after tight results, even when no formal objections were recorded during polling or counting. In Bihar, too, RJD leaders coupled the “25,000 votes” theory with a broader narrative that EVMs inherently favour the ruling side, reigniting an old debate every time the scoreboard goes against them.
- How an EVM Actually Works
Behind these dramatic claims lies a much more prosaic reality. An Indian EVM is designed to be a simple, stand‑alone counting device, closer to a sealed calculator than to a connected computer. Before polling day, every machine is “zeroised”. When it is switched on in the presence of officials and party agents, the display shows zero votes for every candidate, and this status is recorded in statutory forms that all sides can inspect and sign.
The voting day itself begins with a mandatory mock poll at each booth. Polling agents or Booth Level Agents (BLAs) from all major parties cast a set of test votes and then watch as the Presiding Officer generates a mock result from the machine. Only if the number of votes recorded for each candidate matches what the agents themselves cast do they sign the mock poll certificate; once signed, the machine is reset back to zero and sealed for actual polling to begin. Throughout the day, every press of a button adds exactly one vote to a secure internal memory, with the total capacity of a control unit typically in the range of a few thousand votes—sufficient for the registered voters on that booth, but nowhere near the “25,000 votes in a single EVM” alleged in Bihar, which is mathematically impossible given both design and legal turnout limits.
Crucially, the EVM is intentionally built as a single‑purpose device: it does not run a general operating system, cannot receive software updates in the field, and has no ports for external drives or networks to plug into. The only thing it is meant to do is display a candidate list, accept button presses, and store the resulting vote counts in non‑volatile memory until they are read on the counting day. This stripped‑down architecture, combined with fixed capacities and observable procedures like mock polls and sealing, is precisely why India’s poll body insists that “pre-loading” thousands of invisible votes into each machine is not just illegal but structurally incompatible with how the hardware and process are put together.
- “Unhackable from Outside”: What That Really Means
Supporters of EVMs often say the machines are “unhackable,” but what they usually mean is more specific: they are not reachable from outside the polling environment. Indian EVMs have no internet, no Wi‑Fi, no Bluetooth, no SIM cards and no cellular modules; they are not connected to any server before, during, or after polling. When voters cast their ballots, the control unit and ballot unit are linked only by a physical cable and powered by a battery; there is simply no pathway for remote code, malware, or external commands to enter the system during an election.
Physical tampering is controlled through a different set of defences. Each unit is sealed with tamper‑evident paper and plastic seals, signed by party agents; if a case is opened, the broken seal is visible and can trigger rejection of that machine. Machines are logged, transported under guard, and stored in strongrooms where access is tightly regulated and monitored; any discrepancy in serial numbers, broken seals, or paperwork can become grounds for complaint or legal challenge. At the same time, independent security researchers and critics remind that no electronic device is abstractly “perfectly secure”: if a determined insider at the design or manufacturing stage colludes to alter chips or code, some forms of compromise might be theoretically possible. Yet, despite multiple petitions and political allegations over two decades, no court‑accepted, large‑scale case has demonstrated that such insider manipulation has altered an Indian election result, and repeated technical and procedural audits have so far reinforced the official claim that field‑level hacking or remote interference is not supported by evidence.
- Why Such Claims Go Viral Anyway
Given this dense web of procedures, seals, and checks, it may seem puzzling that a line like “every EVM had 25,000 votes stored inside” can gain more traction than pages of technical clarification. The answer lies less in circuitry and more in psychology. Elections are high-stakes, zero-sum contests where one side’s setback is the other’s celebration; for leaders facing angry cadres and disappointed supporters, blaming a mysterious machine can be far easier than admitting misreading the public mood, mishandling alliances, or running a weak ground campaign. A narrative of “we were cheated” keeps the base energised, preserves the leader’s image, and turns defeat into a moral victory—especially when framed as a fight against an unjust system.
Social media supercharges this instinct. Platforms reward outrage, simplicity, and certainty: a 20‑second reel shouting “rigged EVMs stole 25,000 votes per booth” is infinitely more viral than a five‑minute explainer on mock poll forms, randomisation, and VVPAT reconciliation. Visuals of machines being moved, half-heard rumours from counting centres, and old videos clipped out of context can be stitched together to tell a compelling story of conspiracy, even when official records signed by party agents contradict that story. In this environment, phrases like “magic numbers,” “secret chips,” or “algorithm se chhed-chhad” travel faster than any election handbook, ensuring that myths about EVMs continue to mutate and spread long after a particular allegation has been formally debunked.
VVPAT: The Paper Trail People Forget
- How VVPAT Works
The Voter Verifiable Paper Audit Trail (VVPAT) is a small printer attached to the EVM, introduced to add a physical, voter‑visible record to an electronic vote. When a voter presses a button on the EVM, the VVPAT instantly prints a slip showing the candidate’s name and symbol behind a glass window for about seven seconds, after which the slip automatically drops into a sealed box separate from the EVM’s electronic memory.
This slip cannot be taken home; it stays locked inside the VVPAT box and can later be used to verify that the electronic count matches the paper trail. The design gives each voter a brief but concrete confirmation that the vote recorded on the machine is the same as the vote they intended to cast.
- The Audit Mechanism
After polling, a sample of polling stations in every constituency is selected—by rule, a fixed number like five per Assembly segment—to undergo manual cross‑verification. In these booths, officials count the VVPAT slips by hand and compare them with the corresponding EVM totals, in the presence of candidates or their agents.
Across multiple elections, this process has involved tallying slips from tens of thousands of machines and crores of individual votes, without any systematic mismatch large enough to force a full constituency‑wide recount or cancellation. For many statisticians and administrators, this consistency is a strong indicator that the electronic results and paper trail move in lockstep, even though several parties and experts continue to press for larger VVPAT samples or risk‑limiting audits as part of an ongoing debate on how much verification is enough to satisfy every stakeholder.
CCTV, Strongrooms, and the Invisible Architecture of Security
- From Booth to Strongroom
Once polling ends, each EVM is closed in full public view. Poll officials seal the control unit and VVPAT with paper seals and tags, and party agents are invited to sign on these seals so they can later recognise any tampering. The sealed machines are then transported under police or central force escort to designated strongrooms—locked, guarded buildings where polled EVMs remain until counting day, usually under 24×7 CCTV coverage and a double‑lock system.
At many locations, representatives of candidates or recognised parties are allowed to sit outside these strongrooms and keep round‑the‑clock watch, and any opening or closing of the strongroom is done with prior notice, video recording, and the presence of party observers. Parties can also seek access to CCTV footage or raise objections if they notice irregular movement, making custody a jointly watched, not secret, process.
- Multi-Layer Checks and Randomisation
The security architecture starts even before polling day with “double randomisation.” First, district officials randomly allocate available EVMs to constituencies; then, in a second draw conducted in front of party representatives, specific machines are randomly assigned to individual polling stations so that nobody can predict in advance which unit will go to which booth. Alongside machine randomisation, polling staff are also shuffled across areas, reducing the scope for any pre‑planned collusion tied to a particular device or location.
On polling day, indelible ink is applied to each voter’s finger to prevent multiple voting, and every critical step—mock poll, start and close of poll, sealing, deposit in the strongroom, and final counting—is documented on statutory forms that carry signatures of the Presiding Officer and the polling agents. Before counting begins, these same agents can inspect machine numbers and seals again, and if anything appears inconsistent with the records, they can demand clarification or lodge written objections on the spot.
- Limits and Blind Spots
Even with this elaborate framework, practice on the ground is not always perfect. Reports and observers occasionally flag issues such as CCTV cameras placed at poor angles, incomplete videography, lax sealing at smaller warehouses, or delays in updating movement registers and informing parties about warehouse openings. These are logistical and human shortcomings—about discipline, training, and infrastructure—rather than evidence of hidden “backdoors” in EVM hardware or software, yet they understandably feed public suspicion when left unexplained.
For a healthy democracy, it is essential that such lapses are treated transparently: documented, admitted, and corrected through clearer instructions, stricter enforcement, and better public communication, so that necessary criticism strengthens procedures instead of being diverted into unfounded theories about secret chips and invisible hands.
Beyond Machines: Real Voter-Identity and Roll Problems
- Voter Fraud Is Not a Myth – But It’s Mostly About Rolls, Not Chips
While accusations of EVM hacking lack hard proof, voter fraud linked to electoral rolls and identity remain documented challenges. Crucially, vote count manipulation (EVM tampering) is different from voter-roll manipulation, which relates to who appears or disappears as eligible voters on official lists.
- West Bengal: Fake Voters, Duplicate EPICs, and Real Investigations
In West Bengal, election authorities identified more than 100 fictitious voter entries during sample checks in districts like South and North 24 Parganas, prompting wider probes and disciplinary action against officials. Officials were also suspended and FIRs filed after some allegedly shared electoral-roll system logins with unauthorised individuals, enabling wrongful voter additions in certain constituencies.
Political parties, including TMC, BJP, and Congress, have accused each other and sometimes the Election Commission of permitting bogus voters or “EPIC scams.” The ECI clarified that identical EPIC numbers across states do not necessarily mean duplicate voters, as each voter votes only at their assigned booth, but acknowledged that earlier, there were lakhs of duplicate or invalid entries cleaned through centralised revision processes.
- The Ground-Level Reality: Forms, Documents, and Human Error
Common causes of roll problems include frequent migration, weak documentation among poor or border communities, and overworked or inadequately trained officials, like Booth Level Officers and data entry operators. Patterns from investigations reveal repeated use of the same supporting documents for multiple fictitious applicants, unauthorised access to voter database software, and delays in deleting deceased or relocated voters from rolls.
These administrative gaps create vulnerabilities where small-scale fraud or manipulation can occur—not by hacking EVMs, but by quietly shaping the voter list, allowing some to register multiple times or enabling bogus registrations, which impacts electoral fairness.
The New Battlefield: Reels, Rumours, and Broken Communication
- From 60-Second Reels to 6-Hour Counting
In today’s digital age, complex electoral processes get compressed into short, punchy social media reels with catchphrases like “unhackable vaults,” “rigged from the start,” or “one man, 10,000 cards,” fueling both blind faith and deep suspicion. Most voters never witness mock polls, strongroom security checks, or see official circulars and technical documents; instead, their primary exposure is through these simplified, sometimes sensational, digital snippets, which often omit crucial context and nuance.
- The SIR and OTP Scam: When Fraud Rides on Confusion
During West Bengal’s Special Intensive Revision (SIR) of voter lists, fraudsters posing as election officials called citizens demanding one-time passwords (OTPs) under the false pretext of “SIR verification” or voter list corrections. This scam tricked many into divulging sensitive information, prompting stern public warnings from the Election Commission of India (ECI) and West Bengal’s Chief Electoral Officer, stating that neither the ECI nor state officials ever request OTPs for any voter list process. Complaints are encouraged through official phone numbers and WhatsApp channels to protect voters from such cyber fraud.
- When Parties Weaponise Errors
Genuine mistakes—like duplicate EPICs or erroneous voter additions—often become ammunition in a heated political battlefield. One party brands such errors as an “epic scam,” another calls it a “witch-hunt,” while others blame “foreign infiltrators.” This cacophony makes it harder for ordinary citizens to distinguish between verified administrative lapses, correctable technical glitches, and exaggerated or fabricated conspiracy theories, eroding trust in the electoral system as a whole.
Trust, Transparency, and the Real Democratic Risk
- Machines vs Minds
The greatest threat to Indian elections today may not be tampered EVMs but distorted public perceptions. While machines can be designed as simple, sealed, and auditable systems, citizens’ beliefs are vulnerable to rumours, misinformation, deep fakes, and selective facts. When people believe “nothing will be fair,” some may disengage from voting, reduce participation, or become susceptible to anti-democratic ideologies.
- Busting Myths Without Denying Loopholes
Evidence so far strongly supports that India’s EVM+VVPAT system, secured by multiple physical and procedural safeguards, has not caused any proven large-scale election tampering. Yet, weaknesses in electoral rolls—such as fake entries, delayed verifications, and occasional local collusion—persist and require ongoing audit and accountability. Blanket denial of concerns alienates sceptical voters, while exaggeration of administrative errors as conspiracy harms trust without constructive outcomes.
- What Needs to Change – Concrete Ideas
- The Election Commission of India (ECI) should communicate more proactively and in simple language about EVM design, VVPAT audit procedures, randomisation methods, and error-correction protocols.
- Data on electoral roll corrections—including duplicates removed, new registrations, complaint volumes, and resolutions—should be regularly published for transparency.
- Training for officials managing voter databases must be strengthened, with strict penalties for breaches such as sharing login credentials or bypassing verification.
- Collaboration among educators, civil society groups, and fact-check organisations is critical to teach citizens digital verification skills and improve public awareness about elections.
These steps will help rebuild trust and ensure democracy survives not just on machines but in the minds of voters.
Conclusion – When Truth Travels Faster Than Rumour
The swirling images of Bihar’s viral claims about “pre-loaded EVMs” and West Bengal’s harrowing exposure of fake voter cards and OTP scams illustrate the twin battles at the heart of Indian elections today: one fought on the machines themselves, the other in the minds and screens of millions. India boasts some of the world’s most robust, tamper-resistant voting machines, fortified by layers of physical and procedural security. Yet, it also wades through one of the most intense information wars anywhere, where misinformation spreads far faster than official clarifications.
Democracy will endure only if two essentials go hand in hand. First, the system must keep evolving—improving the technical and administrative integrity of machines, voter rolls, and the entire electoral ecosystem. Second, citizens must learn to question loudly but verify patiently, supporting transparent debate without falling prey to convenient lies or unsubstantiated conspiracy theories.
India does not just need secure EVMs; it needs citizens whose minds are secured against fear, fakery, and convenient falsehoods—the true foundation of a thriving democracy.
Disclaimer
This article is intended for informational and educational purposes only. While every effort has been made to ensure accuracy, the author and publisher do not take responsibility for any errors or omissions, nor any consequences of relying on this content. The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of any institution or organisation. Readers are encouraged to verify information from official sources and exercise critical judgment.
References:
Election Commission of India official info on EVM and VVPAT security:
Bihar 2025 election and RJD’s pre-loaded EVM claims coverage:
West Bengal voter roll controversies and investigations:
SIR OTP scam public warnings and advisories: